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Full text of "Action Report, Iwo Jima, February, 1945"

COMMANDER TASK FORCE FIFTY-TWO 



Instructors Reading .his Document 
Sign Below (File No. 
N«me Data 



File: Al6-3(2) 
Serial: 0013 



OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE 
Fleet Post Office 
San Francisco, California 



7 March 1945 



From: 
To: 

Subject : 



Reference : 



Commander Amphibious Group ONE. 
Distribution. 



Report of Operations of Task 
Campaign from 10 February to 
Deletions in. 






%xy $m <W0 JBIA 
K) 19 February - 



(a) CTF 52 Secret File Al6r.3(2), serial 009 of 22 February 
1945. 



1. Upon receipt of this letter, all Commands designated as 

holders of the subject report will delete the code words appearing in the 
following pages: 

A-26, in entry for 0757 

A-27, in entry for 0856 

A-28, in entry for 1056 

A-30, in entry for 1421 

A-32, in entry for 1720 and 1817 

A-34, in entry for 0641 

A-44> in entry for 1825 

D-9> subparagraph (~£) 9 second line. 



W.H.P. BLANDY. 

Distribution : 

Same as for Subject Report, reference (a). 



L.D. REEDY, / 
Flag Secretary/ 



£1 mm 



O/Vj //3Y 



tJUW 2 1 1965 



OFFICE OF THE COMViANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE 
Fleet Post Office 
San Francisco, California ? r 



File: Al6-3(2) 
Serial: 909 — 



DC 



6\*'NG?ilDED AT 3 YEAR IN I SSvffi^ A " uaA ^ 1945 




. " - T .T Y^Ai 
DGD DIR 5200.10 



From: 



To: 
Via: 



Commander Task Force 52 (Amphibious Support Force) 
(Rear Admiral W.H.P. Blandyy USN, Commander 
Amphibious Group ONE, U. S.S. ESTES, Flagship). 
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. 
(1) Commander Task Force 51 (Commander Joint 
Expeditionary Force and Commander Amphibious 
Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet. 
Commander FIFTH Fleet. 



(2) 
(3) 



Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and 
Pacific Ocean Areas. 



Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA. Campaign 

from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which 
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; 
Report of. 

Enclosures: (A) Chronology of Operations. 

(B) Comments on Intelligence. 

(cj> Comments on Ships 1 Gunfire Support. 

(D) Report on Support Aircraft Operations. 

(E) Comments on UDT Operations. 

(F) Comments on Mine sweeping. 

(G) Comments on Battle Damage. 

(H) Comments on Medical Facilities and Casualties. 

(I) Comments on Weather. 

(J) Comments on Communications. 



1. The function of this command during subject period 

was to exercise general supervision over, and coordinate, all acti- 
vities at the objective prior to the arrival of the landing and 
assault elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force on DOG Day (19 
February). The forces participating in these pre-landing activities 
of Task Force 52 were: 

(a) The Gunfire and Covering Force, Task Force 54> under command 
of Rear Admiral B.J. Rodger s, USN (Commander Amphibious Group 
ELEVEN), consisting of 6 OBB, 4 GA, 1 CL, 15 DD, 1 DM, and 

1 AVD. 

(b) The Support Carrier Group, Task Group 52,2 under command of 
Rear Admiral C.T. Durgin, USN (Commander Escort Carriers, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet), consisting of ' 8>CVE, 5 DD and 9 DE. 



Operations of Task Force 4 Jijfi i%, |ko J IMA Campaign* ( } a 
from 10 February to 0600(li^4#^l^ > ^^>T^<*hji &» 
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; 
Report of. 



(c) The Mine Group, Task Group 52.3, under command of Rear 
Admiral A. Sharp, USN (Commander Minecraft, U.S. Pacific 
Fleet), consisting of seven Sweep Units comprising 43 mine- 
craft plus 8 LCP(R) l s rigged for shallow water minesweeping, 

(d) The Underwater Demolition Group, Task Group 52.4, under 
command of Captain B.H. Hanlon, USN (Commander Underwater 
Demolition Teams, U,3. Pacific Fleet), consisting of 6 APD's 
carrying UDT's Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15, 

(e) Gunboat Support Units One and Two, Task Units 52.5.1 &nd 
52,5.2, under command of Commander M.J. Malanaphy, USN 
(Commander LCI Flotilla Three), consisting of 1 LCI(L) and 
12 LCI(G)»s. 

(f) Land-based heavy bombers of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific 
Ocean Areas, Task Force 93, delivered air strikes under the 
control of Commander Air Support Control Unit, Task Group 
52.10, Captain E.C. Parker, USN, embarked in the flagship of 
Commander Task Force 52, when weather permitted, 

2. The mission of forces under this command was to effect 
the maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and defenses of 

r/JO J IMA by aircraft and surface ship bombardment, minesweeping, and 
underwater demolition, during the period D -3 to D -1, inclusive, 
in order to facilitate its capture, 

3. Intensive planning by this command for this campaign 
commenced on 15 October at PEARL HARBOR. It was greatly facilitated 
by the presence in this location, during the early period of the 
planning stage, of Commander FIFTH Fleet (Admiral R.A. Spruance, 
USN.), Commander Joint Expeditionary Force (CTF 51, Vice Admiral 
R.K. Turner, USN, Commander Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet), 
Commander Attack Force (CTF 53, Rear Admiral H.W. Hill, USN, Com- 
mander Amphibious Group TWO), Commander Expeditionary Troops (CTF 
56, Lieutenant General H.M, Smith, U3MC), Commander Landing Force 
(CTG 56,1, Major General H. Schmidt, USMC), CTG 52,3 and CTG 52.4. 
Joint conferences were held and members of the staff of this command 
worked continuously with the staffs of the above commands . 

4. CTF 52 issued his Operation Plan No. A101-45, on 1 
January, 1945, and sailed for ULITHI on 12 January in his flagship, 
ESTES, accompanied by NEVADA and IDAHO, the transport ADMIRAL COONTZ, 



Subject : 




K * * * 




Subject : 



OperationsLdf Tajk Force 52 in the- rfO^qp Campaign 
from 10 Fclkta^ £o £6GQ^^19^Bruary, at which 
time CTF 53Tassumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; 
Report of. 



and screening ships, in accordance with CTF 52 Movement Order No, 
A102-45, and arrived ULITHI on 23 January (East Longitude Date). 
Gunnery and other training exercises were held enroute. Intensive 
drills for the Staff and Air Support Control Unit were conducted, 
in the form of battle problems covering each period of the operation 
at IWO JIM. 

5. Prior to departure from PEARL HaRBOR, it had been 

expected that ships and commanders of TF 54, TG 52.2, TG 52.4, and 
Gunboat Support Units One and Two would be assembled at ULITHI by 
24-27 January, and that the period from their arrival to 10 Feb- 
ruary, the date of departure, could be devoted to intensive briefing 
and conferences, training, and rehearsals, as well as logistic re- 
plenishment. While CTF 52 was enroute ULITHI it became apparent 
that delay in releasing certain ships' then engaged in operations 
against LUZON, as well as damage sustained by these ships, would not 
only prevent their assembly at ULITHI, but would prevent their par- 
ticipation in operations at IWO JIMA, and that extensive changes to 
existing plans, particularly the ships 1 gunfire support plan, would 
be necessary. Furthermore, it developed that Vice Admiral J.B. 
Olendorf, USN (Commander Battleship Squadron ONE), would not command 
TF 54. Commander FIFTH Fleet's Operation Plan 13-44 'originally pro- 
vided that heavy ships of TF 54 would consist of CALIFORNIA, NEVADA, 
MISSISSIPPI, NM MEXICO, WEST VIRGINIA, COLORADO, TEXAS , LOUISVILLE, 
PORTLAND, INDIANAPOLIS, TUSCALOOSA, CHESTER, PBNSACOLA and SALT LAKE 
CITY. When it became apparent that participation of many of these 
ships would not be possible, CTF 51 revised his plan to include, for 
the period D -3 to D -1, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, TENNESSEE, 
IDAHO, NEVADA, NM YORK, TEXAS, ARKANSAS, CHESTER, PENSACOLA, ShLT 
LAKE CITY, and TUSCALOOSA*. He reprinted the intricate and detailed 
schedules of ships' gunfire on this basis, and advance copies were 
delivered to CTF 52 on 28 January by Rear Admiral Rodgers, who flew 
out from PEARL HARBOR to become CTF 54 in place of Vice Admiral 
Olendorf. By the time these changed plans arrived, however, Com- 
mander FIFTH Fleet had indicated that NORTH CAROLINA, and WASHINGTON 
would not be available until DOG Day, but that VICK3BURG would join 
TF 54 at SAIPAN. As CTF 51 was now at sea, and there was not time 
for him to issue further changes upon his arrival at ENIWETOK, CTF 
52 at once prepared pen and ink changes to the Ships Gunfire Support 
Plan Annex of CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44 to cover these changes in task 
organization, informed CTF 51 that copies of these changes would 
reach him at ENIWETOK on 6 February, and that meanwhile fire support 
ships present at ULITHI would be briefed in accordance therewith. 



Subject : 




CTF 51 approved the proposed changes. Advance copies of Change No. 
3 to his OpPlan, covering the latest changes in task organization, 
were received on 6 February and delivered to ships of TF 51 present 
at ULITHI, forthwith, as well as to such ships of TF 58 as might be 
called upon for fire support duties. In the meanwhile communications 
training of fire support ships and support aircraft, and two re- 
hearsals of UDT operations, the second including actual fire support, 
were conducted. Conferences were held with CTG 52,2, CTG 52.3 , CTG 
52.4, and on 8 February there was a general conference and briefing 
attended by Commanding Officers of all ships present of TF 52, TF 54, 
possible fire support ships of TF 58, and many of the higher echelons 
of these commands. The Staff Gunnery Officer and Intelligence Of- 
ficer had in the interim briefed gunnery officers and top and air 
spotters of fire support ships. Ships of the Support Carrier Group 
and carriers of TF 58 were also briefed. Emphasis was placed upon 
the necessity for confining the preliminary bombardment to deliberate 
destructive fire against installations which would threaten planes, 
ships, and the actual landing. In view of the great number of def- 
ense installations, time and ammunition did not permit fire at tar- 
gets of lower priority. This subject is treated more fully in en- 
closures (C) and (D). Three additional CVE's were assigned to TG 
52.2 prior to departure of ships of TF's 52 and 54 on 10 February. 

6. Passage from ULITHI to SAIPAN was uneventful. t Feb- 
ruary 12 and 13 were devoted to a rehearsal of DOG Day operations on 
each day, delivery of plans and orders to NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, VICKS- 
BURG, TERRY and MULLANY which joined at SAIPAN, and fueling screen- 
ing vessels. A party was sent aboard to brief the NEW YORK. It was 
possible to bring gunnery officers and spotters of TENNESSEE and 
VICKSBURG on board ESTES for briefing which included demonstration 

of specific enemy installations in areas of responsibility of these 
ships by means of photographs^ Passage from SAIPAN to IWO JIMA, in 
accordance with CTF 52 Movement Order No. A105-45, was uneventful. 

7. The general plan of operations at TWO JIM for 16 
February consisted, briefly, of sweeping adjacent waters to within 
approximately 6000 yards of the shore, gunfire at long (above 12000 
yards) and medium (from 6000 to 12000 yards) ranges with air spot 
for destruction of defenses and silencing of enemy batteries, air 
strikes by support carrier aircraft and land-based heavy bombers of 
TF 93, examination of beaches from the air by special hydrographic 
observers, aircraft photo missions in late morning and afternoon, 
installation of a navigational light on HIGASHI IWA, a small rocky 





Subject: Operationl^ot^'&db Force,524j&J$e Jljg |pA Campaign 

from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which 
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; 
Report of. 

islet about 3000 yards to the eastward of P?0 JIMA, and early 
morning and late afternoon fighter sweeps against CHICHI JIMA to 
destroy planes and ships or boats which might interfere with the 
operation. Fire support ships were to follow minesweeping units in 
towards the island and then work in their assigned sectors inside a 
screen of destroyers and APD's which enclosed the island area. APD's 
were to conduct visual reconnaissance of beaches, but not to approach 
closer than 3000 yards. This plan was followed, except that low 
ceiling and intermittent showers prevented the photo mission, the 
morning strike against CHICHI JIMA, the strike of land-based bombers, 
and severely handicapped the spotting planes. CTF 52, in order to 
prevent waste of ammunition, directed ships to fire only when ef- 
ficient air spot was available. It was not possible to follow the 
planned firing schedules, and instead each ship fired in its assign- 
ed area of responsibility whenever weather permitted. Two enemy 
luggers were discovered early in the morning by support aircraft 
about 30 miles west of SURIBACHI MOUNTAIN. They were attacked and 
left burning and in a sinking condition, with crews abandoning ship. 
In the early afternoon a PENSACOLA spotting plane reported shooting 
down a Zeke which had apparently taken off from MO JIMA. Three 
Betty* s were strafed and probably destroyed on the ground. A bat- 
tery which opened fire on minesweepers from northern flank of east- 
ern beach was quickly silenced by fire support ships. None of our 
ships was hit. One fighter plane and pilot became lost in thick 
weather and did not return. One plane was an operational loss. One 
fighter plane was shot down by enemy AA but the pilot was recovered 
uninjured. One NM YORK spotting plane was damaged on catapulting, 
and sank after personnel were removed. Results of minesweeping were 
negative, but one old mine adrift was sighted and sunk. Excellent 
reports were received from the air hydro graphic observer indicating 
that beaches and surf conditions would permit landings by any type 
of landing craft. He could see no evidence of underwater defenses. 
Lack of photographs and the paucity of observed results by ships and 
aircraft prevented accurate assessment of damage to enemy instal- 
lations. It was estimated, however, that the comparatively small 
amount of firing permitted by the intermittent thick weather had in- 
flicted little damage on major defenses. Pilots reported enemy 
heavy AA gunfire not particularly intense or effective, and fire of 
Automatic? AA intense but generally inaccurate. 

8. At sunset all ships commenced night deployment away 

from the island, except for four destroyers which were designated 
to remain and provide harassing fire and illumination, interdict the 



Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the B'70 JIM Campaign 

from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which 
time GTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; 
Report of. 



use and repair of airfields, and prevent escape or reinforcement of 
the garrison, CTF 52 in ESTES, screened by 4 AM's, after following 
the fire support units away from the island during dusk, returned to 
the vicinity of the island to supervise night operations. 

9. Operations planned for 17 February consisted in gen- 

eral of morning and evening fighter sweeps against CHICHI JIM; close 
range destructive fire against eastern beach defenses during which 
minesweeping up t/6 about 150 yards from the eastern shore would be 
covered by the h/6avy ships; UDT reconnaissance of eastern beaches 
in the late morning closely supported by heavy ships, 7 destroyers 
and 7 LCl(G)'s; strikes by land-based bombers at 1330; close range 
destructive fire on western beaches; minesweeping off western 
beaches and UDT reconnaissance of these beaches supported as in the 
morning; minesweeping to within about 2000 yards of the northern and 
northeastern shore; hydro graphic observation of beach conditions 
from the air, photo missions, and night operations at the object- 
ive as on 16 February. At 0124(K) ComDesDiv 111 in NMCOMB, with 
HALLIGAN, was directed to proceed to point (Lat 26°-00 N, Long 141° 
-50* E) and to act as radar pickets and provide life guard services 
for air strikes against CHICHI JIM. At 064l(K) HALLIGAN was at- 
tacked by three Betty's when 24 miles, bearing 355°, from SURIBACHI 
MOUNTAIN, She drove off the attackers, shooting down one Betty. 
Fire support ships arrived on station and commenced the scheduled 
bombardment prompt ly at 0700(K). Mine Unit Two, in company with 
Gunboat Support Units One and Two, arrived at 0700(K), Gunboat 
support units reported to CTG 52.4 and Sweep Units 5 and 6 to CTG 
52.3, A special air strike group of 12 VF's departed for CHICHI 
J IMA at 0735 (K), The first support air strike group reported on 
station at 0715 (K). During the day many air strikes were launched 
against the objective through meager to intense heavy and light 
anti-aircraft fire. Photographic missions were completed, but the 
morning verticals were poor, preventing accurate damage assessment. 
The fire support ships were ordered to close the eastern beaches at 
0803 (K) for close destructive bombardment. Under cover of this fire, 
and supported by two destroyers, Sweep Units 5 and 6 proceeded with 
operations along the eastern shore. APD's with UDT's embarked, 
destroyers and LCl(G)'s began assembling off the eastern beaches • 
about 0930 for execution of the UDT reconnaissance. At 0938 the 
PENSACOLA, off the northeastern shore, was observed to be under fire 
by apparently quite heavy caliber guns as some splashes appeared to 
be almost as high as her foremast. She sustained extensive damage 
and many casualties. A plane was set on fire. The ship continued 



Subject : 



Operations o. 
from 10 Febr 
time CTF 51 > 
Report of. 



I 111 f&%e & m, %PPtfp 

|c#| .to t 6660(K) i# E^i%llg3 




lampaign 
hich 



Plan,- 



to fire as she withdrew to extinguish the fires and repair damage. 
She continued to carry out her mission, ceasing fire from time to 
time while casualties were being operated on and given blood trans- 
fusions, CTG 52.3 requested additional support for Sweep Unit 4 
working off the northeastern shore, and VTCKSBURG was ordered to 
provide it. By 1048(K) all units were in position to commence the 
UDT reconnaissance set for 1100(K), The last of the minesweepers 
was completing the sweep off the eastern beaches, these small ships 
having gallantly passed close along the eastern shore in precise 
formation, firing as they went, without deviation from their pre- 
scribed tracks although under occasional enemy fire. The UDT recon- 
naissance commenced exactly on schedule. As the LCl(G)'s moved in 
toward the beach, enemy fire began to concentrate on them. By 
1105 (K), when they reached a point 1000 yards off shore, enemy fire 
was intense from both medium and minor caliber weapons on the flanks 
and minor caliber along the beaches. The personnel of these little 
gunboats displayed magnificent courage as they returned fire with 
everything they had and refused to move out until they were forced 
to do so by materiel and personnel casualties. Even then, after 
undergoing terrific punishment, some returned to their stations 
amid a hail of fire, until again heavily hit. Relief LCl(G)'s 
replaced damaged ships without hesitation. Between 1100(K) and 
1145 (K) all twelve of the LCl(G)'s were hit, LCI 474 ultimately 
capsized after the crew had been removed, and was ordered sunk. 
Intensive fire from destroyers and fire support ships, and a smoke 
screen laid by white phosphorus projectiles, were used to cover 
this operation. Fire support ships took on board casualties from 
the LCl(G)'s as they withdrew, and CTG 52.3 in TERROR most promptly 
and efficiently initiated emergency repairs for serious hull damage, 
as well as assisting in care of the wounded. At 112l(K) LEUTZE was 
hit, the Commanding Officer receiving serious injuries, requiring 
his later transfer to ESTES, but no extensive damage was sustained 
by the ship. By 1220(K) all swimmers of the UDT's but one had 
been recovered, and the APD's and supporting destroyers moved out 
of the area. The reconnaissance had been accomplished. It disclosed 
no underwater or beach obstructions and no minefields, though one 
J13 "reef mine" was reported in 8 feet of water off the north flank 
of Red 2 Beach. Beach and surf conditions were found to be good for 
landing. 

10, Early in the afternoon heavy fire support ships were 

ordered to close the western beaches and commence destructive short- 
range fire. At 1354(K) three squadrons of land-based bombers of 





Subject : 



Operations ojWdl^ Ptfrcer iff £ne IWO JIMA Campaign 
from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February , at which 
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; 
Report of. 




Task Force 93 commenced bombing runs on the objective. The first 
squadron encountered little large caliber AA fire, but this fire 
increased in intensity and accuracy as the second and third squad- 
rons commenced their runs. It was learned later that one plane 
received major damage, and a few others minor damage, but that all 
were able to return to base. The bombing was conducted from about 
5000 feet altitude, and appeared to be most precise. Under cover of 
close-in fire support ships with two destroyers in direct support, 
Sweep Units 5 and 6 swept the area close to the western beaches, 
without drawing more than sporadic fire from the island, UDT recon- 
naissance of the western beaches was commenced at 1615(K). The sup- 
port was modified in that no LCl(G)'s were used and the destroyers 
were ordered to close from 3000 yards to 2000 yards. A smoke screen 
by aircraft was ordered but the smoke planes had difficulty in com- 
plying, as the screen was not laid until 20 minutes after the order, 
and was not placed where ordered. The operation was partially 
screened by white phosphorus projectiles laid on the northern and 
southern flanks, and behind the beaches. The UDT's accomplished the 
reconnaissance successfully. One mine was found and a delay charge 
placed to destroy it, Minef ields or underwater obstacles were 
determined to be non-existent, and beaches and surf conditions were 
found to be suitable for landing, 

11. At 1734(K), HOWARD reported reselling 3 men from a 

crashed TBF. Night deployment commenced about 1830(K). EDWARDS, 
TWIGGS and STEMBEL were designated to remain at the objective to 
execute night harassing fire, interdiction of airfields, prevent 
escape or reinforcement of the garrison, and to maintain careful 
surveillance of the beaches to ensure that the enemy did no work on 
them, MJLLANY, APD's of TG 52.4 and Sweep Unit 4 remained with 
ESTES in the vicinity of the objective, as did the Gunboat Support 
Units One and Two. Shortly after dark TWIGGS shot down one enemy 
plane near the island, At 2321(K) WATERS and BULL were despatched 
with beach charts and personnel from the UDT's for distribution and 
dissemination of information; on the beach reconnaissances to CTF 51, 
CTF 53, and designated elements of the Attack Force. Strikes on 
CHICHI JIMA resulted in damage to about 18 small craft and an am- 
munition barge blown up. At HAH A JIMA about 15 small and 1 medium 
sized craft were damaged, It was estimated, and examination of the 
afternoon photographs confirmed, that the greater part of major 
known defensive installations still remained undamaged. However, 
heavily casematcd batteries at the northern base of SURIBACHI 
(already on map) ancjf 0rf ; t*he*^r3:ghir f lank-of eastern beaches 




Subject : 




time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; 
Report of. 



Task Force 93 commenced bombing runs on the objective. The first 
squadron encountered little large caliber AA fire, but this fire 
increased in intensity and accuracy as the second and third squad- 
rons commenced their runs, It was learned later that one plane 
received major damage, and a few others minor damage, but that all 
were able to return to base. The bombing was conducted from about 
5000 feet altitude, and appeared to be most precise. Under cover of 
close-in fire support ships with two destroyers in direct support, 
Sweep Units 5 and 6 swept the area close to the western beaches, 
without drawing more than sporadic fire from the island, UDT recon- 
naissance of the western beaches was commenced at l6l5(K), The sup- 
port was modified in that no LCl(G) f s were used and the destroyers 
were ordered to close from 3000 yards to 2000 yards. A smoke screen 
by aircraft was ordered but the smoke planes had difficulty in com- 
plying, as the screen was not laid until 20 minutes after the order, 
and was not placed where ordered. The operation was partially 
screened by white phosphorus projectiles laid on the northern and 
southern flanks, and behind the beaches. The UDT's accomplished the 
reconnaissance successfully. One mine was found and a delay charge 
placed to destroy it. Minefields or underwater obstacles were 
determined to be non-existent, and beaches and surf conditions were 
found to be suitable for landing, 

11. At 1734(K), HOWARD reported rescuing 3 men from a 

crashed TBF, Night deployment commenced about 1830(K). EEWARDS, 
TWIGGS and STEMBEL were designated to remain at the objective to 
execute night harassing fire, interdiction of airfields, prevent 
escape or reinforcement of the garrison, and to maintain careful 
surveillance of the beaches to ensure that the enemy did no work on 
them, MULLANY, APD's of TG 52.4 and Sweep Unit 4 remained with 
ESTES in the vicinity of the objective, as did the Gunboat Support 
Units One and Two. Shortly after dark TWIGGS shot down one enemy 
plane near the island, At 2321(K) WATERS and BULL were despatched 
with beach charts and personnel from the UDT's for distribution and 
dissemination of information, on the beach reconnaissances to CTF 51* 
CTF 53, and designated elements of the Attack Force. Strikes on 
CHICHI JIMA resulted in damage to about 18 small craft and an am- 
munition barge blown up. At HAH A JIM about 15 small and 1 medium 
sized craft were damaged. It was estimated, and examination of the 
afternoon photographs confirmed, that the greater part of major 
known defensive installations still remained undamaged. However, 
heavily casemated batteries at the northern base of SURIBACHI 
(already on map) and pa fctop „jaigjrt flank Q.f the eastern beaches 







Operations of Task Fordf ^? irf the IWO JIMA Campaijigf 1 
from 10 February to 06o4(k) 19 Februarv^tjw^h 1 Si* 
time CTF 51 assumed titlipfcl j^t*6r%Sg To Plan; 
Report of. 



m 



Subject : 



(3 of the k guns not on map) had been definitely located. Orders 
were issued changing schedules of fire for 18 February to provide 
for heavy concentration of destructive fire from short range on the 
blockhouses, pill boxes etc., of the eastern beach area, and defenses 
behind it and on each flank. For knocking out the heavy flanking 
batteries a cross fire by IDAHO and TENNESSEE was directed. It was 
felt that unless this was done, the success of the landing itself 
would be seriously jeopardized, even though it was realized that 
guns and mortars in other areas would probably give trouble after t he- 
landing. Fire support ships were advised of the entire situation, 
and directed to make every effort to obtain the greatest possible 
effect from each remaining round of ammunition and minute of time. 

12, At 0308(K) on 18 February MJLLANY was sent to ren- 
dezvous with LUNGA POINT with photographs for delivery by plane 
that morning to CTF 51 and various elements of the Attack Force. 
Minesweeping commenced on schedule. Fire support ships were on 
station at 0700(K) and off the eastern beaches delivered almost 
continuous fire from 0700(K) to 1830(K) at ranges of from 1800 to 
3000 yards from the shore. Other ships fired at targets in other 
areas throughout the same period. TEXAS, assisted by two destroy- 
ers, also covered uncompleted minesweeping operations off the north- 
ern shore. During the afternoon a TEXAS spotting plane recovered 

a downed pilot, uninjured, from 135 miles at sea. He had been 
sighted by a B29 of the 21st Bomber Command, 

13. Night deployments were commenced at sunset, except 
that 5 destroyers were assigned to usual night operations at the 
objective, with special instructions to ensure that no work by the 
enemy was accomplished on the beaches. By late afternoon all mine- 
sweeping necessary to permit a successful landing, and its support 
and the ensuing unloading, had been accomplished. No mines were 
found. Reports from firing ships and examination of photographs 
showed that the principal defensive installations on and behind the 
eastern beaches, and on their flanks, had been either destroyed or 
heavily damaged. Among these were included the casemated batteries 
on the northern and southern flanks of the beaches, which were es- 
timated to have fired on the LCl(G) f s with such telling effect on 
17 February, Fragments recovered from LCl(G)'s indicated that the 
heaviest of these guns were about 150mm in caliber. During the 
evening CTF 52 informed CTF 51 that although weather had prevented 
expending the full ammunition allowance, and that more installations 
could be found and. destroyed with an additional day of bombardment, 




Subject : 



Operations of Task Force 
from 10 February to 0600 
time CTF 51 assumed tit! 
Report of. 




§.9* Febffuary^ i&ifciSjM 




he believed a successful landing could be made on 19 February if 
necessary. At 2130(K) BLESSMAN was bombed and disabled by a low fly- 
ing plane. GILMER proceeded to her assistance, and ARDENT was sent 
to take her in tow. At 2255(K) GAMBLE was hit and disabled under 
similar circumstances. HAMILTON and CHANDLER stood by, and HAMILTON 
took GAMBLE in tow. CTF 51 was requested to send salvage ships to 
rendezvous with these disabled ships as soon as possible, ESTES and 
CHESTER each proceeding independently, were in collision at 0600(K) 
on 19 February. Damage to ESTES was slight and operating efficiency 
not impaired. CHESTER was able to complete her fire support mission 
but was then ordered to SAIPAN for repairs as one propellor was bent 
and the deck buckled so that turret three was not in operating con- 
dition. At 0600(K) CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to plan, 
and ComPhibGroup ONE became CTG 51.19. 

14. This operation clearly demonstrated that previous 
high altitude bombings and long range bombardment of IWO JIMA 
directed only into "target areas" achieved negligible damage to the 
very numerous defenses of the island, which were stout, comparatively 
small, and well dispersed. Photographic interpretation shows, on 
the contrary, that the defenses were substantially increased in num- 
ber during December, January, and early February, The bombardment 

by this force on 16 and 17 February also had less than the desired 
effect, due to interference by weather, to the need for giving way 
to minesweeping and UDT operations, and by lack of thorough famili- 
arity with the actual important targets, as distinguished from a 
mark on a map, or a photograph. It was not until after fire support 
ships their spotting planes and the support aircraft had worked at 
the objective for two days, had become familiar with the location 
and appearance of the defenses, and had accurately attacked them 
with close range gunfire and low altitude air strikes, that sub- 
stantial results were achieved. This experience emphasizes once 
again the need for ample time as well as ample ships, aircraft end 
ammunition, for preliminary reduction of defenses of a strongly de- 
fended position. At the same time it is realized that certain de- 
fenses will never be destroyed or even discovered until after the 
troops land, 

15. It is worthy of note that the defenders did not 
employ heavy guns against minesweepers even when they worked close 
to the shore. Perhaps this was because the Japanese knew there 
were no minefields to defend and considered that damage to mine- 
sweepers would not compensate for disclosure of batteries to the 




Subject: 



1 W l| ^ p PS n 

Operations o^|^^^^5g ^ ^IPgj^/oiAj. 
from 10 February to OoOO(k7 19 February, at" 
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; 
Repa't of. 




ampaign 
which 



fire support ships. When, however, the LCI(G) T s approached the beach 
in support of the UDT's, it was logical for the Japanese to assume 
that being landing craft, they were being employed to carry and land 
troops. The Japanese therefore opened up with everything they had 
to defeat the supposed landing. It is therefore considered that 
LCl(G)'s or craft of that general type should not bo used to support 
UDT's working in the vicinity of strongly defended positions, un- 
less the major defenses are assuredly destroyed beforehand, or unless 
sufficient ammunition is available to permit the same heavy smother- 
ing fire as is used in conjunction with an actual landing, 

16, The large Staff of an Amphibious Group Commander was 
needed to achieve coordination of the many and mutually conflicting 
activities at the objective during the pro-landing period. The 
trained teams which are accustomed to working as a well knit unit 
in controlling naval gunfire and support aircraft so that each of- 
these weapons will effectively supplement the other are considered 
to be a necessity, as are the ample communications, photographic, 
photo interpretation, map reproduction and housing facilities, and 
working spaces, of an AGO. For this operation the Staff was aug- 
mented by four assistants in the Gunnery Section, and one assist- 
ant and two photo interpreters in the Intelligence Section. The 
services of these additional officers were fully employed and a 
similar arrangement is strongly recommended for future operations 

of this type. Familiarity with the problems confronting the Amphib- 
ious Force, and the presence of the Naval Gunfire Officer of the 
Staff of the 5th Amphibious Corps, were of material assistance in 
modifying plans and methods of attacking defensive installations 
to suit new developments of the situation as they arose. It is 
believed that factors discussed above will assume added importance 
in future pre-landing operations of larger scope and greater com- 
plexity, 

17, In the interest of expediting this report, comments 
on Naval Gunfire Support, Support Aircraft Operations, Minesweep- 
ing, and UDT Operations are being forwarded herewith prior to re- 
ceipt of reports from the Task Force and Task Group Commanders who 
immediately directed these activities. These comments have there- 
fore been prepared from the information at hand on the date of this 
report. Additional comments will be submitted by endorsement upon 
the reports of the Commanders of these operations. 



W.H.P. BLANDY, 



11 ~ 



Subject: Operations of Task Force SgJUj £tyh WO rflMfr 0Sty$ifgh| 

from 10 February to 0600(Kp 1L9 February, at which ' 



time CTF 51 assumed title 
Report of 




DISTRIBUTION 



Cominch f Direct} 


(5) 


AtComULITHI 


(1) 


CinCPac (Direct ) 


(5) 


IsComSAIPAN 


(1) 


ComFIFTHFleet 


(5) 


IsComGUAM 


(1) 

V- 4 "/ 


ComTHIRDFleet 


(1) 


IsComTTNTAN 


(1} 


C omSEVENT HF le et 


(1) 




CinCSWPA 


(1) 


ComGenPOA 


(1) 


ComNorPac 


(1) 


ComGenAAFPOA 


(1) 


ComSoPac 


(1) 


ComGenlOthArmy 


(1) 


ComAirPac 


(1) 


ComGen21st BomCom 


(1) 


ComDesPac 


(1) 


ComGenFMFPac 


(1) 


ComServPac 


(1) 


ComGenAirFMFPac 


(1) 


ComServRon 6 


(1) 


CoriGenIIIPhibCorr>s 


(1) 


ComServRon 10 


(1) 
V"** / 


ComGenVPhibCorrjs 


(i) 


ComSubsPac 


(1) 


ComGenlstMarDiv 


\ ■*•/ 


C omWe s C ar Sub Ar e a 


1 


ComGen2ndMarDiv 


(1) 


Co.rnHawSeaFron 


(1) 


ComGen3rdMarDiv 




ComPhilSeaFron 


(1) 


ComGen4thMarDiv 


(1) 


ComFwdAr eaC entPac 


(1) 


C omGen5t hMar Div 


(1) 


ComMarGils Ar ea 


(1) 


ComGen6thMar Div 


(1) 


ComAirFwd 


(1) 




SCOFA 


(3) 


ComTransRon 11 


(1) 


JICPOA 


(1) 


ComTransRon 15 


(1) 






ComTransRon 16 


(1) 


ComTHIRDPhib 


(1) 


ComTransRon 101 


(1) 


ComSEVENTHPhib 


(1) 


ComLSTFlot 13 


(1) 


ComPhibsFac 


(5) 


CoinLSTFlot 21 


(1) 


ComASCUPhibsPac 


(? 


ComLSMFlot 5 


(1) 


AdComPhibsPac 


(2) 




ComPhibGrpTWO 


(2) 


ComlstCarTaskForPac 


(1) 


ComPhibGrpTHREE 


(2) 


Com2ndGarTaskForPac 


(1) 


ComPhibGrpFOUR 


(2) 




ComPhibGrpFIVE 


(2) 


ComBatRon 1 


(1) 


ComPhifeGrpSIX 


(2) 


ComBatRon 2 


(1) 


ComPhibGrpSEVEN 


(2) 


ComBatDiv 2 


(1) 


ComPhibGrpEIGHT 


(2) 


ComBatDiv 3 


(1) 


ComPhibGrpNINE 


(2) 


ComBatDiv 4 


(1) 


ComP hibGrpELEVEN 


(5) 


ComBatDiv 5 


a) 


ComPhibGrpTWELVE 


(2) 


ComBatDiv 6 


a) 


ComPhibGrpTHIRTEEN 


(2) 






C omPhibGr pFO URTEE N 


(2) 


ComCruDiv 4 


a) 




Subject • 



Operations of 
from 10 Febru 




■9T*(«JfftTLTFeKruary, at which 
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; 
Report of. 



ComCruDiv 5 (l) 

ComCruDiv 6 (l) 

ComCruDiv 13 (1) 

ComCruDiv 14 (1) 

ComCruDiv 17 (1) 

ComCruDiv 19 (1) 

ComDesDiv 11 (l) 

ComDesDiv 91 (1) 

ComDesDiv 101 (l) 

ComDesDiv 111 (1) 

ComDesDiv 112 (1) 

ComCortDiv 63 (1) 

ComCortDiv 72 (1) 

ARKANSAS (BB 33) (l) 

NEW YORK (BB 34) (1) 

TEXAS (BB 35) (1) 

NEVADA (BB 36) (1) 

IDAHO (BB 42) (1) 

TENNESSEE (BB 43) (1) 

WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48) (l) 

NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55) (1) 

WASHINGTON (BB 56) (l) 

PENSACOLA (CA 24) (l 

SALT LAKE CITY .(CA 25) (1 

CHESTER (CA 27) ' (l) 

INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) (l 

TUSCALOOSA (CA 37) (1 

SAN FRANCISCO (CA 3B) (1) 

BOSTON (CA 69) (1) 

PITTSBURG (CA 72) (l) 

SANTA FE (CL 60) (1) 

PASADENA (CL 65) (1) 

BILOXI (CL 80) (1) 

VICKSBURG (CL 86) (1) 

ASTORIA (CL 90) (l) 

NEC/COMB (DD 586) (l) 

BENNION (DD 662) (l) 

HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS (DD663) (1) 



RICHARD P. LEARY (DD 664) 
HALL (DD 583) 
HALLIGAN (DD 584) 
TERRY (DD 533) 
PAUL HAMILTON (DD 590) 
STEMBEL (DD 644) 
JOHN D, HENLEY (DD 553) 
CAPP3 (DD 550) 
BRYANT (DD 665) 
TWIGGS (DD 591) 
LEUTZE (DD 481) 
MULLANY (DD 528) 
H.A. WILEY (DM 29' 
WILLIAMSON (AVD 2\ 

ComEsCarForPac 
ComCarDiv 25 
ComCarDiv 26 
MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93) 
SARGENT BAY (CVE 83) 
WAKE ISLAND (CVE 65) 
LUNGA POINT (CVE 94) 
AN2I0 (CVE 57) 
NATOMA BAY (CVE 62) 
STEAMER BAY (CVE 87) 

DALY (DD 519) 

RALPH TALBOT (DD 390) 

GRADY (DE 445) 

RICHARD 3. BULL (DE 402) 

HUTCHINS (DD 476) 

HELM (DD 388) 

BAGLEY (DD 386) 

RICHARD M. RCWELL (DE 403) 

0' FLAHERTY (DE 340) 

LAWRENCE C, TAYLOR (DE 415 

MELVIN R. N AMMAN (DE 416) 

OLIVER MITCHELL (DE 417) 

TABBERER (DE 418) 

ROBERT F. KELLER (DE 419) 

CominPac 
CominRon 2 




Subject: Operations of Task Force 52^^^$ J^1A^..,_, 

from 10 February to 0600 (K) fl9 February, "at : which I 
time CTF 51 assumed title C#|$2 according to-Plnm " § If 
Report of. Wl I ; i^a fi \ W W IT* I fta 



CominDiv 10 
CominDiv 35 
CominDiv 36 
TERROR (CM 5) 
HOPKINS (DMS 13) 
DORSET (DI r S 1) 
HOWARD (DMS 7) 
HOGAN (DMS 6) 
BREESE (DM 18) 
SKIRMISH (AM 303) 
SIGNET (AM 302) 
•STAUNCH (AM 307) 
SCURRY (AM 304) 
SPECTACLE (AM 305) 
SPECTOR (AM 306) 
TRACY (DM 19) 
SERENE (AM 300) 
SHELTER (AM 301) 
STRATEGY (AM 308) 
STRENGTH (AM 309) 
SUCCESS (AM 310) 
REBEL (Aid 284) 
PC 800 

CHAMPION (AM 314) 
ARDENT (AM 340) 
DEFENSE (AM 317) 
DEVASTATOR (AM 318) 
GAMBLE (DM 15) 
YMS 323 
YMS 362 
YMS 374 
YMS 401 
YMS 411 
YMS 478 

LINDSEY (DM 32) 

SC 775 

SC 1027 

YMS 193 

YMS 235 

BIS 345 

YMS 361 

YMS 407 

YMS 475 



£. 0. 



L.D, REEDY, ) 
Lieutenant, IE NR., 
Flag Secretary. 



i) 
i) 
i) 
i) 
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i) 

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i) 
i) 
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i' 
l 

i' 
i 

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i) 
d 
i) 

;s 

i) 
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i) 
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SC 1054 

ComUDT'sPac 
GILMER (APD 11) 
WATERS (APD 8) 
BULL (APD 78) 
BLESSMAN {APD 48) 
BARR (APD 39) 
BATES (APD 47) 
UDT 12 (in APD 47) 
UDT 13 (in APD 39) 
UDT 14 (in APD 78) 
UDT 15 (in APD 48) 

ComLCIFlot 3 
ComLCIGroup 8 
LCI(L) 627 
LCI(G) 450 
LCI(G) 466 
LCI(G) 469 
LCI(G) 471 
LCI(G) 473 
LCI(G) 346 
LCI(G) 348 
LCl(6) 438 
LCI(G) 441 
LCI(G) 449 
LCI(G) 457 

ESTES (AGC 12) 
ComASCU, PhibGrpONE 
CominFac , Rep , PhibGrpONE 

CNO 

CNO (ONI) 

ARMY & NAVY STAFF COLLEGE 

C & Gs SCHOOL, LEAVENWORTH 

NaVAL WAR COLLEGE 

COMDT. MARINE CORPS 

COMDT. MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS 

ComPhibTraLant 

ComPhibTraPac ' 

PhibTr aBas e ,Ft .Pierc e , Fla , 



(l) 

:d 
:d 
:d 
:d 
:d 
:d 
:« 

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:d 
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:3) 
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:d 
(i) 

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:ij 




- 14 - 



CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS 



10 January 19A5 

0750 (VW) TG 52.11 commenced sortie from PEARL HARBCB for move- 
ment to ULITHI in accordance with ComPhibGroupONE Move- 
ment Order A102-45. Task Organization: CTG 52.11, Rear 
Admiral BLANDY, OTC; ESTES (AGO 12), Flagship; Battle- 
ships TEXAS and NEVADA 5 Transport Unit ADMIRAL COONTZ; 
Screen, TransDiv 101, WATERS, BATES, BARR, GILMER and 
WILLIAMSON. 

0945(VW) CTG 52.11 assumed tactical command. 



0958 Set course 225° T. ; standard speed 13 knots. 

1017 Commenced antiaircraft practice. 

1200 Noon Position: 20°-A2.7 f N.j 158°-H.6« W. 

1305 Ceased present exercises. 

1425 Conducted exercise repelling aircraft attack. 

1559 Ceased present exercises. 

1800 Changed local time to plus 10 Zone time. 

2000(W) Position: 19°-54.5 f N.$ 159°-45.3 I W. 
January 1945 

0600(W) Conducted Exercise 2(c), USF-1QA, BATES target. 

0800 Position: l^-^.S 1 N.j l62°-31.4 f W. 

0900 Exercised at flag hoist drill. 

0955 Secured from flag hoist drill. 

1027 Commenced tactical exercises. 

1132 Secured from tactical exercises* 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN SHE IWO Jim CAMPAIGN 



11 January 19Z.5 (continued) 

1200(w) Noon Position: 19°-33«2* N.j l63°-20.6» W. 

1355 Commenced exercises. 

1413 Ceased present exercises. 

1700 Set clocks back one half hour to plus 10£ tine. 

1745('^) Transferred appendicitis case from GILMER to ESTES. 

2000 Position: 19°~24.2» N. ; 164°-56.1' W. 

2015 Commenced tactical exercises. 

2044 Secured from tactical exercises. 

12 January 3,945 

0600(Ytt) Conducted Exercise 2(C), USF-1QA, BARE target. 

0800 Position: 190-01. 9 1 N.j l67°-35 ! W. 

0927 Commenced tactical exercises. 

1100 Secured from tactical exercises, 

1200 Noon Position: 18°^. 5 1 N.j 168°~29.9 ! W. 

1301 NEVADA launched two planes, NEVADA conducted Exercise 4(B) , 

USF-1GA for NEVADA and TEXAS, 

1436 Commenced tactical exercises. 

1458 Completed tactical exerqises. 

1509 NEVADA proceeded independently to recover planes. 

1545 NEVADA rejoined formation. 

1700 Changed local time to plus 11 time. 

2000(X) Position: 18°-29.2» N.j 170°-09.7' VJ. 

A-2 




ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF* ^fUrItiInS ^>^Tjt&A ftftffiTlGN 

13 January 19A5 

0600(X) Conducted Exercise 2(C), USF-lOA, BATES target. 

0800 Position: lS^l^ 1 N.$ 173 o -04..7' H. 

0900 NEVADA and TEXAS, screened by WATERS, GILMER and WILLIAM- 
SON, left formation for tactical exercises. 

1000 Commenced tactical exercises. 

102$ Ceased present exercises. 

1130 NEVADA, TEXAS and screen rejoined formation. 

1200 Noon Position: lT -^.^' N.j 173°-57.1' W. 

1402 Streamed paravanes. 

1539 Recovered paravanes. 

1700 Changed local tine to Zone plus ll^r time, 

2000(XY) Position? 17 -27<1' N.j 175°"39,S' W. 

2009 Tactical exercises - Sound Contact drill. 

2024- Ceased present exercises, 

0738(XY) WILLIAMSON cane alongside ESTES to fuel, 

0800 Position; X6°~57.5' N.; 178°~28.6' W. 

1012 WILLIAMSON cast off from ESTES. 

1059 GILMER alongside ESTES to fuel. 

1200 Noon Position: ,L7°-l6.7 ! N,j 179°-03-6» W. 

1210 GIIM5R cast off from ESTES. 

1223 BARK alongside NEVADA to fuel. 

1355 BARR cast off from V^Ufik.^ * * f J ]J 

A-3 





1A January 19A5 (Continued) 

UOO(XY) WATERS alongside TEXAS to fuel. 

1600 BATES alongside NEVADA to fuel, 

1702 WATERS cast off from TEXAS. 

1736 BATES cast off from NEVADA. 

1748 Crossed 180th meridian. 

2000 Position: 17°-24 t N.j 179°-30» E. 

1$ January l%5 

052l(XY) WATERS reported only one engine in operation due to con- 
denser casualty, 

0600 Conducted exercise 2(C), USF«-1QA, BATES target. 

0628 ESTES had engineering casualty and left formation. 

O64.O ESTES in position; resumed guide. 

0800 Position: l6°-02.9 4 N. ; 1760-4.6.4 1 S. 

0919 Commenced tactical exercises, 

1037 Ceased tactical exercises, 

1200 Noon Position: 15°~37' N.; 175°-53 f E. 

1400 Flag hoist drill, TEXAS leading, 

1518 Conducted exercise 13(A) and 13(B), USF-1QA, 

1555 Ceased present exercises. 

1700 Changed local time to Zone plus 12 time, 

2000(X) Position: H -52.5» N.j 174°-06.7« E. 

24-00 Changed local time to Zone minus 12 time. 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF , OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



17 January 1945 (East Longitude Date) 

0800(M) Position: 14°^.4 f N.j 171°-X2.6» E. 

0911 Commenced tactical exercises. 

1050 Ceased present exercises. 

1100 Commenced radar reporting drill, 

U4.9 Ceased present exercises. 

1200 Noon Position: 13°-51.8« N.j 170°-20» E. 

1345 BATES reported sound gear out. 

1400 Flag hoist drill. 

1502 Secured from flag hoist drill. 

2000 Position: 13°-18.8» N. ; l68°-28.1i E. 

Commenced tactical exercises (Sound Contact drill). 

2040 Ceased tactical exercises. 

2212 TEXAS had steering casualty. 

2215 TEXAS regained steering control. 

18 January l%$ 

0800(M) Position: 12°-20.9 ! H,| l65°-42.6» E. 

0830 TEXAS launched two planes. 

0919 Conducted exercise 4(D), USF-1QA. 

1041 TEXAS left formation to recover planes. 

1200 Noon Position: 12°-04.1' N.$ l64°-52.9 f E. 

1210 TEXAS resumed station. 

1419 GILMER alongside NEVADA to fuel. 

1545 GILMER cast off from NEVADA, 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTPi ^ ?MPOfeT : OF OI«iillo|^!| RUhrO JIMA. CAMPAIGN 



18 January 1945 (Continued) 

1700 (M) Changed local time to minus llj- zone time, 

2000(LM) Position: ll -^^ 1 N.; 163°-W,5* E. 

2015 Commenced tactical exercise (Sound Contact drill). 

2033 Ceased tactical exercises, 

0755 (LM) BATES alongside NEVADA to fuel* 

0800 Position: 10O-47.4 1 ».# l60 -53.9» E. 

0902 BATES cast off from NEVADA. 

0922 WILLIAMSON alongside ESTES to fuel. 

1116 WILLIAMSON cast off from ESTES. 

1137 WATERS alongside TEXAS to fuel. 

1200 Noon Position: 10°-<8.5» N.j 1600-13' E. 

1338 WATERS completed fueling. 

1415 BAKR alongside NEVADA for fuel. 

1520 BABR cast off from NEVADA. 

1600 Commenced flag hoist drill, 

1700 Secured from flag hoist drill. Changed local time to 
minus 11 zone time. 

2000(L) Position: 10°-38.6» N.; S. 

30 January l%$ 

0800 (L) Position: 10°-27.8» N.j 155°-46.4' E. 

0910 Streamed paravanes, 

1108 Recovered paravanes. 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA. CAMPAIGN 



20 January 19A5 (Continued) 

H25(L) WATERS reported condenser casualty repaired* 
1200 Noon Position: 10<V20.8« N.$ ISprQQ.S* E. 

1305 Flag hoist drill, WILLIAMSON conducting. 

2000 Position: 10°-15.7* N.j 153°~11.2» E. 

21 January l%$ 

0800(L) Position: lCK>-22* N, ; 150°-30.9 f E. 

1200 Noon Position: 10 o -24.7» N.j 149°~38.6» E. 

1300 Commenced flag hoist drill, 

14-00 Secured from flag hoist drill* 

1700 Changed local time to zone minus 10^ time* 

2000(KL) Position: 10°-17' N.j U7^47''B. 

OSOO(KL) Position: 10°-O1.4» N. ; 145°^06.1' E. 

1000 Flag hoist drill. 

1100 Secured from flag hoist drill. 

1200 Noon Position: 09 o *-59.7 t N.j 1U°-16.3 ! E. 

1233 Issued Entry Order A104-45 for ULITHI by despatch, 

1245 Commander KAUFFMAN transferred to ESTES from GILMER. 

1700 Changed local time to minus 10 zone time. 

2000(K) Position: 10°-00.8» N. ; 142 -38.1» E. 

2? ?&mnr 1945 

0650(K) Sighted FAIS Island, ULITHI, bearing 200°, distance 
about 14 miles. 

I , ■ 
A-7 




<f m 0^ m P ^ ^% 1 IF 1 

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT <||(iPlli^Q^ Itfi^^ 

23 January 1QZ.5 (Continued) 

0800(K) Position: 10°-02.1< N.| U0°-<24.6» E. 

0848 Commenced tactical exercises. 

0935 Ceased tactical exercises, 

10^2 Commenced antiaircraft firing on sleeves. Tow planes 

from ULITHI. 

1100 Ceased firing; ceased present exercises. Sighted TG 51.1 

approaching MUGAX Ghaaaai fron the south. 

1100 Executed Entrance Order No. A104-45. 

1159 ESTES passed Beacon "A", MAGE JANG Island abeam to port. 

Entering ULITHI Lagoon. 

1223 ESTES anchored in Berth 101, ULITHI. Rear Admiral 

KILAND, ComPhibGrp 7 in PRAIRIE. TF 52 ships present 
ULITHI : OLIVER MITCHELL, MAKIN ISLAND, LUNGA POINT, 
BISMARCK SEA, BAG LEY, HEM, ! FLAHERTY, R.M. ROWELL, 
MANILA. BAY, RALPH TALBOT, R.S. BULL, SAGINAW BAY, 
PATTERSON, J. BUTLER, EDMUNDS, BLESSMAN, ViAKE ISIAND, 
BULL. 



TF 54 ship present: EVANS. 

Arrivals, 23 January: TF 51: ComTransRon 11 in IRE- 
MONT, with KNOX, O'HARA, LEEDSTOT, EiERY LEE, CALL- 
AWAY, FEIAND, FAYETTE, FUNSTON, PRES. JACKSON, BOLIVAR, 
DOYEN, PRES. ADAMS, CAPE JOHNSON, AIMACK, WARRICK, 
LIBRA, HERCULES, JUPITER, SWEARER, RIDDLE. TF 52: 
CTF 52 in ESTES, with GILMER, WATERS, BATES, BARR. 
TF 54: NEVADA, TEXAS, WILLIMSON. 

24 January 1945 

0800 (K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. 



1030 
1438 



Granted GILMER availability for repairs until 1800, 
26 January. 

Granted WATERS availability at anchor until 1800, 27 
January for repairs main steam line. 



1 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO ItF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS- IN |jp IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 

mi — mm»*mm<~ — vMk** m m ma m .mm — . — m •»•.•'*»• • m> m^m*' mm" mm m mm mm «»■■«•«»••«. 

24 January 194ft (Continued) 

1438(K) Arrivals: TF 54: HALL, HALLIGAN, PAUL HAMILTON, TWIGGS. 

25 January 1945 

0800 (K) ESTES anchored in Berth 101, ULITHI. 

0908 CoraFIFTHFleet in INDIANAPOLIS arrived ULITHI. 

1035 Requested ComTransRon 11 to assign 2 LCVP each tem- 

porarily to TEXAS and NEVADA. 

1550 Granted WATERS 6 days tender availability to repair 

casualty to forced draft blower. 

1711 Requested ComTransRon 11 to furnish 1 boat to PhibPac 

Secret Mail Officer. 

2045 Requested AtComULITHI confirm approval UDT rehearsal 

on 3 and 6 February vicinity FAIS and LOSIEP Islands. 

Departures: MANILA BAY. 
# January 194? 

0800 (K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. 

1010 EVANS assigned temporarily to control of ComFI FTHFle et . 

1659 CinCPac OpPlan 11-44 and ComFIFTHFleet OpPlan 13-44 de- 

clared fully effective 1400 26 January. 

2138 Granted WILLIAMSON permission to exercise vdth tame sub- 

marine 27 January. 

Arrivals: TF 51: BUSH, BOYD, TF 54: ComCruDiv 5 in 
CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY, TUSCALOOSA, STEMBEL, 
BRYANT, BENNION, LEUTZE. 

Departures: TF 51: BUSH, BOYD. 



A-9 



EN CLOSURE (a) k% CTF 52 REPORT OF OPEEtATi(fS THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 
"* — "* "* ** " *m <*v*' 

27 J^ary iL%5 

0242 (K) ComEsCarPacFor reported for duty with MAK3N ISLAND, 

LUNGA POINT, BISMARCK SEA, WXE ISLAND, RALPH TALBOT, 
BAGLEY, HELM, R.S. BULL, R.M. ROYtfELL and O 1 FLAHERTY. 

0800 ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI. Rear Admiral COOLEY, 

ComBatDiv 6 cane aboard for conference on plans for 
bombardment of IWO JIMA. 

0900 Fighter director exercises* 

1136 DesDiv 101 less HARADEN ordered report CTF 54 for duty. 

2013 Received report that Rear Admiral RODGERS, CTF 54, had 

reported aboard NEVADA. 

2200 Fighter director communication drills. 

Arrivals: . TF 51: O'NEIL, STERN, S.S. MILES. TF 52: 
ComLCIFlot 3 in LCI(L) 627 and LCl(G)*s 450, 466, 471, 
473, 469, 346, 474, 348, 438, 441, 449, 457, RUDYERD 
BAY, SARGENT 'BAY. 

28 January 1945 

0002 (K) Received approval of AtComULITHI on UDT rehearsal area. 

0900 Hear Admiral RODGERS, CTF 54, came aboard for conference on 

IWO JIMA plans. 

1325 Requested repair services ICI(G) 466 gyro and electrical 

steering gear casualty; requested repair LCI(G) 627 fire 
and bilge pump» 

1330 Commander Air Support Control Unit reported aboard INDIAN- 

APOLIS for conference General LeMAY regarding land-based 
bomber plans for IWO JIM operation. 

1400 Preliminary conference Force Gunnery Officer on ESTES 

with all Gunnery Officers of TF 54 ships present* 



1525 



Directed ComTransDiv 101 to furnish "ComLCIFlot 3 with 2 
boats daily for use of LCI Group 8, 




ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 RgplpldP^ CAMPAIGN 

28 January 19A5 (Continued) 

2015 (K) Rear Admiral RODGERS (ComPhibGrpELEVEN) assumed command 
of TP. 54. 

2050 Ordered TEXAS, NEVADA and WILLIAMSON to report to CTF 54 

for duty. 

Arrivals: TF 52: GRADY. TF 54: NEWCOMB, H.L. EDWARDS, 
LEARY. 

29 January 19A5 

0022 (K) ComFIFTHFleet ordered DeoDiv 111 to report to CTF 54 
for duty, 

0800 ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. 

1028 ComFIFTHFleet directed BUSH report ^o CTG 51.1 for duty 

and BENNION, BRYANT and STEMBEL to report to CTF 54 for 
duty. 

1330 Communication drill to test calibration transmitters and 

receivers for VOF spotting; TEXAS, NEVADA, TUSCALOOSA and 
ESTES. NOTE: These drills throughout used prepared 
traffic to resemble Hunter-Killer action. Frequencies 
tested 4340, 4720, 4580, 4450, 5015, 4795, 3845 and 3905. 

1600 Secured from Communication drills, 

1617 Advised ComFIFTHFleet that services EVANS could be spared 

if relief furnished prior departure SAIPAN. 

1700 Assigned firing berth, ULITHI, as follows: TF 54 des- 

troyers, Berth D; CTG 52.2, Berth E; CTF 54 for BB»s and 
CA's, Berth F to 6 February; to GominPac, Berth F on 
7, 8, 9 February. 

1710 Directed substitution LBUTZE for EVANS in all plans for 

UDT support - Appendix V, Annex (H) CTF 51 OpPlan A25-44 
and Rehearsal OpOrder A103-45. 

1805 Assigned Hydrograpfaie Observers, Lt. (jg) THOMPSON and 

Ens* MOBPHZ to CTG 52.2. 

Arrivals: Tf 52: ANZIO, L.C. TYALCE, R.F. KELLER. 




ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF rfB^Cfe* ON OPERATIONS IN USSr IW& JIMA CAMPAIGN 

0047(K) CTG 52.2 assigned PA1TERSGN, BAGLEY, 0»FIAHERTY, ROWELL 
and R.S. BULL to screen for UDT rehearsal. 

0735 Requested ComSorvRon 10 to drydock LCI(G) 450 to repack 

stern tubes, rudder post and propeller check* 

0300 ESTES at anchor Berth 101, UUTHI. 

0900 Communication drills; CHESTER, PENSACOIA, SALT LIKE CITY, 

ESTES, 

1130 Secured from Communication drills, 

1330 Communication drills, LEUTZE, BENNIQN and NEWCOMB. 

1400 DesDiv Commanders reported aboard for preliminary con- 

ference. 

1600 Secured from communication drills. 

1817 Informed ComDesDivs 96, 101, 111 and 112 of desired 

ammunition loading of destroyers. 

2015 Requested CTF 54 to direct BOYD report to CTG 51.1 for 

duty. 

?i January 194? 

0800 (K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. 

0900 Communication drills, H.L. EDWARDS, HALL, HALLIGAN. 

0918 ComFIFTHFleet requested CTF 94 to advise status re- 

pairs DAVID W. TAYLOR • 

1030 Requested CTG 51.1 to advise whether firing berth desir- 

ed by that group, 

1120 Directed CTG 52.4 to provide CAPPS, LEUTZE, J. D. HENLEY, 

TYflGGS, HALL and BRYANT each one SCR-610, 

1130 Secured from communication drills, 

1330 Coinmunfcation "drills", TWIGGS, STEMBEL,. BRYANT, 



A-12 



ENCLOSURE (A) TQ CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



U fttfWftnr Wfj (Continued) 

1600 (K) Secured from communication drills* 

0800 (K) ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULTTHI. ComCruDiv 5 reported 
with CruDiv 5 to OTP % for dirty, 

3200 CTF 52 received orders from ComFIFTHFleet to coordinate 

sortie TF 51, TF 52 and TF % on 10 February. 

Arrivals: TF %i CAPPS, TAYLOR, HENLEY. 

Departures: TF 52: ANZIO, L,C. TAILOR, R.F. KELLER. 

0000 (K) ComFIFTHFleet requested CincPQA to authorize Rear Admiral 
RODGERS to command Task Force to which assigned regard- 
less of relative rank other officers in same Force or 
Group. (This was approved). 

0800 ESTES at anchor Berth 301, ULITHI. 

0900 Conference in ESTES for IDT Rehearsals. Present: Com 

UDTsPaej 00*3, UDT»s 12, 13, 15; ComTransDiv 101, 
CO's GIUSER, WATERS, BATES, BARR, BULL, BIESSMANj CO' 3 
HALL, D. W. TAILOR, BRYANT, J. D. HENLEY, EVANS, CAPPS, 
TWIGGS; C0»s Gunboat Support Units 1 and 2j CO's 10 LCl(G)«s. 

1200 Requested ComFIFTHFleet authorize WAKE ISLAND and 2 

screening vessels sortie 7 February for launching planes 
and conducting communication drill. 

3410 Requested ComFIFTHFleet designate replacement destroyer 

for D.W. TAYLOR, 

1419 Requested CTF 54 to designate destroyer to accompany 

Gunboat Support Units 1 and 2. 

2642 DesDiv 111 reported to CTF 54 for duty. 

0800 (K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, UUTHI. 



A-13 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF $2 QF" S OffRf Tg)^ ^pf gjfj IMA CAMPAIGN 




3 February (Continued) 

0800(K) TG 52.11 commenced sortie for UDT rehearsals in PAU-LOSIEP 
Area in Accordance ComPhibGrpONE Rehearsal OpOrder No, 
A103-45 and ComUDTsPac Rehearsal OpOrder No, A2-45* ROGER- 
WILLIAM Hour 1100 (K); ROGER-EASY Hour 1500 (k), 

0900 Briefed photographic pilots aboard LUNGA POINT, 

0930 Rear Admiral BIANDY attended CinCPac conference in 

INDIAE1P0LIS. 

1035 ComFIFTHFleet requested information on delivery air support 

charts for air and gunnery target folders. (Advised deliv^ 
ered to Officer Messenger Center, ULITHI, on 1 February for 
distribution) • 

1658 Port Dire c tor , ULITHI requested destination, SQA and route 

TU 52.5.1., TU 52.5.2, BAGLEY, PATTERSON, 1 FLAHERTY, R.M. 
ROVtfELL, R.S. BULL. (Advised UDT rehearsal according to 
plan approved by AtComULITHI and copies supplied). 

1835 ComFIFTHFleet directed all Task Force and Task Group 

Commanders to inform Port Director, ULITHI, of orders 
for sortie, entrance, etc., ULITHI. 

1849 Requested CTG 51.1 issue orders OZARK, S.S. MILES and 

WESSON proceed GUAM, arriving 7 February. 

2355 Requested ComServRon 10 to dock LCl(G)»s 450 and 4-89 

for propellor repairs. 

Arrivals: TF 52: CTG 52.3 in TERROR with LINDSEY. 
A February 19A5 

0200(K) ComFIFTHFleet directed STANLEY, HOTARTH and HALFCED re- 
port to CTG 52.3* 

0800 ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. 

0900 Critique in ESTES on UDT Rehearsal. Attendance same as 

conference 2 February, 

0908 Directed order of sortie 10 February, TG 52.2 and 51.17 

at 1300 (K); TG 52.19 at 1430 (K), ESTES firs hip. 



y itiM^M win 




ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPCET OF OPERATIONS IN IHE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 
L February 19A5 (Continued) 

0930 (K) Held conference on ESTES with CorainPac and representatives 
on plans for IWO JIMA. 

1300 Assumed radio guard CcmPhibGrp7 who departed for LEYTE. 

133fl Communication drills, PAUL HAMILTON, R.P. LEARY, J.D. 

HENLEY. 

U30 Directed CTG 52.2 issue orders sortie WAKE ISLAND. 

1600 Secured from communication drills. 

1601 Advised ARKANSAS and IDAHO frequencies for aircraft radio 
drills 7 February. 

1702 Advised ships TF 54 and TG 52,2 instructions for drill 

7 February delivered to Officer Messenger Center, 

1911 CTG 52.3 ordered RIDDLE report to OZARK for duty. 

2328 ComFIFTHFleet ordered BREESE report CTG 52.3 for duty. 

? February 1942 

0800 (K) ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI. ComTransRon 11 advised 
no firing berths desired. 

0900 Force Gunnery Officer briefed all gunnery officers of ships 

of TF 54 present,. CD's of TG 52*5 ships, VOF spotters from 
¥i!AKE ISLAND ard Marine Corps spotters with TF 54. Commun- 
ication drills j INDIANAPOLIS, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON. 

1130 Secured from communication drills. 

1401 ComFIFTHFleet directed CTF 52 to address two weather re- 

ports daily to him and CTF 51 after commencement of 
bombardment, 

1437 Requested ComServRon 10 release one SCR 608 to Cominpac. 

Departures* TF 51: OZARK, WESSON, S.S. MILES, BELLEGROVE 
ASHLAND, RIDDIE, 




A-15 





, . mk kk & ^ ^ 

ENCLOSUEIE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT 0|y§#ik¥f ONS IN THE IWO Jim CAMPAIGN 

6 February 194ft 

00$2 (K) Advised ComFIFTHFleet that radio teletype to beach burned 
out. 

0800 ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. TG 52.11 commenced 

sortie v f or second UDT rehearsal PAU-LOSSIEP Area in accord** 
ance ComPhibGrpONE Rehearsal OpOrder A103-45 and ComUDTsPac 
Rehearsal Operation Order A2-45. Actual gunfire used. 
ROGER -WILLIAM Hour 1100(K); ROGER-EASY Hour 1500(K). 

1043 CTF 54 designated HENLEY to accompany LCI Group 8 on 9 

February. 

1328. CTG 51*1 requested permission proceed on duty assigned, 

Permission granted. 

Arrivals: TF 52: HOPKINS, DGRSEY, HOGAN, HOWARD, BREESE. 
Departures: CTG 51.1 with ships assigned. 

7 Felmxary 194§ 

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. WAKE ISLAND, GRADY, 
R.E. BULL sortie to conduct communication exercises with 
spotting planes. Sent despatch to CTF 51 recommending 
1EUTZE and HAMILTON be substituted in UDT support in 
place EVANS and TAYLOR. 

0900 Force Gunnery Officer briefed gunnery officers of IDAHO 

and ARKANSAS on board ESTES. Held conference with Com- 
UDTsPac on future operations during the morning. 

0930 Communication drills with planes from WAKE ISLAND «• Ships: 

TEXAS NEVADA, TUSCALOOSA, CHESTER, PENSACOIA, SALT LAKE CITY, 
NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, INDIANAPOLIS, BRYANT, BENNION, 
STEMBEL, ESTES. The LEUTZE, NEWCOMB, H.L. EDWARDS , R.P. 
LEARY, HALL, ARKANSAS, HALLIGAN , TWIGGS, PAUL HAMILTON, 
J. D. HENLEY, IDAHO, NEW YORK and CAPPS listened only. 

1022 CTG 52.3 directed HOGAN and LINDSEY to report for duty to 

Port Director, ULITHI as escorts. 

1100 Secured from communication drills. 

1200 ComUDTsPac re$bf 1^c| Jfc.Cdr. McIAUGHLIN, CQr, BELL, admitted 

to SOLACE witl| |±a^xosis combat fatigue*^ 1 I 



A-16 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIM CAMPAIGN 



7 February 194,5 (Continued) 

1330 (K) Communication drills - same as morning, 

lAlZ Requested CTU 94.10.1 to provide aircraft towing services 

TF 52 and 54 departing 10 February. 

1600 Secured from communication drills* 

1700 Issued orders to ComLCIFlot 3 to proceed on 7 February 

to SAIPAN - TG 52,16 assigned. 

Arrivals: TF 54: ARKANSAS, IDAHO. 

Departures: TF 51s LST 42, 121, 224, and HOGAN, LINDSEX. 

8 Fefr m ry l%$ 

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, UUTHI, 

0830 Conference in ESTES «• Plans and briefing for IWO Jim 

Operation, Attendance: CTF 54 J CTG 52.2$ CTG 52,35 CTG 
52,4: Commanders Fire Support Units 1, 2, 3, and 4 $ 
Commanders Support Carrier Units 1, 2, and 3$ ComDesDivs 
11, 12, 91, 101, 111: ComCortDivs 63 and 72 j Commanders 
Gunboat Support Units 1 and 2; Commanding Officers all 
ships present of TF 52 and TF 54. Also ComBatDiv 6, 
ComCruDivs 13 and 17 and Commanding Officers Fire Support 
Ships of TF 58. 

1358 ComFIFTHFleet ordered PCE 851 to report to CTF 52 for 

movement to SAIPAN. 

1430 CTG 52.3 in TERROR with GUNSTQN HALL, DCRSEX, HOWARD, 

HOPKINS iiftEESE, HALFGRD, FRINGLE, STANIEt and HCMARTH 

departed for SAIPAN. 
1600 Requested ComFwdArea to assign 2 A0*s to rendezvous with 

-GTF54 at 1700 12 February at Lat. H°~58» N.j Long. 145°- 

34 1 E. 'and 2 A0*s rendezvous CTG 52.2 at 0630 12 February 

Lat. 14 ~33' N.j Long. 146°-00t E. 

1615 Accepted offer ComCruDiv 5 for transfer of Aerologist to 

ESTES for forthcoming operation. 



A-17 



W #RATIONS IN yfitfj 

8 February 19A5 (Continued) 

1657 (K) Ordered Lt. FERGUSON to assume temporary command of BULL, 
pending arrival new commanding officer* 

2355 Directed PCE 851 to report to ComLCIFlot 3 for movement 

to SAIPAN. 

Departures: TF 51s HALFCBD, FRINGI£, STANLEY, HCXVARTH, 
TF 52: CTG 52,3 in TERROR with GUHSTON HALL, HOPKINS, 
DORSEY, HOWARD, and EREESE. 

9 Fetffwy 3<?4g 

0800 (K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. CTF 52 son* oxrfc ©poed* 
letter Serial 007, outlining antiaircraft firing for 10 
February, TG 52,16, ComLCIFlot 3 with LCI Group 8, 
HENLEY, and PCE 851 departed for SAIPAN. 

0900 During day briefed ships 1 spotters and plane spotters from 

BB ! s, GA's and CL's aboard ESTES. 

1150 Requested CTG 52.2 to forward latest task organization his 

group. 

1330 Communication drills, IDAHO, ARKANSAS, CAPPS. 

1430 SALT IAKE CITY reported to CTF 54 for duty. 

1A37 Directed Movement Unit B^KER to remain 8 miles astern of 

Movement Unit ABLE upon completion AA firing 10 February. 

1600 Secured from communication drills. 

Departures: TG 52,16, ComLCIFlot 3 with LCI Group 8, 
HENLEY and PCE 851 for SAIPAN. 




A-18 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIldA CAMPAIGN 



10 February 1945 

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, UIITHI. TF 58 commenced sortie. 

0900 Continued briefing ships' spotters and plane spotters from BB»s, 

CA's and CL' s during morning aboard ESTES. 

1200 Sent despatch to CTF 51 outlining plans for delivery operation 

orders to TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG, NEW YORK, WILEY, HUTCHINS, TERRY 
and DALY. Also gave plans for briefing the above ships. Lade 
radar guard assignments for TG 52. 19* 

1340 TG 52.19 commencing sortie. ESTES underway in accordance with 

Sortie Plan, Annex (A) to ComPhibGrpONE Movement Order No. A105- 
45. 

1400 Directed screening vessels not to participate in firing against 

drone • 

1415 Directed TUSCALOOSA to control drone runs for anti-aircraft fir- 

ing. ESTES passed Beacon "A", MANGEJANG Island, abeam to star- 
board. 

1533 (K) CTG 52.19 assumed tactical command Movement Unit ABLE. 

1602 Corrmcnced scheduled exercises. Drone anti-aircraft firing. 

1623 Received report NEVJCOMB had gyro compass casualty, would join 

later. 

1659 Informed CTG 52«9«2 that no drone available for him, as this 

group shot it down. 

1700 Ceased drone anti-aircraft firing. Comr.on.ee d anti-aircraft fir- 
ing at towed sleeve. 

1800 Ceased anti-aircraft firing. 

1809 HELM delivered mail to ESTES. 

1810 Formed cruising disposition 6S1. Informed CTG 52-2 and CTG 52.9* 1 
of cruising orders for night. 

2000 Position: 10°-38.9' N.j 140°-33.9 r E. 

2010 Informed by .BATES that sound gear ^nojJcratlve . 

A-19 




ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 faPSBl $DF ftefikMSK|*]i Bffi| lilllMA CAMPAIGN 



11 February 1945 
073S(K) CHESTER reported steering casualty. 
0739 CHESTER reported steering casualty repaired. 

0800 Position: 12°-00.2» N. ; 142°-53«3 f E * 

0806 Ordered Movement Unit BAKER to join formation. 

0904 Formed cruising disposition 3V1. 

0949 Commenced tactical exercises. 

1023 Secured from tactical exercises. 

1200 Noon Position: 12°-27.5' N.; 143°-29.5' E. 

1252 Approvad CTG 52.2 proposal to send two TBM»s to SAIPAN. 

1611 Directed Movement Unit BAKER take station 16030 at 1645 (K). 

1645 Movement Unit B>\KER leaving disposition. 

1709 Formed cruising disposition 6S1. 

1812 WATERS requested 12 hours availability S- VIP AN repair steam leak 
main feed pump. 

1818 Informed CTU 54 • 1.3 that ESTES will follow Fire Support Unit 3 

during approach in morning. 

1827 Directed CTU 54»9^13 to direct APD's of Movement Unit ABIE to pro- 

ceed on duty assigned at 0500. 

1830 Executed Primary Approach Plan, SAIPAN, Annex (B) to ComPhibGrp- 

ONE Movement Order A105-45* 

2000 Position: 13°-50.7 f N.; 3W>-24-6' E. 

2212 STEMBEL reported surface contact dead ahead, 3000 yards. 

2217 Emergency turn 6 executed. 

2231 Emergency 6 turn. Surface contact identified as PC 1339 • 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 R|^)l%OF OESR/.TICNS IN THE IW m CAMPAIGN 



12 February 1945 

0500 APD ! s released to proceed as directed by CTG 52.4 to report to 
CTF 53- 

0553 Fire Support Units 2 and 3 ordered to proceed independently. 

0600 Fire Support Units 1 and 4 ordered to proceed independently. 

0710 Received information from CTF 51 that AUBURN, ELDORADO, TG 53-5, 
TG 52.4, TF 54 only would engage in first rehearsal. 

0735 CTF 51 ordered MULLANY to replace D.W. TAYLCR. 

0815 Requested berth assignment at SAIPAN, for ESTES, TENNESSEE, VICKS*- 

BURG* 

0855 Requested 12 hours availability and berth for WATERS from CTF 51 • 

0930 CTF 51 took control air support and naval gunfire. 

0931 ComDesRon 24 in DALY with HUTCHINS reported for duty. Ordered 
to report to CTG 52.2. 

0937 Informed that BLESSMAN required new sonar projector head (none 
available). 

0945 Transferred Lt.Col. IVELLER and assistants to NEST YORK to brief 

for forthcoming operations. 

IO36 Second H Hour announced for 3230(K). 

1040 WATERS availability granted. 

1145 TENNESSEE requested permission remain anchor Berth L-40. 

1150(K) CTF 51 directed primary plan for rehearsal 13 February. 

1155 Directed CTF 54 to send one screening vessel each frcn Movement 
Group ABLE and BAKER to ESTES to receive mail at 1500. 

1505 Requested ComServRon 10 to provide sonar projector head to 
BLESSMAN. (None available). 

1605 CTF 51jiireQtod CTF 53 to control gunfire and air support 13 Feb- 
ruary ^p£il U plus 30 when CTF 52 wpu3jd assume control. 

A-21 



■Hi 4 ? & % ft $ ^ " ' \ ! 

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPO OF , OPERATIONS IN THE two $11% CAMPAIGN 

12 February 1945 (continued) 

1611 ESTES anchored Berth 3>56 SAIPAN. 

1637 Directed CTG 52.3 to send one minesweeper to close ESTES at 1800. 

1801 CTF 51 directed CTG 52.3 to substitute YMS 426 vice YMS 411 and 

YMS 288 vice SC 775- 

2123 Granted authority TENNESSEE remain at anchor until 0600 Ik Feb- 

ruary. 

13 February 1945 

0620(K) ESTES underway independently enroute rehearsal area off TINIAN. 

0651 TENNESSEE reported completing fueling. 

0737 Transferred officer messenger mail to TWIGGS. 

0756 CTF 53 confirmed H Hour at 0915* 

0805 Requested CTF 54 issue movement orders to NBV YORK. 

0952 Directed CTG 52.2 and CTU 52.5*1 to report logistic status vessels 

their groups. 

1012 Directed ComLCIFlot 3 to report to CTG 52.3 with ICI Group 8 for 

movement when released by CTF 53* 

1115 Received report LCI(G) 346 was ho3.ed by LVT and in harbor for 

repairs. 

1237 MULLANY designated to replace D.W. TAYLOR ni$it harassment D-3 

night. 

1239 Requested CTF 51 replace R.M. ROWELL due to casualty sound gear. 

1240 CTF 53 signalled exercises completed. 

1250 CTF 54 directed WILEY and BENNIQN to accompany NSW YORK to IWO 

JIMA. 

1338 CTF 51 directed WESSON replace R.E. ROWELL in TG 52.2. 

A-22 



'AIGN 



13 February 1945 (continued) 

1522(K) Directed ESTES, TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG to get underway in order 
named at 06lO(K) 14 February. 

1531 ESTES anchored in Berth L-56, SAIPAN. 

1640 Ordered TENNESSEE and VICKSBURG to send gunnery officers and 

others to ESTES for briefing. 

1935 Informed CTF 51 that logistics were completed* 

14 February 1945 

0612 (K) CTF 51 directed that accurate records be kept for submission of 
all units Amphibious Support Force and Gunfire and Covering Force 
participating in forthcoming operation. (This was passed on to 
CTF 54 for information and action). 

0612 ESTES underway standing out of harbor to rendezvous with TF 54« 

0619 VICKSBURG and TENNESSEE underway ; standing out ♦ 

0640 JCHN D. HENLEY, RICHARD P. LSARY and TWIGGS reported as screen. 

0645 Formed column, ESTES, TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG, distance &50 yards. 

0S00 Position: 15°-15 t N.j 145°~22 l E. 

0923 CTF 52 assumed tactical command TG 52.19» Formed cruising dis- 
position 3V2. 

1040 TENNESSEE reported all repairs to turbine completed. 

1103 Directed screening vessels to include station number when report- 
ing sound contacts. 

1200 Noon Position: 15°-50.3 ! N.; lA4 -42.4 f E. 

1300 HENLEY, and BRYANT closed ESTES to receive mail and deliver to 
heavy ships. 

1534 Directed CTG 52.4 to' make deliveries charts accordance Annex (M), 
CTF 51 OpPlan A25-44* w in£ lading Western beaclgesf % Directed him to 
detail additional XlS %o accompany WATERS* | ^ ■ 



A-23 



ENCLOSURE (a) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TB^jjIMA. CAMPAIGN 



14 February 1<?45 (continued) 

1621(K) PAUL HAMILTON reported No. 3 main feed pump casualty. Estimated 
completion repairs morning 16 February. 

2000 Position: 17°-2S.6» N.; 143°-51.2» E. 

15 February 1945 

0800(K) Position: 20°-03.8« N.j VtfP-l&.y E. 

1020 Requested CTG 52.2 make fighter sweeps CHICHI JIMA on afternoon 

of D~3 and D-2 and morning and afternoon of D-l. 

1100 CTG 52.2 reported that destroyer was sent to pick up high voltage 
transformer. 

1200 Noon Position: 20°-55»3 f N.j 142°-34.2» E. 

Informed CTU 54»9»1 that after Movement Unit BAKER proceeded as 
previously directed he would become OTC of Movement Unit ABLE. 

1252 Passed ComPhibsPac serial 0073 dated 11 February to CTG 52.4 for 

information and action. 

1510 1EARY. reported sound contact, distance 1500 yards 5 bearing 010°. 

1517 LEARY reported contact probably fish(but much later after all 
ships had cleared vicinity, reported it as probable submarine). 

1519 Emergency turn 9 executed. 

1524 Increased speed to 15 knots. 

1530 Emergency 6 turn executed. 

1552 3 Turn executed bringing disposition back to original base course. 

1710 Directed CTG 52.4 to limit speed of APD f s to 20 knots and not to 
approach closer than' 3000 yards to beach nor interfere with bom- 
bardment of B70 JIMA, during D-3 inspection of beaches. 

1750 Directed Movement Unit BAKER to proceed independently. 

1759 Movement Unit ABLE formed cruising disposition 6S3. Rear Admiral 
FISCHIER in TEXAS OTC. 



W ^24 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



15 February 1945 (continued) 

1800(K) Received visual from LEARY reporting only 4 echoes obtained on 

sound contact slight up doppler, no hydrophone effect. (Despatch 
sent to CTU 52.3*19 and TFC5thFlt informing them of contact). 



2000 Position: 22°-21.5' N.; 142°-00.5 ! E. 



A-25 




ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT amjn^jg^ {N&VP #C 
16 February 194.5 

OOOO(K) Advance Movement Group approaching IW6 JIMA in two dispositions, 

proceeding independently. Steaming on base course 331° at 14*5 knots 
CTF 52 in ESTES. 

0230 TERRY detached to rendezvous with Mine sweeping Unit 4. 

0233 Contact made with Mine Unit 1, bearing 359°, range 36,900 yards, 

0345 Contact made on MINAMI IWO JIMA, bearing 050°, range about 54,200 
yards, 

0452 Contact made with NEW YORK, bearing 081°, range 26,300 yards. 
0625 SALT LAKE CITY launched spotting plane. 

0630 BR12SSB directed to join Sweep Unit 4. 

0643 Special fighter sweep on way to CHICHI JIMA to neutralize airfield 
and shipping. 

0644 CTG 52,3 informed CTF 52 that Sweep Unit 1 was in Area 1 and Sweep 
Unit 3 in Area 13. 

0700 STEMEEL detached to rendezvous with Mino swooping Unit 2. 

0707 NEVADA commenced scheduled fires. 

0714 Hydrographic piano on station. 

0718 All fire support ships directed to fire at long and medium ranges 

only when officiant air spot is practicable. 

0725 Air Coordinator and Strike Group ABIE on station, 

0755 NEW YORK commenced scheduled fires. 

0755 WILLIAMSON standing by ME?/ YORK #2 piano. 

0757 2 Enemy merchant ships reported by an ASP plane 31 milos west of 

0758 SALT LAKE CITY directed to pick up dovmed plfnc 
0802 Informed that bo|Bf,Swfiop Uftits 2 and^^c^^lAtes behind scheda 

A-26 




ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE'BfO jM'CAMPAIGN 

16 February 1945 (continued) 
0804(K) Merchant ships identified as of 500 tons or smaller, 
0811 First pass completed in Area Ij results negative. 
0815 Two enemy vessels under air attack, 

0825 Air Support informed that 1 vessel was dead in water and that 
attack ms continuing, 

0830 WILLIAMSON recovered pilot and radioman from NEW YORK piano, which 
was beyond salvage, 

0835 Strike Group ABES ordered to return to base, 

Hydrographic plane ordered to return to base; message drop 
cancelled, 

0837 SALT LAKE CITY mado roport on status of NEW YORK plane, 

0838 WILLIAMSON instructod to return personnel of doomed plane to 
NEW YORK, 

0840 SALT LAKE CITY returning to station, 

0840 Strike Group BAKER orbiting base. 

0843 Attack on two enemy vessels completed, both targets burning, 

0850 All ammunition from 4 VF planes expended on tv/o enemy vessels, 8 
to 10 men wore observed abandoning ship, getting into whale boat, 

0853 TWIGGS requested instructions on what to do about survivors of 
sunken ships, 

0856 All ships warned of floating mine sighted boaring 122°, distance 
10 miles from Il g hgoete s. 

0857 Special CHICHI JIMA strike unable to accomplish mission due to 
weather, 

0902 8 V0F on station, 

0905 Fire support ships reported inside swooping track in Area 1, 
0908 Twin enginod plane reported taking off island. 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT 0F OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



16 February 19A5 (continued) 

0909 (K) Flash RED; Control GREEN. 

0913 Second lap of Aroa 1 completed; results negative. 

0915 Scroon Commander instructed to order ships to capture any boat from 
burning vossols and prevent their landing on IWO JIMA, 

0917 Svioep Unit 3 in Area 13 and Unit 4 in Area 5 reported 30 minutes 
behind schedule. Unit 2 in Aroa 2 reported 20 minutes behind 
schedule. Results negativo in all areas, 

0927 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN, 

0930 CHESTER, PENSACOLA, VICKSBURG each report 2 operational aircraft. 
0936 Flash RED; Control GREEN. 

094.0 Firing ships were asked if they 770 re using air spot and all replied 
in the affirmative 

0953 NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, SALT LAKE CITY each reported 2 planes opera- 
tional. 

1008 Swoop Unit U under fire from beach in Aroa 5. 

1009 Because of Y/oathor, photo plane did not take photographs. 

1013 PC 800 reported sinking 1 Type 93 Model 3 floater mine at 0930, 
1027 CHESTER firing to cover sweepers. 

1041 All ships directed not to fire faster than schodulod rates. They 
were informed it was not necessary to maintain scheduled ratos 
under unfavorable weather conditions, 

1050 Swoop Unit 3 completod Area 2 on schedule; results negative. 

1055 WILEY in Station A-17 made 'Br sound contact and attacked. Contact 
lost, and unable to bo regained. 

1056 CominPac reported shoal, bearing 203°* distanco 5 miles from 

ok u hid been clearance swept; results negative. 

1118 Aroa 2 completed on schedule. 



- 'A~28 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPOW ^JSmjmSm^^B Effl faflJcAMPAIGN 

16 February 194.5 (continued) 

1125 (K) Flash T i?HITE ; Control GREEN. 

1126 WLJEl regained contact; not submarine. Did not make attack. 

1140 CTG 52.3 v?as directed not to permit Unit 4 closer to beach until 
visibility permitted proper fire support. 

1142 CTF 52 informed ships that at night Tjhile remaining at objective 
ESTES would keep NX12 beacon turned on pulsating. Other ships 
similarly oquippod mvo authorized to use same method as aid in 
local identification. 

1145 V7IIEY contact evaluated non* submarine. 

1210 Area 1 completed, results negative. 

1215 CAP strafing enemy Tjhalo boat. 

1230 Sweep Unit 4 ordored to complete Area 5. 

1240 CTG 52.3 requested to order Sweep Unit 1 to report to Commander 
Screen. 

1240 UDT operations scheduled for night of 16-17 February cancolled. 

(Landing few men to investigate oil drums spaced along beach.) 

1242 36 friendly heavy bombers approaching objective. 

1243 All AFD's less BAR assigned to CTF 54 for ni^it deployment. CTF 
54 requested to fuel them as practicable, 73ATERS first. 

1245 Area 4 completed; results negativo, 

1301 Commander Screen directed to form Screen AB #ien Swsop Unit 1 
reports for duty and to rolease APD's to CTG 52.4» 

1320 TRACY investigated rnd recovered objoct reported as mine by ESTES, 
Object proved to be gun broach cover. 

1323 36 heavy bombers orbiting waiting for break in freast&er, 

1345 CAP returns to baso. 




1350 Sweep Unit 3 will cokpl^tQ nortl)OjmWl3rArea 13; available for 
screen at 1500. ^ 



A-29 



f y 1 f 4^ & :„ 

, ■ ' .V'.,. 

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 RSPoft^lti-OQ^^S IN THE IWQi JpMAMPAIGN. 




16 February 1945 (continued) 

1355 (K) CTF 54 informed firo support units to commence fueling APD f s at 
1600. 

H00 3 APD f s relieved by ships of TU 52.3.1; others to relieve in 15 

minutes. 

1401 BARE to bo in position at 1500 for inspection of beaches. 

1402 Srajep Unit 3 directed to report to Commander Screen upon completion 
of northern half of Area 13. 

14.10 Weather report sent to CTF 51. 

1413 NEVADA to fuel BULL and IDAHO to fuel BLESSMAN beginning at 1600. 

1415 0S2U plane from PENSACOLA shot do mi one Zeke. 

1421 CAS reported bogie 7 IlwftujJm 100. 

14.25 Flash RED 5 Control YELLOW. 

1430 PENSACOLA directed to fuel V7ATERS and GIIMER. 

14.37 Screen AB formed. 

144.5 CTG 52.3 reported fuel conditions to TG 52.3 satisfactory, except 
HCFJAKD, which will bo fueled from TERROR on 17th. 

1447 Flash BLUE; Control Y£LLC„ . 

14.53 CTG 52.4 instructed to commence inspoction of beaches. 

1512 Sweep Unit 1 completed Area 3 between 300 and 500 fathom curve; 

results negative. 

1512 CAP launched. 

1515 Sweep Unit 3 has completed northern half Area 13; results negative. 

1517 SALT LAKE CITY reported small boat moving south in Area 149. 

1520 Flash WHITE ; Control GREEN. , _ 

1521 Area 5 to be complo$c?a%t; 1630; Area 6 at 1645.^ y| 

A-30 



ft 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE 1770. JftMA CAMPAIGN. 



16 February 1945 (continued) 

1530 (K) SERENE, SHELTER, HALL reporting to Commander Screen for duty. 

1533 CAP on station. 

1534 CTU 52.3 directed to sink small boat moving south. 

1544 CTU 52.3.5 reported ho could soe no small boat. 

1605 CTU 52.3.5 requested to direct BREESE to sink buoys at Pts. J-M 

and K while gear "was being raeovercd. 

1613 TERRY reported mission completed. 

1622 All ships which could effectively fire in assigned areas were 

directed to carry out fire without regard to time schedule, but 
to keep within ammunition allowance. 

1628 Area 5 completed. Area east and west of KIGASHI Rock for 1000 

yards not swept. 

1631 LEAK? reported sound contact; investigating. 

1635 PENSACOIA directed not to fire on small boat which she reported as 
minesweepers were in this area. 

I636 IEAKY reported she had lost sound contact. 

1640 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN. (Bogies on radar screen). 

1642 LEARY continuing to regain contact. 

1643 Night deployment assignments made. Sweep Unit 4 to report to 
ESTES at 1800 for screening duties, 

1644 MULLANY, HAMILTON, STEMBEL, and LEARY directed to remain at object- 
ive for night operations. 

1645 BLESSMAN and BULL directed to report to CTF 54 on completion 
exercises. 

1647 Flash 7IHITE; Control GREEN. (Bogies proved friendly) 
1652 BATES reported to CTF 54 for duty; exorcise completed. 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA C/»MPAIGN 



16 February 194.5 (continued) 

170 5(K) CTF 52 informed ships present that antiaircraft fire control would 
bo governed by provisions of Appendix XIII, Annex (I) CTF 51 OpPlan 
A25-A4. 

1708 TU 52.3.1 ordered to proceed to Area 14 at 1800. 

1712 CTG 52.3 roportod that d^y's assigned sweep areas had been com- 
pleted with negative results, except for one rusty Mark 93 Model 
3 mine, inhich had been sunk by gunfire. 

1716 ARKANSAS reported she us being fired on. 

1720 TU 52.3.5 reported to CTF 52 for duty. 

1720 VF crashed 3 miles from Hbteefefce, bearing 300°. 

1727 MULLANY directed to rescue pilot of downed plane. 

1728 ARKANSAS estimated that 3" guns had fired at her. 

1735 HOPKINS roportod having rescued downod pilot from LONGA POINT. 

1740 Target ASP ordered to return to base. 

1753 Ships coasod firing, 

1800 ESTES, proceeding astern of TENNESSEE, underway. Minesweepers 
astern of ESTES. 

1800 HOPKINS roportod that rescued pilot was named STEVENSON. 

1805 BARR reported her mission successfully' conplotod. 

1817 DEFENSE foulod swoops on underwater object bearing 212°, distance 

6100 yards from IfuSwlej . CTG 52.3 suggested further investigation 
on 17th. 

1821 CTF 52 informed CTU 54.1.3 thr.t ho and Sweep Unit U would follow 
group for a short time and thon return to objective. 

1832 MUHAN3T reported mission successfully completed. 

1933 SCURRY retrieving gear by hand; will toko anothor hour to complote. 
CTG 52.3 suggestod joining ESTES group. 



A-32 

V 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 TEPOTCT OF OPERATIONS IN THE im JIMA CAMPAIGN. 



16 February 194,5 (continued) 

2OO0(K) Position! 24°-58.7» N.j Ulo-05.5 1 E. 

204-5 SCUflRY roportod to screen of ESTES for assignment. She wis assigned 
position 330, 2000 yards, ESTBS course 118°, speed 8 knots. 



A-33 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



17 February 1945 

OOOO (K) TF f s 52 and 54- engaged in night deployment, after bombarding, 

minesweeping and air operations at IWO JIM on D -3 Day, ESTES 
in company with four minedraft at 8 knots, circling 3370 JIMA at 
5 to 8 miles distance to maintain general observation of DD night 
operations . 

0040 Bombardment instructions for 17th sent out to TG 54. 1# 

0100 Report of minesweeping accomplished sent out to TF 52 and TF 54. 

0124 NEWCOMB . and HALLIGAN directed to proceed to Lat, 26° &, * Long, 
HI -50 1 E, at 0600 to operate as radar pickets and perform 
Air-Sea Rescue Services for TG 52.2 planes striking CHICHI and 
HAHA JIMAS. 

0243 ARDENT reported sound contact bearing 320°, distance 1500 yards. 

0245 ARDENT reported she was going to attack, unless ordered other- 
wise, 

0257 ARDENT reported contact lost in wake of other vessels, 

0420 CTU 52,3.2 directed to leave formation and proceed and rendezvous 
with Sweep Units 6, 7 and 8, 

054.8 TEXAS, ARKANSAS and TUSCALOOSA directed to launch pianos at 
discretion, 

0635 Carriers launched CAP. 

0635 Flash WHITE- Control GREEN, 

O64.O SALT IAKE CITY launched planes. 

0641 HALLIGAN reported under attack by 3 Betty's, bearing 355°, dis- 
tance 48000 from Ift^cfec. 

O64.3 HALLIGAN downed one Betty, and received no damages* 

0645 Flash BLUE 5 Control GREEN. 

O648 CAP on station, 

O650 HALLIGAN reports screen cleared; planes last seen bearing 260°, 



A-34 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF ASLitoSS* *hf ^&^0 JIMA CAMPAIGN 

17 February 19^5 (Continued ) 

0656(K) Flash RED; Control GREEN. 

0700 Ships commence bombardment. 

Flash RED} Control YELLOW, 

CTG 52.4 asked for his recommendation for R-E Hour. 

0707 Flash BLUE; Control GREEJtf. 

0708 CTG 52.4 recommends 1100 as R-E Hour. 
0715 Strike ABLE on station. 

0720 Mine Unit 2 and Gunboat Support Units One and Two arrived Ufo 
JIM/L. 

0725 Special strike 12 VF on way to CHICHI JIMA. 

0730 CHESTER and PENSACOLA report 2 operational aircraft; VIC KS BURG 

reports 0. 

0734- CTU 52.3.5 released from screening ESTES; to carry out day's 
assignment. 

0735 Target ASP on station. 

0735 CTG 52.3 requested to direct 2 ships in addition to J+ AM's re- 

quired from Sweep Unit 2 to report to ComDesRon 4.6 for duty. 

0750 Informed that TRACY and LINDSEY had already been ordered to 

report for screening assignment, 

0752 Informed all APD's except BARR and BATES fueled to capacity on 

16th. 

0758 TU 52.3.7 and 52.3.8 receiving considerable fire from GREEN 

Beach. 

0800 Sweep Units 6 and 7 commencing scheduled operations in Area 9. 

0801 TU 52.3.7 and 52.3*8 ordered to move to seaward. 

0803 SALT LAKE CITY, NEW YORK, IDAHO, TENNESSEE and CHESTER directed 

to move into lower limit of R£ 



limit of Ran^ge JBan&. $AiSRl g 38 | 

I! < ?\ if 



A-35 



i- is 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 I&PORT "5f OPERATIONS" IN *THE IWO jlMA CAMPAIGN 

17 February 1945 (Continued ) 

0810 (K) Hydrographic plane over IWO JIMA. 

0811 CTG 52.3 directed to commence operations; fire support ships 
closing- in # 

0818 CTG 52,3 commences operations. Requests 2 destroyers for close 

support. 

0821 R-E Hour confirmed as 1100 (K). 

0824- Informed by CTG 52.3 that YUB would require closer fire support. 

0825 CTG 52.3 directed to conduct further investigation of object upon 

which DEFENSE fouled hor gear on l6th t 

0830 CTU 54.1.1 ordered to direct TENNESSEE, IDAHO and NEVADA to close 
for accurate destructive bombardment; also to move WH YORK, CHESTER 
and SALT LAKE CITY in to effective range. 

0831 Photo plane and fighter escort on station. 
0834 CTG 52.3 resuming operation. 

0837 CTU 54.1.1 told that TENNESSEE, IDAHO and NEVADA were to move 
inside 3000 yards and as near 2000 as practicable. 

0840 Requested CTG 52.3 to advise completion time of Area 9. 

0855 ESTES closed to within 2£ to 3 miles from beach. 

0855 CTF 54 directed NEW YORK with 2 DD's as screen deploy night of 

D -2 following Movement Unit ABIE and to have NEW YORK in firing 
position at 0600 daily. 

0858 CTG 52.3 advised he expected to complete Area 9 about 1100. 

0902 Photo plane commenced operations at 5000 feet over target. 

0920 ComDcsRon 46 directed to assign 2 of first destroyers arriving 
for UDT support to support Swoop Units 5 and 6 in Area 9. 

0933 CTG 52,3 was informed that fire support was being provided by 

battleships and that when destroyers are available they will 
supplement. 

g 1 J* ^ ^ '~ """ " 

0935 LCI(G)*s forming up prcf^Qtory to closing eastern beaches in 

support of scheduled UOT, * operations* %m 



A-36 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 LEPORT CF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 

V4- L . ;. 

17 February 1945 (Continued ) 

0938 (K) FENSACOLA hit by fire from IWO JIMA. 

0948 CTG 52 « 3 informed CTF 52 that IMS received heavy fire from IWO 

JIMA. 

1009 CTG 52. A was asked which APD had been detailed to accompany 
WATERS to rendezvous with Attack Force. 

1010 BRYANT and LEUTZE sent to support TU 52.3.7 and 52.3.8. 
1010 Weather report sent to CTF 51. 

10U CTG 52.3 reports that battery which hit PENSACOLA will interfere 

with Sweep Unit A in Area 8. Additional close in fire support 
requested* 

1015 CHICHI JIMA strike on way home; many small craft there destroyed. 

1016 ComDosRon 4-6 requested that BRYA&T and LEUTZE be released from 
supporting minesweepers to tako station for UDT operatic n # 

1018 CTG 52.3 informed that unless mincswocping was expedited the 

UDT reconnaissance would be delayed. 

1021 LCI(G) ! s moving toward beach supported, by TWIGGS and C/PPS. 

1035 MULLANY designated to deliver photographs to LUNGA POINT. Ensign 

STEVENSON, who had been downed on 16th, will be returned from 
HOPKINS via MULLANY to LUNG/. POINT. 

1037 CTG 52.3 reported Area 14- completed; results negative. 

1038 APD's standing in toward beach with UDT teams, preparatory to 
launching LCpTrJ's. 

1039 LEUTZE and BRYANT directed to support both minesweepers and 
UDT's. 

1045 LCl(G) f s have taken station to support UDT operation and are 

firing into the beach. Enemy returning fire. 

104-8 APD Units take station to commence UDT operation. 

1052 CTG 52.3 reports Area 9 completed; results negative. 



A-37 




ill % < ' K: - r f> 1 

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT iM^Wfi in||U0LIGN 

17 February 194.5 (Continued) 

1053 (K) TENNESSEE directed not to fire time fused shells over UDT boats. 

1055 TENNESSEE reports being hit at 084.8; 4- men injured, no damage to 
ship. 

1055 VICKSBURG moving around to support sweepers in Area 8, 

1100 ROGER EASY Hour. 

1101 LCI(G) 44-9 has been hit. 

1112 LCI 450 standing out of operating area; she is afire. 

1113 Smoke being furnished "by white phosphorous shells. 

1117 CTG 52.4 requested air strike in Area I83 and 184, whence fire 

is believed coming. 

1121 LEUTZE reports being hit; Captain injured, Executive Officer 

in command, minor material damage. 

1125 Air strike being sent in to support UDT f s 

1130 CTG 52.4- was asked if operations wore progressing satisfactorily 

and he replied that UDT ! s were receiving heavy fire from right 
flank. 

1133 BIS 362 fou]od sweep gear on shoal Lat. 1410-19 1 E.; 21>P-W N. 

1137 CTG 52./+ requested smokers. He was directed to use WJP. 

projectiles. 

114-1 CTG 52.4- requested increased, rate of fire on all known targets, 

and this was ordered. 

114-5 LCI(G) 474- observed to be hit; listing heavily; believed to be 

sinking. 

1151 LCI 4-74- reports that crew has abandoned ship; all aboard CAPPS, 

1156 CTG 52.4- was requested to provide information on nature of 

opposition from beach itself. 

1200 CTG 52,4 believed^Jbfi^o* w«5 ^oi^.mgrt^r; fire. 

, ',1 "* t ; ' * ' >' > I ""^ 

A-38 




1218 
1224 

1225 

1234 

1238 

1241 

1241 

1241 
1242 

1245 

1251 
1254 
1254' 
1310 
1313 



•y 19A5 (Continued ) 

CTG 52.4 requested smokers again. 

CTU 52,5.1 informed that CTF 52 would take 21 or more bed cases 
after UDT operation completed. 

CTU 52,5.1 was asked how many KJI's would be available for 
afternoon 1 s operations and he replied that only one would be 
available. 

WILLIAMSON going alongside LCI 449 which is reported out of 
control and sinking. 

CTU 54.9.1 asked if he should hold up firing schedule or continue 
from south of bearing 070°. 

CTG 52,3 requested instructions for Sweep Units 6 and 7 which 
are ready to commence in Area 10 on schedule, 

CTG 52,4 was requested for his recommendation for use of smoke 
during afternoon's exercises and his recommendation for R-W Hour. 

CTG 52,3 requested permission for Sweep Unit 4 to remain in Area 
8, estimated time of completion 1500. 

TENNESSEE reported sho had 40 critical cases from KJI's aboard. 

LEUTZE reported that Commanding Officer required Xray and sur- 
gery and she was told to close ESTES to transfer casualties, 

WILLIAMSON reported her rescue party aboard LCI 449 and that 
TERROR was alongside and standing by. WILLIAMSON available to 
continue servicing planes. 

CTG 52,3 was requested to verify reported obstruction. 
CTG 52,4 desired smoke for afternoon's operations, 
CTG 52.3 reported LCI alongside with 60$ casualties aboard. 
B~24's contacted on way to IWO JIM. 

CTU 52.3.6 directed to commence scheduled operation, LINDSEY 





A-39 



ENCLOSURE (A) to CTF 52 REPORT drf" OPERATIONS IN THE jTlflA^MPAIGN 
17 February 19A5 (Continued ) 

1314(10 TWTGGS requested NOT YORK to take casualties she had aboard from 
LCI's. 

1315 CTU 52. 3.6 reported to CTG 52.3 that fire support v/as negative 
at this tine, 

1316 PENSACOLA requested cancellation of her firing schedule for the 
afternoon while doctor operated on casualties. 

1325 WILLIAMSON reported to TERROR that she had possible sound contact 

on port bow, range 800 yards. 

1325 CTG 52*3 directed to continue sweeping Area 8, Heavy fire support 

units ordered to close beach, CTG 52.3 to commence operations as 
soon as they arrive. 

CTU 52.5.1 and 52.5.2 informed LCl(G)»s not required for after- 
noon's operation. 

1327 CTG 52.3 directed to commence opcratim in Area 10 as soon as 

heavy ships arc scon to close the beach. 

1327 CTG 52.4 informed that no LCI's are available for afternoon's 

operation and that the use of airplane smoke screens, VJP shells 
from destroyers and close support by both DDIs and heavy ships 
is contemplated, 

1330 CTG 52,4 reported on morning f s operation: 12 LCI's hit; all 

swimmers but one recovered. He recommended that DD's close to 
2000 yards and that smoke planes be available for immediate use, 
on call* 

1333 WILLIAMSON reported to TERROR that contact was mushy; no contact 

now, 

1337 VICKSBURG directed to cover mines?; copers in Area 8 and to carry 

out schedule as far as possible. 

1337 Sweep Unit 3 being fired on by 4.0mm. in Area 7. Ordered to move 

out until fire support arrives. 

1339 Photo plane mission successfully accomplished. 

1350 Smoke planes report on statirn. 



A-40 



ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPORT OP OPER4T|QNS Hi THE ; 




17 February 1945 (Continued ) 
1354(K) B-24's bombing IWO JIM. 

1358 LEUTZE reports damage sustained in morning's hit, 

14.00 CTU 54.9.1 directed to observe operations in Area 10 and inform 
CTF 52 if airplane smoke needed for their protection. Ships 
arc to close in to 2000 yards from shore. 

U00 HAMILTON and HENLEY designated to support YMS in Area 10, com- 
mencing now. 

14-02 MULLANY instructed to rendezvous at 0600 18th at Pt. RANSOM to 

deliver photographs to LUNGA POINT, 

U06 ARKANSAS and TUSCALOOSA directed to close in to within 2000 yards 
of shore, 

U09 ComCruDiv 5 to take chargo of CHESTER and VICKSBURG in supporting 

minesweepers in Area 7 and 8, 

1410 HOPKINS directed to transfer Ens. STEVENSON to MULLANY for transfer 
to LUNGA POINT. 

1415 Received report of damage to PENSACOIA. 

1424 Informed that CTU 52.5.1 was putting a fen officers and men 
aboard LCI 44-9. 

1425 All ships requested to keep sharp lookout for one missing UDT 
swimmer. 

1428 Commanding Officer of LEUTZE and 3 injured men transferred to 

ESTES. 

1444 CTG 52.4 was informed that CTF 52 was still awaiting his recom- 

mendation for R-W Hour and designatin of APD to accompany WATERS. 

144.8 CTG 52.4 was ordered to direct WATERS to close ESTES prior to 

leaving on assigned mission, to receive material for delivery to 
Tractor Group ABLE. 



1455 CTF 54 requested 6 AM*$ 9<Pr$4$t4 d^>l^i®b| p llfTeflit Unit 

BAKER screen was reduce^ to four DD ! s. \ t 




A-41 



ENCLOSURE (a) CTF 52 REPORT Cf^ERA^TIONS IN THE IWO J IMA CAMPAIGN, 
„ _ i 

' ■" ■ '4'-' 

17 February 1945 (Continued ) 

1455(K) ESTES proceeding to west coast of IWO JIMA. 

145S CTG 52.4 recommended R-W Hour as 1615 provided all DD f s are 

available. He could not designate an APD to return with WATERS 
until need for demolition determined. 

1504 Flash RED; Control GREEN. (Bogey on radar screen.) 

1507 Ordered CTF 54 to sink LDI(G) 474, which had capsized and was a 

menace to navigation. (Later informed by CTF 54 that LCI(G) 474 was 
sunk by 40mm. fire from CAPPS at 1329(K). 3i miles, 091° from 
SURIBACHI in about 100 fathoms of water. ) 

1507 Issued following ordors for UDT operation: 5" AAC'and 5 ,f /51 fire 
will bo as follows: TENNESSEE move into Sector 3> cover southern 
flank? JiRKAN&IS cover Purple 1, Brown 1 and 2; TEXAS, White 1 and 
2 and Orange 2. TUSCALOOSA Orange 1 and southern flank. Carry 
out fire on schedule relative R-W Hour. 

1509 VICKSBURG asked CTU 52.3.4 if ships had been fired upon during 
last sweep. 

1510 CTU 52.31.1 notified his task unit that R-W Hour was 1615 and 
that destroyers would close from 3000 to 2000 yards offshore as 
no ICI ! s are available. 

1511 ASP plane damaged 4 luggers on KITA 10 J IMA with rockets and 
machine gun fire. 

1514 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN. (Bogey identified as friendly.) 

1514 Sweep Unit 4 moved out of Area 8 into Area 3« Area 8 75$ completed 
from seaward. 

1515 ARKANSAS requested permission to move out to about 3000 yards 

in order to fire cvor minesweepers with main battery. Permission 
was' granted. 

1517 CTU 52.3.4 reported to VICKSBURG that ships had been fired on from 
a battery in Area 251 FKDI. 

1525 CTG 52.4 requested that HENLEY and HAMILTON bo returned to support 

UDT*s. ,.. ^ .-*& r 



A-42 



ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 IMPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE B. T JIHA CAMPAIGN 

3.7 ¥<frwm 1%$ (ConM*w4) 

152S LINDSEY requested PAUL HAMILTON to neutralize Aroa U6 1M as 

sweepers drew fire fron that area. 

1553 CTG 52.3 directed to designate one AM to take LCI 441 in tow. 

1554 CTG 52.4 requested smokers for line 233R to 198G. 

1557 ConDcsRon 46 ordered to direct HENLEY and HAMILTON take position 
for UDT support. 

1559 CTG 52.4 nade additional request for smoke; on line 147B to 131X. 

1600 CTG 52.4, reported no obstacles and only one nine in morning's 
mission. 

1602 CTU 52.5.1 requested ship be assigned to repair underwater damage 
in 3 LGI's to make then seaworthy, 

1603 APD's launching UDT teans. 

1605 CTG 52.3 submitted report on damage to LCI 449. 

1605 Enemy returning fire of DD*s supporting UDT operation. 

1606 Western beaches being strafed in support of UDT operation. 
1615 RCGER WILLIAM Hour. 

1621 MULLANY directed to remain in screening station until released 
by ConDesRon 46 and then to close ESTES. 

1624 Smoke being laid on western beachos in support of UDT operation. 
Not laid where ordered. 

1650 CTG 52.4 roqucst od smoke from planes and ^"Pfrom destroyers on 
line between 233R and 198G. 

1655 Minesweepers fired on from Area 233. 

1710 Sent following nessage to CTU 52.5.1* "Greatly admire magnificent 
courage your valiant personnel. When circumstances permit report 
condition each LCI and casualties. LCI 4-74- which' Capsized has 
been sunk. Am directing one ATA designated by CTG 52.3 to take 
LCI 441 now alongside NEVADA in tow and remain objective pending 
further orders." 



A-43 




ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPORT OF ofSM<il%N fHfll#jl|| 

uiii w iLirf iwaSfif 

17 February 19A5 (Continued) 

1712 (K) Reported to CTF 94 that B-29 reported survivor 214 miles bearing 
089° from IWO JIMA. at 1300 17th. Sending search to drop survival 
kit first light 18th. 

1715 CTG 52.3 reported on condition of LCI 469 and 457. 

1720 CTF 54 directed to use every opportunity to fuel DD»s fron heavy 
ships . 

1734 HOWARU reported picking up crew of TBF. 

1738 Night deployment postponed until 1830, 

1739 CTU 52.5.1 requested to close BSTES and ccmo aboard for brief 
conference. 

1742 CHAMPION reported picking up three men from PETROF BAY, 

1800 MULLANY directed to remain vicinity of ESTES and assist in 

screening. Photographs will not be ready for transfer until 
0300, 18th. 

1800 Sweep Unit 4 directed to report to ESTES as scroen; Sweep Unit 1 
to report to CTF 54 for screening assignments. 

1805 SALT IAKE CITY granted permission to join CTU 54.9.1. 

1806 CTG 52.3 reported on day ! s sweeping assignments: All areas 
completed, except inboard 25% of Area 85 results negative. 

1810 LCI 471 reported to ESTES for repairs. 

1813 All aircraft of support group, ASP and one section CAFroturned 
to base. 

1815 CTG 52.4 directed to report type of nine found in first operation. 

1817 UDT operations completed. Ships ordered to cease supporting 
fires. 

1818 EBRARDS, THIGGS, STEMBEL directed to remain objective for^^t 
operations. 




1825 SALT LAKE CITY directed to pr«$«e*%na recover disable^ WMtfMg 

plane, bearing 272°, 3 miles IlWt links. ;.v^W** 

A-44 



In,---* 



ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPOR^' OF, OPERATIONS IN THE IWO Jlfal *CA?.5PAIGN 

17 February 1945 (Continued ) 

1828 (K) Flash WHITE* Control YELLO*. 

1S30 TU 52.5.1 and 52. 5.2 directed to ronain vicinity objective over- 
night, 

I836 CTG 52,3 reported Area 3 completed; results negative, 

I838 CTG 52,4. reported on nine found in morning's operation. No 
evidence of minefield; nine found in 8 feet of water, 

1850 LCI 471 alongsido ESTES for repairs, 

1855 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOT;. (Bogey on radar screen.) 

1859 CTU 54.9.1 granted permission to proceed as previously directed 
upon completion of firing. 

1910 CTG 52,3 directed to bo prepared to clear side of TERROR for 
maneuvering, in view of bogey situation, 

1920 CTG 52,4 considered no further UDT operations necessary, 

1933 Received report on ninccraft and LCI casualties,. 

1934 CAPrS directed to contact CTU 52. 5*1 in morning in regard to 
transfer of LCI(G) personnel. 

1938 Flash RED; Control YELLOW. 

1945 LCI 471 away from alongside ESTES. 

2000 Fosition Report: 24°-38.5 l N.j 141°-26,6* E. 

2020 Issued instructions to ships to keep bright lookout for hostile 

planes , 

2030 Flash VmTBf Control YELLOK. (Radar screen clear.) 
2034 CTU 52,3.5 directed to join ESTES group, 

2100 CTG 52.4 to CTF 52: Transfer completed. Expect you will detach 
EATERS and BULL, 

2112 WATERS and BULL sent on assigned mission, 

A-45 ■ .. ^ * " 
^0 ^ ^ 



ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE OTO Jm.Q&MPAIGN 
17 February 1915 (Continued ) 

2135 (K) CTF 54- dispatched casualty report his force. 

2158 MULLANY directed to take charge of screen around ESTES. 

2225 CTU 52.3.5 reported having three men aboard from PETROFF BAY 

and requested instructions as to disposition of then. 

2231 WATERS and BULL proceeding on duty assigned. 

2252 Dispatch sent to fire support ships assigning targets for 18th, 

2317 MULLANY direct to proceed to rendezvous with LUNGA POINT at 0600 
18th. Transfer photographs and Ens. STEVENSON and return to 
objective. 

2340 CTU 52.3.5 told that orders v/ould bo issued in morning regarding 
transfer of PETROFF BAY personnel. 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE" 3MT JIMA" "'CAMPAIGN 



18 February 1945 

OOOO(K) TF 52 and TF 54 operating in accordance with CTF 52 Opera- 
tion Plan No. A101-45 in vicinity of 3W0 JBIA. 

0058 CTG 52.2 was ordered to direct LUNGA POINT to comply with 

CTF 51 OpPlan 25-44 in delivering photographs to be received 
from MULLANY. 

0308 MULLANY was directed to close ESTES. 

0351 MULLANY was directed to proceed on duty assigned having 
received from ESTES photographs and aviator for delivery 
to LUNGA POINT. 

0625 Flash HLUE; Control YJELLCW. (Bogey on radar screen.) 

0635 Flash WHITE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey identified as friendly.) 

0645 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN. 

0650 CAP on station. 

O656 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN. (Bogey on radar screen.) 

0658 Special air strike by 12 VF underway for CHICHI JIMA. 

0659 Air coordinator on station. 

0700 Fire Support Ships commenced firing. 

0705 TRACY and TU 52.3,5 directed to report to CTG 52.3 

0715 PENSACOLA reported she had jettisoned damaged plane and 
had made temporary repairs on shell holes underwater 
forward. 

0716 Flash RED; Control GREEN 

0717 ASP now on station. 

0720 Air Support Group of 8 VF and 8 VT on station. 

0725 CTG 52.3 was directed to suspend sweeping operations in 

Areas 7, 8 and 10 until further instructions were received; 
to continue in Area 13. w 

N Vh % x„ • i >*_ . t--^ ^ 

A-47 




18 February 1945 

0739(K) CTU 52,3.6 was asked by CTF 52 if he observed nature of 
drums on beaches during sweeping operations yesterday. 

0743 Special strike on CHICHI JIMA cancelled due to weather, 

0747 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN. 

0758 CTG 52.3 was directed to further investigate underwater 

obstruction reported bearing 212° distance 6100 yards 
from SURIBACHI. 

0806 PENSACOLA reported she would cease fire as her scheduled 

fire for period was completed, and she had surgical work 
to do on casualties. Permission granted. 

0808 Flash WHITE; Control Green. (No unidentified planes on 

radar screen.) 

0815 CTF 54 recommended IHJTZE screen NEW YORK enroute SAIPAN 

and be granted availability at SAIPAN for repairs. 

0820 CTU 52.3.6 advised CTF 52 he had been unable to identify 

drums on beaches, 

0841 Flash RED; Control GREEN. (Bogey on radar screen,) 

0855 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN. 

0856 Air Coordinator reports sighting bogey, believed to be an 
Irving . 

0903 Directed CTF 54 to supply information on present fuel 
situation of DD's. 

0905 PC 800 reported definite sound contact, bearing 145°, 

distance 8 miles from SURIBACHI, 

0904 CTF 54 directed major ships to rig to fuel one DD each 
and to accomplish fueling when this could be done without 
interfering with scheduled bombardment, 

0914 Directed CTG 52.4 to supply information on present fuel 

situation of APD» s. £ 1 1 $ f| ^ P% f% $ § W" 



A-48 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPlS&TlONS^IN /Tf^3WC^3wdf CAMPAIGN 



18 February 1945 

0921(K) Flash BLUE; Control GREEN, 
0923 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN. 

0928 PC 800 reported having lost contact which was evaluated as 

non-sub, CAPPS investigated area without obtaining con- 
tact and resumed station, 

0950 BREESE reported sound contact in Patrol Area C6 and new 

attacking. 

095S CTU 52.3.6 stated no drums observed on eastern beaches, 

1007 BREESE completed second attack in Area C6 and sighted un- 

identified slick. 

1015 CTF 52.3 ordered PC 800 to investigate possible shoal 

reported as bearing 212°, distance 6100 yards from SURI- 
BACHI. 

1027 ComDesRon 46 was asked if he had double screen stationed, 

1029 ComDesRon 46 was asked to make recommendations when Hunter- 

Killer operations deemed advisable. 

1029 LCI 471 was asked if she required assistance to insure sea- 

worthiness, 

1031 NEW YORK reported she was unable tc deliver more than 

27000 gallons of fuel an hour as she was not equipped with 
modern pumps, 

1035 GILMER was ordered to proceed to ESTES for fuel; WILLL-&S0N, 

BATES and BARE to follow, 

1051 MULLANY reported that in passing photographs to LUNGA POINT, 

supporting lines slacked, dropping containers into sea. 
All were recovered and delivered, believed in good condition, 

1056 CTU 52,3*6 reported that mounds resembling little volcanoes 

were observed on eastern beaches and fired upon with no 
apparent damage to them, . . . 



A-49 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO GTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE "IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



18 February 1945 

105B(K) TWIGGS reported that plane that attacked her may have used 
leaky NAN beacon X-12 as point of aim. Her beacon had been 
satisfactory until yesterday and was found after attack to 
be damaged from own gunfire during day, 

1100 ComDesRon 46 reported double screen in effect, 

1100 CTF 54 reported all DD's have about 60$ fuel aboard. 

1109 STRENGTH proceeding to investigate a sound contact reported 

by DEFENSE. 

1121 CTG 52.4 reported swimmers within ten yards of waterline 

on all beaches except ORANGE, 25 to 60 yards; PURPLE, 50 
yards; BLUE, 30 to 80 yards, 

1124 ComDesRon 46 was directed to supply information on status 
of BREESE sound contact. 

1125 IDAHO and TENNESSEE were informed their mission not com- 
pleted until direct hits obtained on all casemated guns 
located at northern base of SURIBACHI and on north flank of 
eastern beaches. 

1125 CTG 52.3 was directed to prepare to execute D -1 minesweep- 

ing schedule in Area 7 and 8> including remainder of Area 
8 uncompleted yesterday; no further work contemplated at 
present in Areas 9 and 10, Directed to retire immediately 
if heavy fire received, 

1125 CTU 54.1.3 was directed to recommend support for sweeping 

assignments in Areas 7 and 8. 

1128 ComDesRon 46 reported BREESE lost sound contact at 1036; 

operation "observant" being carried out. 

1130 HALL reported #3 main feed pump casualty; to be repaired 
midnight tcnigfrt, 

1131 LEUTZE was directed to report to NEW YORK prior 1800 for 
screening duty. To obtain emergency repairs at SAIPAN and 
return MO JIMA. 



A-50 





1151 
1205 
1211 

1212 

1223 

1236 
1250 
1315 

1322 
1353 

1358 



(A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE 3W0 JIMA CAMPAIGN 



Commander Screen was directed to reassign units for cover- 
ing screening stations C 18 to C 20. 

CTU 94.11.1 was informed that 2 VT with survival kits had been 
sent to search for downed .personnel reported byB-29*s yesterday. 

STRENGTH reported sound contact worked by her and DEFENSE 
evaluated as non-sub, 

ComDesRon 46 reported BREESE and MULLANY completed opera- 
tion "observant" without further contact. They are return- 
ing to screening stations, 

LCI 477 reported she was in no immediate danger, but could 
not proceed in rough sea above six knots without shipping 
water through above water holes in hull. 

CTU 52.5.1 was directed to make recommendations as to ' 
which LCI's should return to base, with "reason therefor, 
so that Movement Orders might be issued, 

CHESTER reported plane in water bearing 115° , 5 J miles 
from Mount SURIBACKI. 

BISMARCK SEA reported hydrographic conditions at BTO JIMA 
to TF 51. 

TEXAS VOS picked up survivor bearing 090°, 135 miles from 
SURIBACHI and is bringing him back. (Survivor was located 
by VT ! s searching for survivor reported yesterday by B-29 f s, 

12 VF on way to CHICHI JIMA. for special strike, 

CTU 52.5.1 reported LCI*s 441 and 473 require towing; 441 
has inoperative machinery and 473 has engine room flooded, 
LCI f s 438, 449, 457, 466 and 471 require extensive repairs 
to hull and armament; 450 and 469 can be operated after 
above water hull damage is repaired; 346, 348 and 627 opera- 
tive. 

NEW YORK was directed to transfer Marine spotter to VICES- 
BURG prior departure. 



18 February 1945 



A-: 





18 February 1945 



1401(K) 
1405 
1415 
34.15 

1415 

1418 
1430 

1440 
1440 
1446 
1503 

1506 
1510 



TEXAS was ordered to cover minesweeping operations in Areas 
7 and 8. 

LEUTZE reports TBF crashed at 1400, several hundred yards 
off northern tip of island, 

HALL and BRYANT were directed to rescue survivors in rubber 
raft bearing 005°, distance 3 to 4 miles from Mount SURIBACHI. 

Directed CTF 54 to submit his opinion as to whether defenses 
of MO JBLA had been sufficiently reduced to justify sche- 
duled operations on 19th. 

VICK3BURG reported HAMILTON was within one mile and was 
picking up survivors, from plane crash off north side of 
island. 

B-24 strike cancelled on account of weather. 

CTU 54,1.3 requested CTG 52.3 for special instructions for 
covering minesweeping. €TG 52.3 replied that operations 
will commence in Areas 7 and 8 as soon as fire support 
arrives; sweepers now ready, 

HALL and BRYANT were directed to report to CTG 52,3 to 
assist in covering mine sweeping in Areas 7 and 8. 

CTG 52.3 was directed to proceed with operations in Areas 
7 and 8. 

Sweep Unit 2 new in northwest corner Area 8; will sweep 
east. 

CTG 52.3 was informed that smoke planes would be on station 
during minesweeping operations. Informed hin CTF 52 did 
not wish to use smoke unless enemy fire is heavy, as it 
would interfere with bombardment, 

LINDSEY was directed by CTG 52,3 to cover unit commencing 
sweep in Area 7. 

WILLIAMSON was directed to proceed to two Kingfishers out 
of gas bearing 125°, 5 miles from SURIBACHI. 




1510 (K) 
1515 

1525 
1530 

1554 

1547 

1600 
1600 

1605 
1610 

1611 
1622 

1630 
1632 

1649 



(A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIl'A CAMPAIGN 



BRYANT likewise covering unit sweeping Area 7. 

LEUTZE requested permission to close ESTES prior to report- 
ing to NEW YORK to transfer effects of Commanding Officer, 
Permission granted, 

BATES was directed to come alongside ESTES for fuel. 

CTF 54 was informed by ComDesRon 46 that if destroyers did 
not fuel, they would require reballasting. 

PC 800 reported she had conducted investigation for reported 
shoal, with negative results. 

WILLIAL50N reported two spotting planes in water have gas; 
boat standing by to assist as necessary. 

BARE directed to repair light on HIGASHI Reck, 

Issued orders to LCI ! s to remain near objective tonight. 
Recommended to CTF 51 that LCI(G) 346 and 348 be used as 
Press boots; others not to take part in assault tomorrow. 

Ordered NEW YORK to use all 14" and as much 5"/51 HC as 
profitable; firing need not terminate at 1800. 

CTU 94, 11*1 was informed that one survivor from a CVE in 
rubber boat was rescued in position 135 miles, bearing 
090° from 3W0 JIMA at noon today. CTF 52 sent TEXAS a 
"Well done rt for VOS pilot and crew who made this rescue, 

LINDSEY reported she would make next sweep with CTU 52.3.4. 

Ens. VALPEY of "NATOKA BAY, survivor, brought aboard ESTES, 
condition good. 

Special strike on CHICHI JIMA returning to base, 

Sweep for moored mines in Area 8 completed; results nega- 
tive. 

CTU 54,1.4 reported several large caliber shells falling 
in his vicinity. - t f ' 1 ' h ' 



18 February 1945 




A-53 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE 3WO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



18 February 1945 

l650(K) Sweeping of Area 8 inside 100 fathom curve completed for 
magnetic mines. Sweepers to make one pass in Area 7> un- 
less otherwise directed, CTG 52,3 considers minesweeping 
to date sufficient until island is taken. 

1658 LEUTZE directed to close ESTES prior to former^ departure. 

1700 Minesweeping in southern half Area 13 completed; results 

negative, 

1708 IDAHO reported splashes in her vicinity; believed to be 

overs from other side of island, 

1713 SALT LAKE CITY reported overs to be ricochets. Fragments 
from last hit SALT LAKE CITY, no damage to ship, 

1714 Permission granted to LINDSEY to fire salvos at three anti- 
aircraft batteries she discovered, 

1715 Issued orders to NEW YORK to depart IWO JIMA screened by 
LEUT2E at about 1830. 

1718 TU 52.3«4 was directed to clear area and recover minesweep- 
ing gear, 

1735 CTG 52.3 submitted fueling requirements of his group. 

1743 LEUTZE reported to NEW YORK for screening duty, 

1749 SaLT LAKE CITY reported aamunition allowance for day ex- 
pended, 

1750 UDT 13 completed repairing light . on HIGASHI Rock. 

1752 Informed CTU 94»11.1 that survivor rescued at noon today 

was not the one reported by B-29 f s on 17th. 

1800 BATES alongside ESTES to fuel, 

1800 CTG 52.3 directed DM 18 and DM 15 report to CTF 54 for 

night deployment. 




ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THlf^O^MJ^ JflAIfl 



18 February 1945 

1812 (K) CTG 52 # 3 reported sweeping 1500 yards inside 100 fathom 
curve completed in Area 7; results negative. Sweep Unit 
3 recovering gear. 

1815 TENNESSEE was granted permission to leave station to pick 

up damaged plane. 

1817 CAP and ASP returned to base. 

1822 CTU 54*9*2 requested CTG 52.3 to provide six escorts for 

night deployment. 

1825 Orders for night deployment issued. Sweep Unit 4 to report 

to ESTES as screen. 

1837 CTU 52.3.5 reported to ESTES for screening duty. 

1848 TWIGGS was directed to screen ESTES until arrival of Sweep 
Unit 4. 

1850 STEMBEL, TWIGGS, LEARY, HAIL and HENLEY designated to 

remain at objective for night operations, 

1852 Informed CTF 54 that Sweep Unit 1 and 4 APD*s have been 

ordered to report to him for screening purposes during 
night deployment. 

2000 BATES completed fueling from ESTES . 

2002 ComDeyDiv 101 in KALL was placed in charge of night opera- 

tions and directed to ensure that enemy did not work on 
beaches during the night. 

2030 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey on radar screen.) 

2035 Flash WHITE; Control YELLOW. (Screen clear.) 

2130 BLESSMAN reported to CTG 52*4 that she had been hit and 

was on fire, (No details given.) 

2135 Flash BLUE; Control YiJLf^ -^flbgef ott^r&dar TTCfteSH. 

2200 Flash WHITE; Control ||[|^ y^|e& ^ogr,.^ ^ jj 



A-55 



18 February 1945 

2223 (K) CTF 54 reported GAMBLE hit by plane amidships . Two destro- 
yers standing by. 

2250 CTF 52 informed CTF 51 ho believed landing could be accom- 

plished on schedule . 

2255 BLESSMAN requested CTG 52.4 to close and put water on boat 

deck fire, 

2255 GAMBLE reported to CTG 52.3 via HAMILTON that she had been 

hit by bomb from low flying twin engine bomber, DORSET 
standing by to take GAMBLE in tow. 

2259 BLESSMAN reported to CTG 52.4 she was losing control. 

(Presumably of fire.) 

2303 CTU 52.5.2 reported shell fragments recovered from LCI 457 

identified as about 6 H . He believed that spherical buoys 
moored offshore were used for mortar and artillery range 
purposes. Other fire encountered was 37mni and .30 cal. 

2315 CTF 52 asked CTG 52.4 if he was in contact with BLESSMAN, 

and whether he needed assistance. 

2334 CTG 52-.4 replied he required medical assistance and a ship 

to take BLESSl^N in tow. Position: 19 miles, bearing 345° 
from SURIBACHI. 

2340 CTU 52.5.1 reported his ships noted buoys offshore during 

UDT operation, presumably for ranging purposes by the 
enemy. 

2346 CTU 52.3.5 was ordered to send an AM to take BLESSMAN in 

tow, 

2356 CTF 52 informed CTG 52,4 that ARDENT was being sent to take 

BLESSMAN in tow, and directed CTG 52.4 to bring casualties 
to ESTES after ARDENT had taken BLESSMAN in tow, 

19 February 1945 

0205 (K) CTF 52 informed CTF 51 that HAMILTON with GAMBLE in tow 
and ARDENT with HLSSSXAJL in tew wf r^proteefd'^n^f^o a de- 
signated point nfcar ) '"JIKA where they -arrive k| dawn, 

ylv^u ru-*'**" ***** 
A-56 



ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 5 2 'REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THITIWO' J IMA CAMPAIGN 



19 February 1945 

0205 (K) and that both GAMBLE and HLESSMAN had been damaged by bomb- 
ing. Recommend that salvage ships be sent to them as soon 
as possible. 

0519 Radar contact made with approaching main body of Joint 

Expeditionary Force, 

0559 CcmPhibGrpONE reported to CTF 51 for duty as CTG 51.19. 



A-57 



ENCLOSURE (B) TO CTP 52 REPORT OF. OPERATIONS ' 
IN THE JWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



COMMENTS ON INTELLIGENCE 



1. PLANNING 

(a) Assembly of intelligence material for Staff plan- 
ning began about 1 November. Photographs were of high order and other 
available target information reflected the work done by higher echelons 
particularly by JICPOA and ComPhibsPac Intelligence Section, Very 
close liaison was maintained with the latter, and Group ONE intelligence 
personnel participated in the design and production of much of the de- 
tailed intelligence material. Bombardment, navigation, anchorage, and 
other basic maps and charts were available well in advance, 

(b) Group ONE designed (with the assistance from Air 
Pac) and supervised production of a new type air-target folder reported 
as highly satisfactory to air and air-ground laeison personnel, These 
consisted of gridded vertical contact prints (scale rf 1/5,000) of each 
1,000-yard square with a line intelligence map containing defense in- 
stallations of the identical area facing each companion photo and 
printed on the reverse of the preceding sheet, 

(c) A detailed photographic plan was prepared by the 
section as a result of conferences with representatives of FMFPac, 5th 
PhibCorps, PhibsPac, and PhibGrpTWO and was included as a part of the 
PhibsPac Air Plan. It was detailed as to coverage and distribution and 
provided for a final interpretation of late photographs to be made at 
GUAM by Interpron TWO and representatives of the units involved in the 
BITO JIM Operation. 

(d) In view of the limited time available for reduction 
of defenses, ComPhibGrpONE directed that the photographic interpretation 
section be increased, since accurate, rapid, and continuous damage 
assessment would be essential to accomplish the maximum results. Accord- 
ingly, arrangements were made for the temporary services of two photo in- 
terpreters, one from Fleet Marines Force,. Pacific, and one from Photo Ron 
TWO at GUAM making a total of five photo interpreters attached to the 
Staff. Results accomplished, despite poor photographic weather, justi- 
fied the increase, 

(e) To further accurate damage assessment, the section 
set up and operated a target information center in Joint Operations, 
where ships* and planes' reports on naval gunfire and air missions were 
recorded on cards, previously set up for each primary target, and given 



B~l 



ENCLOSURE (B) TO CTF 52 REPO] 



iAMPAIGN 



a serial number to facilitate reports by firing ships. A Kardex system 
was installed so that information would be instantly available for use 
by the force Gunnery Section and CASCU personnel. As available, photo- 
intelligence of damage to installations was to be added and a final 
evaluation of results made. 

(f ) In view of the absence of ships to be assigned Com- 
PhibGrpONE for the bombardment it was decided that distribution of 
PhibsPac intelligence material could best be made by ComPhibGrpONE at 
ULITHI. Accordingly, on leaving PEARL HARBOR, this material was taken 
aboard and subsequently distributed at the staging point. 

(g) R ECOMMENDATEONS 

(1) Wherever possible, PhibsPac and Group Intelli- 
gence Sections should be together during the planning phase, at 
least until material to be produced is decided on and responsi- 
bility therefor assigned. Where separation is unavoidable it is 
recommended that reasonably frequent conferences by representa- 
tives be held. 

(2) The accurate location of defensive installa- 
tions on early maps is extremely important and more care should 
be taken in order that relocation of the same targets need not be 
made on later maps. Joint participation by naval and ground 
forces in the preparation of intelligence maps is most desirable. 

2. STAGING 

(a) Enroute to ULITHI, work was completed on special 
intelligence presentations for use by fire support ships. Sets of an- 
notated enlargements of the east and west beaches, showing particularly 
the blockhouses, pill-boxes, and covered artillery emplacements located 
in this area, were produced in quantity. The obliques were tied in with 
the grid-maps by annotating prominent points on the former with pin- 
point grid coordinates. Silhouettes of the island from various angles 
and distances off-shore, and sets of stereo coverage of the target were 
also produced in sufficient quantity for distribution to the destroyers, 
battleships, and cruisers. 

(b) Briefing consisted of meetings with intelligence 
officers attached to the larger ships, general briefing of ships gun- 
nery officers, and a photographic briefing of ships 1 air and top spot- 
ters, during which photographs of areas of responsibility were studied. 
Sufficient time was not available to make this last program .fully ef- 



fective, but some value was derived, l^ch^mo^ c^r^bll 3 abliie fm this re- 






ENCLOSURE (B) TO CTF 52 EEPOR%£)i ^WUffiM TBI THE IWO JIM CAMPAIGN 



gard by breaking the sessions up into smaller units. 

(c) Together with the air-support intelligence officer, 
personnel aboard the carrier' designated to take most t>f the D -3 to D 
Day photographs were briefed, and a photographer from ComPhibsPac put 
aboard to assist in the photographic program. Results are covered in 
detail in the CASCU comments (Enclosure (D), herein). 

' (d) Considering the number of changes in the makeup of 
TF 54 and TF 52, distribution of intelligence material was accomplished 
satisfactorily. The fact 'that this material was aboard the flagship un- 
doubtedly was responsible, as addressees of packages made up in advance 
could be changed to meet a very fluid situation. CTF 52 also had on 
hand a supply of spare copies of such material and was thus able to take 
care of new-comers on the spot. The officer detailed from the staff of 
ComPhibsPac was very helpful in meeting a difficult distribution situa- 
tion. 

(e) REC QMMEND AT IONS 

(1) So far as the gunfire and covering force is 
concerned, every effort should be made to produce special intelli- 
gence which will bo of aid on the firing program. To accomplish 
this, fire support ships should make suggestions and submit any 
ideas regarding material •which would be useful as well as indicat- 
ing those things which are of no particular use to them. 

(2) It is recommended that future photographic 
plans have in mind fire support requirements, and photographs be 
obtained which will, so far as possible, enable firing ships to 
thoroughly know their areas of responsibility. 

(3) Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers should 
be equipped with several pairs of stereo viewers. At present 
most of these ships have none on board. 

(4) Intelligence officers aboard fire support 
ships should become "field f orb if ic ation experts" and should be 
in a position to thoroughly brief personnel aboard; and should, 
where possible, maintain very close liaison with the Intelligence 
Section of Commander Amphibious Support Force. 

(5) Photographic plane should carry a hand camera 
of sufficient focal length to take large scale photographs, in the 
event a camera of small focal length is installed to meet special 
conditions -which may fail to materialize. 




ENCLOSURE (B) TO CTF 52 REPORT-- OF OPERATIONS IN THE IftO JllA CAMPAIGN 



(6) If ships assigned to the support force are 
scattered when the principal distribution is to be made, it is 
recommended that material be packaged by type, and distribution 
accomplished by Commander Support Force at the staging ai^eaj pro- 
viding of course, sufficient time for study still exists. In any 
event, a supply of 150 copies of all basic material should be 
given Commander Amphibious Support Force for distribution to new- 
ly assigned ships or those who have not received their material. 

(7) It is recommended that officer personnel, 
aboard major fire support units, be given information regarding 
their particular assignments as eerly as considerations of secur- 
ity will permit, in order that they may be thoroughly familiar 
with them in time to participate intelligently in conferences. 

3. BOMBARDMENT 

(a) The Target Information Center, Joint Operations, 
proved very useful. Improvements in the system and a longer bombardment 
period will, it is believed, make it even more valuable. Reports of de- 
struction or damage to targets by firing ships showed a conscientious 
attempt to get precise information to Commander Amphibious Support Force, 
With good weather, reports would have undoubtedly been more -accurate, 
but as it was, especially on D -3 and D -2, direct observation and photo- 
graphic confirmation of damage wa3 very difficult. Mechanics of the sys- 
tem are far from perfect, but if a current record of reported results and 
photo intelligence is valuable this system is a step in the right direct 
tion, 

(b) The system of serially numbering individual targets 
was, from this Command's standpoint, workable. It has its limitations 
and defects, especially where large areas are involved,. Fire support 
ships are in the best position to comment on its usefulness. Some con- 
fusion was probably caused by the relocation of targets in the last in- 
telligence map (cf planning, recommendations par. (b)). Some form of 
short cut in reporting results is, however, desirable and reports re- 
ceived from ships were extremely valuable in determining results accom- 
plished. 

(c) As noted elsewhere in these comments, photographic 
interpretation of results was handicapped by poor photos, brought on, 
in turn, by unsatisfactory weather conditions. As a result, accurate 
damage assessment was limited to those photos taken on D -1. between 
0900 and 1500. As firing continued on that day until 1830, a largo 
amount of accurate fire was delivered after 1500, unquestionably with ex- 
cellent results. Even so, photographs did disclose the lack of definite 



B-4 





ENCLOSURE (B) TO CTF 52 REPORTfOf fPtEfK ONR ifplfp fljvfl, Jt|t UdPiilGN 

destruction on D -3 and D -2, aM Xh~e highly satisfactory results accom- 
plished by close range fire on D -1. Reports of hits on first two days 
were not confirmed in many instances by photographs but the D -1 reports 
tallied very closely with photographs of the installations. Given the 
proper pictures and a longer period in which to make the evaluated infor- 
mation on damage available, it is believed that photo graphic interpreta- 
tion will be a valuable ally to controlled, precise gunfire. It is, how- 
ever, recognized that photo-interpretation too, has its limitations and 
in the present action undoubtedly much more was accomplished by the pre- 
landing bombardment than was disclosed by photography, 

(d) Camouflage of installations at IY/O JIMA was of a 
high order. It is considered that photo interpreters did excellent work 
in locating defenses, in spite of this. Ships and planes undoubtedly had 
considerable difficulty in distinguishing many targets from surrounding 
terrain, even though they knew where to look, 

(e) The damage assessment map was delivered according to 
plan along with the required photo graphs. The original map was limited 
by the limitations restricting photography but a later one was printed 
and distributed in quantity to CTF 51 and 5th Amphibious Corps on D Day 
morning, This was probably too late to be useful, especially to the 
troops. Again, more time will permit more information earlier. 

(f ) The usual situation plots were maintained by the sec- 
tion, viz on the flag bridge and in the War Command Room. An excellent 
plot has been developed using a relief model on a table, covered with a 
sheet of clear plastic. Target areas, fire support ship responsibility 
areas, front lines, etc can be drawn and easily changed on the plastic, 
while the relief model, if well made, is far more realistic than a map, 

4. SUMMARY OF MATERIAL PROCESSED BY PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY 

AND MAP REPRODUCTION UNIT , USS ESTES, PERIOD OF DECEivlBER 
10 TO FEBRUARY 13 INCLUSIVE 

(a) Pho to gr aphi c Lab o rat o ry t 

(1) Total prints all sizes 57,836 

(2) Total negatives processed 1,104 

(3) Sonne rolls printed (200 ft. each) 102 

(4) Rolls aerial films processed, 29 

0>) Map Reproduction : 

(1) No, sheets off-set press 18,450 

(2) Negatives 86 

(3) plates :-w*-*'*-**%r m 81 



s,- -,■ u 





!• General Plan 

• 

(a) Each heavy ship was assigned an area of responsi- 
bility, all of which taken together, covered the entire island. 
Bombardment by destroyers for purposes of destruction was not 
planned, nor vfas secondary battery fire from heavy ships con- 
templated except for count erbatt cry and UDT cover. The plan 
provided on D -3 for bombardment at long and medium ranges, not 
less than 6000 yards offshore. For this day firing periods were 
arranged with the view toward having the minimum number of ships 
firing at one time and with the intent of having each ship' fire 
for about six hours. For D -2 the plan provided for heavy, close 
range destructive bombardment of the defenses from Suribachi to 
Higashi from the eastward until about 1030. During this period 
ships assigned to the western areas were to conduct bombardment 
from longer ranges necessitated by safety requirements during 
the close bombardment from the east. At about 1030 major calibre 
fire from the ships working from Suribachi to the East Boat Basin 
was to stop as the ships withdrew sufficiently to permit ships 
engaging in support of the UDT's reconnaissance to take station. 
From this time until about 1230 the heavy ships on the east, as 
well as the close supporting destroyers, were to be primarily 
concerned with the support of UDT's. Upon completion of the UDT 
operation on the eastern beaches the ships assigned to the west- 
ern areas from Suribachi to Hiraiwa Bay wore to close and com- 
mence heavy short range bombardment while the ships assigned to 
the eastern beaches were to withdraw to positions clear of this 
fire and continue their own bombardment at longer ranges. The 
heavy bombardment from the west was to continue until 1430, at 
which time the heavy ships were to have withdrawn, permitting 
vessels engaged in the western UDT reconnaissance to take their 
stations • From about this time until the completion of the UDT 
operation the western bombardment was to be largely limited to 
5" fire in support of these operations* Fires in the sectors 
to the northward wore scheduled to allow each ship therein about 
six hours firing time* Safety considerations, both with regard . 
to minesweeping and ricochets did not permit scheduling these 
vessels to approach very close to their targets. The schedule 
for D -1 Day contemplated a repetition of the D <r2^^gdul© if 
further UDT operations (demolitions) were to take $ls|f $ and an 
extension of the elosefrange firing periods if sucH* operations 
were not to be carried i out • sJ ^ ^ $ i* Jk^** 



0-1 



ENCLOSURE (C) TO GTF 52 REPORT OF (^RATIONS IN THE IWO JIM CAMPAIGN 



(b) The plan required deliberate destructive fire at 
specific individual targets, and the assigned target priorities 
emphasised fire on defenses and installations which could most 
severely threaten our ships, our aircraft, the ship-to-shorc 
movement, the landing, and operations immediately following the 
landing. The total number of defense installations was too great 
to attempt more than this in view of the limited time and ammunition 
available before D Day. Great emphasis on the priority principles 
was made not only in the plan but during the briefing, with the 
design of concentrating destructive fire on pillboxes, blockhouses, 
covered gun emplacements, etc., in the landing areas and around 
Suribachi .and on the high ground immediately to the northward of 
the landing areas. Ships were specifically directed not to expend 
their efforts on destruction of installations in the northern parts 
of the island which would not threaten ships or aircraft, the land- 
ing or the early stages of subsequent operations: for example, 
pillboxes on the northern slopes. The fire of the ships having 
areas from #2 Airfield and to the northward was directed largely 
at coastal defense and antiaircraft guns. Continually, in brief- 
ing and during the operation, stress was laid on the importance 
of closing to short ranges to obtain maximum observation and 
destruction of pinpoint targets which presented the probabil- 
ity of being hit with a flat trajectory. As an aid in recog- 
nition of targets and familiarization with the areas, ships 
assigned to the beach areas were provided with large low ob- 
lique photographs covering their particular areas. 

2. D minus 3 Day . On D -3 weather conditions until mid- 
afternoon were very unfavorable, with low coiling, rain and mijst. Ob- 
servation from the ships and spotting planes was frequently impossible. 
Ships adhered to their instructions and fired only when visibility 
permitted reasonable observation. Prearranged schedules of fire were 
finally abandoned and ships were ordered to fire only when conditions 
permitted accurate fire and effective air spot. As a result of these 
unfavorable conditions, only about half the bombardment contemplated 
on this day was accomplished. 

3. D minus 2 Day . During D -2 more effective fire was 
possible as visibility conditions were excellent. However, ships 
were not as prompt as desired in closing the range. The necessity 
for frequent movement to permit the deployment of units supporting 
UDT operations and the necessity of keeping major calibre impacts 
away from the beaches while swimmers were close inshore, > limibel/thc 
volume of effective fire. The ammunition expenditures* for this day, 
however, approximated these originally scheduled. The D -2 schedule 
was adhered to as originally plaririCd ^ except that the" UDT operations 



ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF 



were longer than intended, which further reduced the amount of short 
range bombardment. At the end of the D -2 bombardment it was ap- 
parent from reports of firing and from photographs that relatively 
little destruction had been accomplished due to the conditions de- 
scribed above, and that only by concentration on the preferred (east- 
ern) landing beaches could adequate preparation for a landing be ef- 
fected. 

4. D minus 1 Day . Since no UDT operations were found neces- 

sary on D -1 a rearrangement of fire schedules was practicable, NEW 
YORK was assigned an eastern beach area; TEXAS was assigned coastal 
defense and other batteries northeajst of Motoyama; VICKSBURG was as- 
signed the area around the northeast portion of Airfield #2, which had 
previously been NEW YORK's responsibility. These ships were directed 
to close the range early and to fire as continuously as it was profit- 
able to do so. Ammunition allowances were authorized to the extent 
of all bombardment ammunition on board, less the quantity scheduled 
for r> Pay fires and a reserve prescribed for one battleship. ARKAN- 
SAS was assigned the former TEXAS area in addition to her own. She 
and TUSCALOOSA were directed to conduct firing as practicable from 
as close range as would be permitted by the inevitable overs and 
ricochets from ships off the eastern beaches. This rearrangement of 
stations achieved a concentration of 4 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 
an^ 1 later 1 light cruiser on the defenses on and behind the eastern 
beaches, and on the flanks thereof i Fire from the ships on the east 
was deliberate and almofst continuous. In general, it was delivered 
from very short ranges, even as low as 1800 yards; So far as could 
be determined from the firing reports, and observation from the flag- 
ship, ships carried out conscientiously their directives to get the 
utmost value from each projectile; In the forenoon TENNESSEE fired 
southwesterly and IDAHO northerly, primarily at the heavy easemateji 
batteries flanking the east b&aeh, in the afternoon th#y were 
directed to exchange stations so as to be able to reach additional 
targets in their areas from favorable directions. In the afternoon 
TEXAS was directed to give close support to the minesweepers operat- 
ing off the northern shores, /ammunition expenditures, except for NEW 
YORK, which completed her part in the bombardment and departed the 
area with only 19 rounds of 14" HC remaining, fell short of the autho- 
rized expenditures by an average of 90 rounds per ship. It is doubted 
that in view of conditions as described above, much value could have 
resulted from ships expending this additional ammunition simply for 
the purpose of getting rid of it. Instead, it was probably of con- 
siderable value for call fires. 

/ ^ 

5» (a) Ships' reports indicated a thorou^^^^^42^i 

of the target priorities and conscientious ^pi®Liand^/'ia. mpiaWr 
directives as to method of ' firing., ^Bf^^tdM^h-. iW&tik Irequently 
and in considerable detail. t 






ENCLOSURE (G) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPBPuVTIONS%"N£ : THE B^J»i CAMPAIGN 
- r ^ - 

(b) At the end of D -1 it was considerccf% igrjgr aj.1 
available that the principal defense installations in an#v"' 
jacent to the eastern beach areas were cither destroyed or %^y*ily 
damaged and that while more could be accomplished if another day 
could be allowed, the preparation was sufficient to permit a landing, 

6. Sup-port of Underwater Demolition Teamsj 

(a) The plan for support of the Underwater Demolition 
Teams provided that each operation would take place after a pro- 
longed period of heavy bombardment of the beach and flank areas; 
that 30 minutes prior to the departure of the UDT boats from the 
line of LCl(G)'s, 5" fire would be laid along the beaches and on 
the flanks; that this fire would initially be from the heavy ships 
and la±er from the destroyers; that the KJlCG^s proceeding from 
stations 2000 yards offshore would lead the boats as far 1000 
yards offshore, covering them fcith 40mm fire while the boats went 
in further to put over the swimmers. The plan included provision 
for communication between boats, the LCl(G)'s and destroyers. 

All of this close support was under the command of GTG 52,4 (Com 
tHT' sPhibsPac); the deep support was under the command of CTF 52. 

(b) The ineffectiveness of the bombardments on D -3 
Day anr- the limited amount of close bombardment prior to the UDT 
operations on D -2 undoubtedly contributed to the heavy fire 
drawn by the close support ships during the first UDT operation. 
The factors contributing to this have already been noted above, 

(c) The support of the UDT operation on the eastern 
beaches was carried out according to plan. Heavy fire was drawn 
from Suribachi and, to an even greater extent, from the high 
ground on the north flank of the eastern beaches. This fire was 
extremely damaging to the LCl(G)'s and inflicted minor damage 

on LEUTZE. The fire is believed to have come from deeply emplaced 
weapons sited for the specific purpose of attacking landing craft 
and it aay have been controlled to some extent with the aid of 
marker buoys noted offshore by LCl(G) personnel. During the 
course of the operation GTG 52.4 requested smoke a>long the en- 
tire eastern beach area. Smoke planes not being available at 
the moment, a smoke screen was laid by TENNESSEE, NEVADA and 
IDAHO using 5 ff VfP projectiles. The screen was continued for 
the remainder of the opera^^n. t For the western UDT operation 
so few LCl(G)'s were in c^c^f-^n^o provide support that it 
was determiner! not to emplg^ J,hem. The same destroyers were 
used as for the eastern beaches tjaf'thcy were sent in to 2000 
yards from the shoreline. To obtain additional 5 11 fire, ( TEN- 
NESSEE was moved to the west and the beach- ir$&s^f or 5" }P^- V J 



G-4 



ENCLQSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS-^' THE?>IWO JIMA CiMP/JGN 
I 4% 

ship fire reassigned. Otherwise the western operatidn^was car- 
ried out according to plan. During the western operatio^/ssmoke 
was again requested by GTG 52.4. The smoke planes evidentl^had 
difficulty in getting their smoke started^ 4s a result thezriy 
screen was late and laid in the wrong place and W projectiles 
had to be used again. In this case, of the heavy ships engaged 
in 5" support, only TENNESSEE was equipped to deliver W fire. 
The remainder of the screen was provided by NEVADA and IDAHO 
firing at about 7000 yards over Mount Suribachi, controlling 
their fire with air spot. No damage to our ships was experienced 
during the western UDT operation although some enemy fire was 
received. 

(d) While the damage and casualties to the Ld(G)'s 
were unexpectedly severe, the fire which they drew focused ad- 
ditional attention to the threat existing on the northern flank 
of the eastern beaches, and in particular disclosed three heavy 
guns in well camouflaged concrete casemates, not previously dis- 
covered fr^m the photographs. These guns were definitely put 
out of action on P -1 Day, an^ were not heard from again. Had 
the fire of these and other weapons in this area not been drawn 
on D -2, very heavy losses might have resulted during the landing 

7. Analysis of Bombardment 

(a) During the operation . All priority A (weapons 
threatening aircraft, ship and UDT operations) and priority B 
(installations threatening the ship-to-shore movement and land- 
ing) targets were assigned serial numbers to permit more specific 
reference in reports and orders and for brevity in communications 
Ships reported in detail on the bombardment of each assigned -tar- 
get. A sample of the reports is attached hereto. Continuous 
record of results was maintained on a card index as reports were 
received. These reports were checked against photographic in- 
terpretations to evaluate the progress of the bombardment. The 
reports were made on the Naval Gunfire Overload Circuit which was 
kept very busy handling them throughout the day and for several 
hours thereafter. 

(b) The following tabulation presents in statistical 
form for certain types of target a comparison of the reported 
results and photographic intrepretationi 



ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPA$&N / 
I. Targets on and near beaches :*" 



J; 



TYPE 



REPORTED BY SHIPS 



DAM- 



TARGET 


•FIRED ON: 


DIRECT 


HITS' 


DESTROYED J 


AGED: J 


DESTROYED: 


:DAMAGSD 


Blockhouse 


I 14 ! 


5 




7 s 


1 :! 


1 >* / s 


5 


Pillboxes , 


37 S 


16 




! 12 


! 3 *W 20 ! 


t 2 


Covered Em- J 
placements 


! 8 1 


1 




! 3 ! 


> • < 
2 


t u ! 




DP Gun 


: 1 


• 




', i 
i 


: :i 


\ 1 : 


t 


Heavy AA MG 


i 3 i 

i • 
i • 




: 1 ! 





1 


: 



PHOTO INTERPRETATION 



II • Targets in northern High Ground Areas 



Pillboxes • 


! 3 


: : 


3 ' 


f :: : 





Covered Sn-: 
placements • 


2 


: 


t 1 


i :: 





DP Guns : 


21 : 


1 : 


2 : 


. 9 :i 2 : 


1 


Heavy AA MG: 


60 


8 


20 : 


. 1 :: 1 


Q 



Several points must be borne in mind in considering these figures. 
The study does not summarize the entire bombardment. The targets 
listed in Table I were generally subject to direct observation for 
the firing ships and had little natural cover, whereas the targets 
listed in Table II were subject only to air observation and indirect 
fire. Many had some natural cover. The targets in Table I in gen- 
oral, presented larger areas than those in Table II. Differences 
exist, of course, in the manner in which ships formulate their/ 
opinions as to their results. It is considered that in the dase 
of targets in Table I, reports were based upon good observed evi- 
dence, and that in Table II, reports were largely based upon con- 
clusions drawn from the volume of fire and the placement^ ; of MPI« 
The photographs on which the assessments above wore madp were taken 
prior to 1500 on D -1. Firing, however, continued un^al about 1830» 

7 

? 

C— 6 /* y 



ENCLOSURE (C) TO GTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS TCtI 




% 



JIMA CAMPAIGN 



The photographs of the beach areas were somewhat superior to thoso 
of the higher grounds In some cases, fragment ^fccf>f consequence 
to installations and personnel may not have showuon thfc photographs. 



All of the foregoing is based upon inforrS^on^zailablo 
to the Task Force Commander by the end of D -1 and in^MW.that 
with methodical bombardment, good observation, and pho 
plus analysis, a reasonably sound assessment of target 
be made prior to the landing. 

8* Ammunition Expenditures ; D -3 through D -1 (as reported 

in daily dispatches ) 

. HIGH CAPACITY 




SHIP 



TENNESSEE 

IDAHO 

NEVADA 

NEW YORK 

TEXAS 

ARKANSAS 

TUSCALOOSA 

CHESTER 

SALT IAKE 

CITY 

PENSACOLA 
VICKSBURG 



JtSL 



127 
71 
120 
204 
274 
143 
45 
275 

210 
203 
24^ 



D-2 



251 
207 
112 
251 
242 
436 
418 
212 

347 
227 
221 



D-l : 



TOTAL ROUNDS 



434 
378 
227 
567 r 
195 
454 
341 
281 

543 
355 
1382 



812 
656 
459 

1022 
711 

1033 
804 
708 

1100 
785 
1851 



10001 



TONS 



222k 



382 



414") 
7(12") 



31 



3263* Tons 



ARMOR PIERCING 



SHIP i 


NUMBER ROUNDS : 










NEVADA s 


12 i 










NEff YORK ! 


19 ! 










IDAHO j 


8 j 


I 


TUSCALOOSA i 


27 ! 


J 32 tons 


5" AAC, HC, Common : 


14491 J 


* 399 tons 




^ • J 3694 Tons 

iWWi.lw. j T H 



ENCLOSURE (C) TO GTF 52 REPORT OF OPERAT3EW&- IN THE IWO JIMA. CAMPAIGN 
«. * . - • 

USES OF 5" AAC , HG AND COMMON " " ' 



Direct Support of Minesweepers 906 rounds 

Night Harassment 1533 rounds K%e 'W : # 

UDT Support 7272 rounds 

Count erbattery and Misc. targets 4780 rounds 



White Phosphorus 1091 rounds 

Star Shell (Nigfit Harassment) 187 rounds 



14,491 rounds 

1091 rounds 
187 rounds 
15,768 rounds 



3 n , 40mm and 20mm not reported. 
9* Recommendations 

(a) That pro-landing day bombardments of major amphibious 
objectives continue to be directed by an Amphibious Group Commander 
embarked in an AGC# 

(b) That pro-landing day bombardments be scheduled to 
extend over not less than three days, which is considered the mini- 
mum time necessary for efficient firing of the bombardment allowance 
at point targets. If there are to be incidental operations , in- 
cluding frequent movements interfering with gunfire, or if the fixed 
defenses arc unusually strong and numerous the bombardment period 
should be extended accordingly* 

(c) That bombardment ships be assigned areas of respon- 
sibility, to be changed only as essential during the operation. 
This will permit their personnel to become thoroughly familiar 
with the terrain and defenses they arc attacking. 

(d) That bombardment plans include carefully considered 
target priority instructions, provisions for continuous reporting 
of results, provisions for frequent photographic fligftta-^nd photo- 
interpretation of results, and dissemination of the .Comma^cr's 
evaluation of the results . to the firing ships, and for.. t be ready 
reassignment of targets* .-. 

(e) That each bombardment ship be provided wi^h all prac- 
ticable detailed intelligence of latest date available "kef ore the 
operation. This material should .include large scale low obliques 
and stereo pairs, with suitable annotations. Each ship should be 
provided with at least two stereo viewers. ? 

(f ) That each bombardment ship designate an officer with 



ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE Bit) 4BIA CAMPAIGN 
. ---'^ 

such assistants and facilities as necessary working in or in ; close 
conjunction with the ship's gunnery department, to ndk& a .detailed 
analysis of the target areas prior to bombardment, to receive all 
available information concerning the results of firing, -and to pre- 
pare reports of such results for rapid transmission to the com- 
mand having overall control of gunfire. 

(g) That future gunfire plans contain ammunition loading 
instructions for all Fire Support Ships and those which may be 
called upon to serve as such. 

(h) That future gunfire plans contain, in addition to 
present plans NEG/.T and VICTOR for the control of Naval Gunfire 
during air strikes, a plan for placing 5 to 10 minutes of 5 11 fire 
over the antiaircraft batteries in each ship's area of responsi- 
bility just prior to an air strike, 

(i) That LCl(G)'s be not employed in close support of 
UDT operations in heavily fortified areas until considerable re- 
duction of the defenses has taken place. 





0-9 



/Li 



h, / 



ENCLOSURE (C) TO GTF 52 REPORT 




SAMPLES OF FIRING REPORTS SUBMITTED 



1. 42 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 200P X 90 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 
200Y AND U X 28 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 1821 X DIRECT HIT TARGET 404 X 
NEAR HIT TARGET 306 X 26 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183C D AND E X DIRECT 
HITS TARGET 428 AND 437 X 138 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183L X NEAR HITS 
IN AREA X 57 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182U X DIRECT HIT TARGET 378 X 
NEAR HIT TARGET 416 413 AND 414 X 49 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182X X 6 
ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183W X DIRECT HIT TARGET 452 X 7 ROUNDS TARGET 
AREA 183N X 9 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182M X 18 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 166H X 
18 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183A X 8 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 201U X 

2. TARGET 112 44 ROUNDS X 6 DIRECT HITS X BELIEVED COM- 
PLETELY DESTROYED X CLOSED SOUTH ENTRANCE TO BLOCKHOUSE X SHRAPNEL 
MAY HAVE ENTERED ENTRANCE X TARGET 138 33 ROUNDS X COMPLETELY 
DESTROYED X BELIEVED TO BE PILLBOX CONTAINING ANTI-TANK GUN X PERSONNEL 
FLED AND WERE STRAFED BY 40MM X TARGET 176 6 ROUNDS X 3 DIRECT HITS X 
DESTROYED X BLOCKHOUSE IN 148Q 17 ROUNDS X COMPLETELY DESTROYED X 
PERSONNEL FLED AND WERE STRAFED X TARGET l6l 11 ROUNDS X PARTIALLY 
DESTROYED X BLOWN OPEN ON SOUTH SIDE X 119A 14 ROUNDS X 4 DIRECT 

HITS X COMPLETELY DEMOLISHED X 148L 28 ROUNDS X BIRD REPORTED 
SEVERAL CLOSED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENTS X SEVERAL DIRECT HITS X PART- 
IALLY DESTROYED ENTRANCE X 148U TARGET 144 X PROBABLY COMPLETELY 
DESTROYED X 12 ROUNDS X TARGET BELIEVED TO BE 117 OR COVERED ART- 
ILLERY EMPLACEMENT IN 148Q COMPLETELY DESTROYED X 1490 BLOCKHOUSE 
ON BEACH COMPLETELY DESTROYED X 4 ROUNDS X 




C-(l)-l 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS -- * ~ 
IN THE IWO JIMft .CAMPAIGN " 

REPORT ON SUPPORT AptflRAFT- OPERATIONS 



1. GENERAL COMMENTS 

(a) Advance Commander Air Support Control Units re- 
ported to Commander Amphibious Support Force (CTF 52) aboard 
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12) on 6 January 1945, with unit attached. 

(b) Primary function of this unit at IWO JIMA was the 
control and direction of all aircraft activities in support of 
the Pre-D-Day bombardment. This function included a variety 
of operations. First, it complemented and supported the ships 
of the Gunfire and Covering Force in destroying targets on the 
Island, Second, it provided air protection for units engaged 
in minesweeping and underwater demolition operations. Third, 
it included routine tasks, such as air defense against enemy 
aircraft and submarines. Lastly it included special missions 
such as photographic, hydro graphic and smoke. 

(c) Preliminary bombardment of the objective was be- 
gun at daylight on 16 February (D -3 Day) and control of all 
aircraft activities in the vicinity was assumed by Advance 
Commander Air Support Control Unit under CTF 52. This control 
was maintained until 0600(K) 19 February (DOG Day) when Com- 
mander Air Support Control Unit under CTF 51, arrived and 
assumed control. At this time CTF 52 became CTG 51 #19 and 
Commander Air Support Control Unit for this task group remained 
active in a standby status monitoring all circuits. 

2. TRAINING PHASE 

(a) CTF 52 sortied from PEARL HARBOR enroute to ULITHI 
on 10 January 1945. Prior to leaving, preparations were made 
for training exercises. Parallel drill circuits were placed 
in Joint Operations and the Inner Office for four nets. This 
set-up provided receiving and transmitting outlets for inter- 
communication between four control officers operating in Joint 
Operations and four in the office. Positions were prepared 
for eight radiomen (two to each net) for copying all trans- 
missions. 

(b) Training exercises were started the second day *" 
after sailing with the primary purpose of familiarizing per- 
sonnel with voice calls and the type of missions, to i>e used 
in the Operation. However, no operational maf>£-'or material 




D-l 





ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPE|ftK)NS 1 IN TO|^^,OTA CAMPAIGN 



other than voice calls, were given general distribution dur- 
ing the training phase . 

(c) After the first training exercise, remaining 
time enroute to ULITHI was spent participating in ships' 
battle problems. The purpose of these problems was to simu- 
late battle conditions and to give the various departments 
opportunity to coordinate their activities. 

(d) During the period at ULITHI, and enroute to 
SAIPAN, Air Support held daily drills over its parallel hook- 
up. A separate group of radiomen were also given drills each 
afternoon in the use of sound-power phones connecting Joint 
Operation, Flag Shelter, Flag Bridge, Flag Plot and CIC. 

(e) During the two days of rehearsal off TINIAN a 
thorough test of operating equipment was obtained. Minor 
discrepancies were noted and final corrective 'action was 
taken. 

(f ) Upon arrival at the objective both personnel and 
material were in an excellent state of readiness. 



D -3 Day 

3. OPERATION 

(a) On arrival at the objective all positions were 
manned by 0500. All circuits were tested and found ready 

for use. At the break of dawn it was found that the skies 
were heavily overcast, with weather in general very unsatis- 
factory for flying. Except for short periods, low ceilings, 
poor visibility and rain continued until later afternoon. 

(b) Sorties for the day totalled 158 but die to 
weather only 6 support missions were executed. However, some 
good results were obtained. In a morning strike^ ^^meld 
No. 2 was strafed and attacked with rocketSf ^^^.^^mn 
this strike 3 twin-engined planes were -4ellroyea,%A^^e pro- 
bably destroyed, on the air strigu another ^is% Ion fighters 
attacked two luggers discovered by an ASPyjAre about 35 miles 
from the objective. Affce%% strafing Itftck both luggers were 
left burning and in sinkm% '.coji^l^^n. 



D-2 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE BID JIMA CAMPAJPN 

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ^ — m. *j. .jjjp.' fcn— t-*- — — "— — — 

(c) In the forenoon the weather cleared sufficiently 
for an attack against emplacements on SURIBAGHI Mountain. The 
latter was again struck in late afternoon and a fighter sweep 
of Airfield No, 2 was executed just prior to dark. 

(d) The afternoon Army Air Force heavy bomber strike 
arrived on station slightly ahead of schedule . The ceiling 
was too low for bombing but as the weather was expected to im- 
prove, the Army bombers were kept on station for one hour, the 
maximum that their fuel would allow. The weather did not im- 
prove and the strike was returned to base, 

(e) Detail of sorties, missions and targets attacked 
are included in the appendices. 



D -2 Day 

(f ) Weather was excellent for flying. 226 sorties 
were flown, excluding ASP and CAP sorties. Twenty- five mis- 
sions were executed including one smoker, two hydrographic and 
three photographic missions. Support missions concentrated 

on dual purpose guns and automatic antiaircraft around the air- 
fields, and on both beach areas in protection of UDT operations, 

(g) In two strike groups, 8 VF carried Napalm fire 
bombs and used them against targets, with only a fair degree 
of success* Four of the bombs used did not release on first 
attempt and several failed to ignite after drop. Somewhat 
similar experiences on D -1 lead to the conclusion that tba. 
answer to effective use of Napalm by plane drop has not been 
obtained. It is recommended that training in CVE groups with 
Napalm be continued with' emphasis on improvement of equipment 
used, methods of release, and tactics to follow in making low 
altitude drops, 

(h) The smoke mission in support of UDT f s operating 
off the western beaches was poorly executed. Four planes 
carried smoke tanks. Although three made releases, oji^,one 
was satisfactory. t : 

(i) Support missions against antiaircraft amj £># guns 
were well executed. Results were in general obscure but the 
Air Coordinator reported in most instances Jihat areas were 
given a thorough going-over. One direct "hit on a pillbox on 



D-3 




the south eastern beaches resulted in a heavy explosion and 
fire. Strafing planes destroyed a total of ten trucks near 
East Boat Basin. 

(j) Light antiaircraft was intense throughout the 
day. Heavy antiaircraft was intense only during the strike on 
the southern part of the island by 42 Army Liberators, This 
strike was effective in that the majority of the bombs, dropped 
from 5000 feet, hit in the target area. There were however, 
some premature bursts at about 2000 feet. Photographs showed 
no known installations hit by these bombs, but the fragments 
may have caused some damage and casualties. 



P - 1 D a y 

(k) Weather was only partially good for flying, 
Throughout most of the day the sky was overcast with low hang- 
ing clouds. Most strikes were made thru breaks in cloud for- 
mations. By 1330 when the Army land-based bombing group arrived, 
a layer of low clouds with ceiling at 2000 feet held up the 
strike. The strike eventually was cancelled and the formation 
was returned tp» base. 

(1) Sorties flown totalled 28 excluding TCAP and TASP, 
Missions totalled 27, of which 21 wore of the direct support 
type. Support missions were concentrated largely against po- 
sitions flanking the landing beaches. The SURIBACHI Mountain 
area was repeatedly attacked by both fighters and bombers, a 
total of six missions hitting the northeastern slopes where 
heavy antiaircraft and dual purpose guns were grouped. On the 
flank of the beaches the wooded, camouflaged area overlooking 
the East Boat Basin was struck repeatedly with Napalm, rockets 
and bombs. 

(m) Results for the day are difficult to assess. It 
is, however, believed that support aircraft functioned better 
than on the preceding two days. Pilots appeared more familiar 
with their targets and attacked more deliberately. The Air 
Coordinators made several observation flights which result |$>*% 
in pin-pointing of certain targets, and a conseque^fdf^^a%eT, | 
in effectiveness. Concentration attacks ^pn *a^gfels., relation; * 
ly few in number but studded witta ^flMfous installations, g 4 
ceivably weakened the areas comnafrd&ngHJie laM%g filches. 



D-4 




(n) By early afternoon reports from the 3URIBACHI area 
showed that antiaircraft had slackened appreciably. Light anti- 
aircraft was again intense in other areas. One Support Group 
of 8 VF and 8 VT reported after a strike that practically all 
torpedo planes had received hits, with four badly shot up. Only 
one of these planes, however, failed to reach base. All person- 
nel from the crashed plane were rescued. 

4. PHOTOGRAPHIC STRIKES 

(a) Bad visibility prevented the completion of any 
photographic missions on D -3. On the following day three 
missions were run and drops on the ESTES successfully made. 
Low obliques of the landing beaches and SURIBACHI area were 
excellent. Verticals were unsatisfactory for damage assess- 
ment as a 6 inch focal length camera was used in the expecta- 
tion that a low ceiling would require low altitude flights. 
However, the ceiling lifted and phographs- were taken at 5000 
to 6000 feet resulting in a scale of 1:12,000 instead of 
1:5000 as called for in the plan. 

(b) All deliveries of film were accomplished success- 
fully and promptly. 

(c) On D -1, three missions were successfully made. 
Proper focal length of lens was used arid all pictures, verti- 
cals and obliques, were uniformly good. One photographic plane' 
received hits in the wing but was able to return to base safely. 

5. CHICHI J IMA AND HAH A JIMA STRIKES 

(a) Morning and afternoon strikes against CHICHI JIMA 
and HAH A JIMA were scheduled by Commander Support Carrier Group 
(CTG 52,2) for all three days preceding the landing. At least 
two of these strikes were not completed because of bad weather. 
Available to this command on incomplete reports are the follow- 
ing results on D -2 Day. 

(b) At CHICHI JIMA 12-15 operational single engine 
and twin-engine planes were found on the morning strike. These 
planes were strafed. One Betty is reported as probably des- 
troyed, one Topsy probably drmaged. The afternoon strike strafed 
three enemy planes on the ground, none of which flamed. 

(c) 15-18 small craft wsre; observed in the cove north % 



D-5 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF O^I^^NSf 




of SUSAKI Airfield. 

(d) The afternoon strike reported that one 75 foot 
ammunition barge exploded and three small craft flamed after 
strafing. 

(e) At HAH A JIKA various small craft were strafed in 
the coves. No damage is reported. 

6. AIR DEFENSE 

(a) Enroute from ULITHI via SAIPA N to IWO JIM 

TG 52.2 furnished an eight plane Combat Air Patrol for control 
by U.S.S. ESTES (AGO 12) in the Movement Group area. Tracking 
and communications practice was obtained but no enemy planes 
were encountered, 

(b) At the objective area an eight plane CAP was fur- 
nished by TG 52.2 to U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12) for Fighter direc- 
tion control from approximately" 0620 to 1815 each day from 

D -3 Day to D -1 Day, inclusive. Primary Fighter Direction was 
delegated alternately to DD»s BENNION, STEMBEL and BRYANT. 

(c) No enemy planes were intercepted. It is believed 
that only two enemy planes appeared in the area during dayli^it. 
One, a Zeke apparently from IWO JIKA, was shot down by an 0S2U 
from U.S.S. PENSACOLA early in the morning of D -3 Day. (No 
other planes are believed to have landed on or taken off from 
MO JIMA.) The other, reported as an Irving, was sighted and 
chased by the Air Coordinator on the morning of D -1. CAP was 
vectored but bogey apparently saw the TBH chasing him and 
escaped at top speed lew on the water. 

(d) No night CAP was available during this three day 
period. The following enemy planes are regarded as the total 
of authentic enemy planes during darkness*. 

(1) At 0640 (K) on D -2 the picket HALLIGAN, o&^S 
of two DD's stationed 80 miles north of IWO J^f, *Sk£\^j 
attacked by throe twin-engine planes receiviji|f no - 
damage and destroying one by antiaircraft/" • % 

(2) At 1957(K) on D -2 the TWJGGS shot dalfn a 
bogey first reported by the picfyrt 80 miiy^north and 
later tracked into the objective area^^ 




D-6 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OJ^/T|ON& YN%i^3WO JIMA CAMPAIGN 

I* ; " l'* iSfc,,. 

(3) About 2130(K) on D -1, onS ^/two planels*^ 
flying at about 100 feet altitude succe*98$iaiy bomb^ 
GAMBLE (DM) and BLESSMAN (APD). Radar repeat ^ on ^ • 
this plane were practically nil although there wfe^£' 
a few weak and quickly fading contacts. Use of raHar 
not indicated. BLESSMAN believed enemy homed visually 
on wake, as ship was making 22 knots while attempting 
to join a movement group, and wake was phosphorescent. 
At 0615 (K) DOG Day Force Fighter Direction in U.S.S. 
ELDORADO relieved Force Fighter Director Officer in 
U.S.S, ESTES (AGC 12). 

7. COMMUNICATIONS : Fighter Direction and Inter Fighter 

Director nets were generally satisfactory. Further comments have been 
made in the communications report. Use of authenticate rs was nil. 

WEATHER ; On D -3 and D -1 Days weather was poor for 
flying and particularly poor for visibility. Practically solid cover 
existed from lower levels of 100 to 7000 feet up to undetermined top 
level. CAP was kept at or below mattress on D -2 Day, Flying weather 
and visibility were good. 



9. REC0M.CENDATI0NS 



(a) That position of CVE»s and nearby CV*s be obtained 
by ECM hourly. 

(b) That definite information be obtained from CVE's 
and from U.S.S. ESTES on desirability and feasibility of operat- 
ing the U.S.S. ESTES YE/YG. 

(c) That CVE^, particularly on first day of operation, 
brief pilots more thoroughly on location of base to which they 
are to report. 

(d) That CVE*s and CV^s check outgoing planes carefully 
for IFF and pancake them if they are not showing IFF. 

(e) That 'CVE's be briefed on new CcntComTWO VHF channel 
designations, e.g. ''Uncle tor SAD primary and "William" for 
Fighter Director Primary.,'^ 

*V ' 

(f ) That pilots flying one type of mission be thorough- 
ly briefed on channels in use by planes on other miss ^pns, so 
that if, for example, an Anti-Sub Patrol Plarie sees a 



D-7 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE BTC) JJ&'lA CAMPAIGN 
> 

and later sees the CAP searching for it he may,.£ass information 
to them that he is not "the bogey and that the%o gey is flying 
such and such a course, , \ v *V 

' - . '>.•¥■ " y 

(g) That ASP plane radio equipment be checked careful- 
ly. 

10. ANTI-SUEL1ARINE OPERATIONS 

General Comments 

(a) The Air Plan called for target ASP planes to use 
a specialized voice call. This had two purposes in view, (1) 
to identify its patrol sector and (2) to differentiate it from 
local ASP planes, who were using a simple plane call plus the 
carrier call. For example, 1 Able Sabre for TASP meant that 
this plane, from carrier whose voice call was Sabre, was assign- 
ed from flight Able and had sector 1 to patrol,. During the ' 
operation many TASP planes did not use this specialized call, 
thus creating confusion and resulting in unnecessary transmis- 
sions. 

(b) Difficulty was encountered in planes coming up on 
wrong frequencies and using the wrong IFF code, 

(c) Ah overlap of 30 minutes should be set-up for re- 
lieving pianos. In this way each sector has 30 minutes of two- 
plane search. At least this much time is needed to receive all 
position reports and to instruct relieving plane. 



D -3 Day 

(d) No contact. Planes were late in. reporting on sta- 
tion due to bad weather. Sectors were only partially flown as 
weather conditions permitted. Total sorties: 20. 



D -2 Day 



(e) No submarine contacts reported. Plane on sector 
4 was given permission to strafe 3 small luggers 'on the east 
side of KITA 10 JIMA, Total sorties: 42. 



D-8 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



D -1 Day 

(f) Two submarine contacts were reported^ PC 600 re- 
ported contact bearing 145° distance 8 miles from Point HtS$&gg3$. 
Relief plane for Sector 4> voice call 392 Ruler, was ordered to 
the scene for Hunter-Killer Operations* Upon arrival at scene 
the contact was classified as non-sub and plane ordered to Sec- 
tor 4 for patrol. 

(g) The second contact was reported by U.S.S. BREESE, 
bearing 110° distance 20 miles from U.S.S. ESTES. 392 Ruler, 
the nearest plane, was again vectored to the contact. This 
plane worked with the destroyer for 2j hours. All attacks were 
made by the destroyer and the contact was finally evaluated as 
non-submarine. Attack was ordered off by competent authority. 

(h) Total sorties: 26 - Planes were remaining on sta- 
tion for three hours in contrast with lj hour patrols on D -2, 

11. AIR SEA RESCUE OPERATIONS 

(a) The chart and chronological incidents below re- 
present Air-Sea Rescue Operations from D -3 to D -1 inclusive: 



DATE 




PLANE 


CAUSE LOST 


SAVED 


Feb, 


16 


0S2U 


Operational 


1 


Feb. 


16 


FM-2 


Probably 










Operational 1 




Feb. 


16 


FM-2 


Combat 


1 


Feb. 


17 


TBM 


Combat 


3 


Feb. 


18 


FM-2 


Operational 


1 


Feb. 


18 


TBM 


Comt^at 


3 






February 16 


, 1945 





Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 1 



At 0745 an 0S2U from the U.S.S. NEW YORK made a forced 



D-9 





. M % 

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OIERATIOlS#BJ- THE ^0 _ JIMA. CAMPAIGN 

landing due to engine trouble at a point 15, 
198° T from Mount SURIBACHI. As a result of the 
ing the wing tip float of the plane was broken. 

The destroyer HALL immediately siood-by the dama" 
plane and was shortly relieved by the sea-plane tender 
WILLIAMSON. 

At 0800 the SALT LAKE CITY was directed to recover the 
plane. At 0835 the Flag Bridge reported' that all personnel had 
been rescued but that the plane was lost. Names of crew unavail- 
able , 

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 2 

One VF from the SARGENT BAY of the Target Combat Air 
Patrol, which arrived on stat5„on at 0930 never succeeded in 
joining up with his group. 

After arriving in the area, he stated that he didn't 
know where he was but believed that he was somewhere "west of 
the weather front," (At this time the front was from east to 
west) , 

CIC could contact him only through the DD BENNION and 
the DD STEMBEL. CIC instructed him to turn on emergency IFF. 
He received the transmission bit was apparently unable to turn 
on his emergency IFF. 

The last course that he was known to be on, according 
to his own report, was 090° T, 

CIC gave him a vector of 070° tut received no acknow- 
ledgement. Thereafter we heard no more from him, but CTU 52.2.1 
was in contact with him for a short time. 

The plane failed to return to jtfase and no further re- 
ports have been received. 



Anti-Submarine patrol planes tM$c alerted to be on the 
lookout for the lost plane. Name of pilo^unavailablo • 



Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 3 



At 1715, during a strafing attack cn LfcunifeSURIBAi 
a VF from the LUNGA POINT was reported to be smoking <Etf6rif> 




D-10 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERAT DN# f| 'THE TWJ^ JIMA CAMPAIGN 


by antiaircraft, £^ 

At 1715 > a' "crash" report was heard giving*W& 3?Qj^Cf^$ 
tion as three miles, bearing 300° T from Mount SURIBACHI#^j^ 
was reported that the pilot had climbed out of the plane a fcjf^ 
gpt into his rubber boat, ^7 

The DM3 HOPKINS observed the crash, and immediately 
proceeded to the scene. Meanwhile CTF 52 despatched the DD 
MULLANY to effect the rescue. 

At 1724, the HOPKINS was alongside the survivor, and 
the MULLANY ? s mission was cancelled. 

Rescue was completed at 1730 and the LUNGA POINT noti- 
fied. Pilots name: Ensign Stevenson. 



February 17 , 1945 
Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 1 

At 1730 a VT from the PETROF BAY, call 387 Circus, 
made a water landing at position reported as four miles bear- 
ing 330° T from Mount SURIBACHI. All personnel were observed 
to get out into life-raft. Two ships started heading for 
scene, the HOWARD (US 7) and the YMS 340, The HOWARD arrived 
first and picked up the three survivors. Names not available, 

February 18, 1945 
Air-Sea Rescue Incident No, 1 



At dawn two VT ! s from the ANZIO were launched on a 
special search for a survivor reported 17 February by a B-29 
at position 214 miles bearing 089° T from WO JIMA. Both planes 
were equipped with droppable survival gear. 

At 0815 these planes reported sighting a survivor 127 
miles bearing 090° T from IWO JIMA{- which distance was later 
changed to 135 miles. At 0940 the" TEXAS launched an 0S2U for 
rescue mission, At 1040 an ARKANSAS VOS joined up, established 
communications with 'him and they proceeded on .mission, 

* w & *> *• 3 

mm fif A* 

D-ll 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE 3WO 'JD^^PAIGN 



At 1200 the VOS's arrived at scene where VT' s'were'r 
still orbitting and relieved them* The TEXAS plane immediately 
landed and effected rescue. 

The VOS ! s returned to base and the survivor was placed 
aboard the WILLIAMSON which delivered him to the ESTES. 

The pilot was from the NATOMA BAY - plane call Ruler 
32 - and was launched pre-dawn as a part of the first LCAP on 
16 February, He never succeeded in joining up due to weather 
conditions and became hopelessly lost in a storm. He made a 
water landing seven hours later at 1330. The loss of the plane 
was never reported to Commander Air Support Control Unit. 

Pilot was not survivor orbitted by B-29. Name: 
Ensign D.P. Valpey. Condition: Good. 

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 2 

At 1400 a report was received of a VF forced down due 
to antiaircraft after a bombing run. Position: four miles due 
north of Mount SURIBACHI. 

A VOF pilot reported that a ship was headed toward the 
three survivors who were in a rubber boat with dye marker show- 
ing. 

At 1437 VICKSBURG reported that the PAUL HAMILTON &D 
590) was picking up survivors. 

The aircraft »s parent was KAKIN ISLAND - call of plane 
312 Fido, Names: Lieutenant (jg) H.A. Hughs, D.A. Hau.s, ArM3c, 
D,C. Smith, AL&Ilc, Condition: Not reported but assumed satis- 
factory, 

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 3 

At 1715 the picket destroyers stationed about BO 
miles northeast of 3OT0 JIMA relayed a message from a BENNINGTON 
VB - call 261 Legion, stating that possibly two parachutes had 
gone down at a position one mile due west of the highest point 
of CHICHI JIM, which would place^ them in Futain Harbor. There 
was no report of rubber boat or dye 'marker. No action was taken 
by TF 52 on this report. " , * * 




D-12 





ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF $2 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN^pE BSC^JIMA CAMPAIGN 

12. COORDINATION OF AIR SUPPORT >^D NAVAL flPWlflfe ^ 

(a) Prior to arrival at the objective, con£^gmc%% 
were held with representatives of Staff Intelligence a*' 
Gunfire with the* purpose of coordinating surface bombarc 
with air strikes. As a result of these conferences, a lis 
of targets was prepared; the targets being given priority 
ings in accordance with their relative importance to the task 
given to the Amphibious Support Force. This list was divided 
into three groupings. One group consisted of targets which 
Naval Gunfire could handle most effectively. Another group 
was made up of those targets that could be hit better by air- 
craft. The last group were targets which were assigned jointly 
to air and gunfire. It was understood that targets in either 
of the- first two groups might be fired upon by either gunfire 
or air, but that in general target assignments would follow 
the groupings, 

(b) This arrangement worked excellently in operation. 
The majority of targets, attacked by aircraft of an Advance 
Air Support Control Unit, are of the pre-det ermine d type. 
This is especially true of the first day, when there has been 
little opportunity for accurate target spotting. The advantage 
of a previously prepared list of targets which can be most 
effectively attacked, "is obvious. It is recommended that this 
practice be continued. 

13, COivMJNICATIQNS 

(a) On the whole communications were excellent, A 
few mechanical failures were experienced but were qi ickly cor- 
rected by the technicians on duty. 

(b) The Air-Sea Rescue net was used effectively. 
Army land based planes used this net for reporting in and 
results were good. Considerable interference from C.W., was 
noticed occasionally but did ^V'Jalock cut messages. 



(c) For much of the time the HK net had C.W., and 
other interference. Traffic was'^ight anp incoming signals 
were readable. In the sole instancy where £(K tactics were 
employed, the surface vessel (HREESEM&I Id) Wuld be reached 
by neither this ship (on HK, GW or LAW} (nor the^plane assigned to 
work with it. Commander Air Support Control Unit, *«ver HK, had 
perfect communications with the plane. The .-latter 'Wmmunicated 



D-13 




ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATION^ P THE UNO JIMA COLIPAIGN 



V? • .-.IN 

with the BREESE via blinker, , ^ 

(d) The ASC(HF) proved successful. Traffic was#|ot 
heavy and only Commanders of CVE task group and un^ts werl' 
with Advance Commander Air Support Control Units. AS^JftlF- 
was not used but it is doubtful that it would have f unci^6j^l ^ 
because of 5 X 5 feed over from 37.2 mcs, used by Underwc^br^^ 
Demolition Teams, yyp 

(e) The General Warning net was used for general alert 
and traffic was very light. 

(f ) The local air warning net was used for communica* 
tions by all anti-submarine patrol planes. Radio discipline 
was bad and frequently messages had to be repeated. Local car- 
rier anti-submarine pilots should be thoroughly briefed on 
radio discipline and patrol plans. In several instances impor- 
tant transmissions from long range anti-submarine patrol planes 
(TASP) wei*e cut out by local ASP. Contact with TASP planes was 
difficult at times; some being off frequency and ethers having 
faulty equipment. 

(g) The SAD(S) (5135 kes) was not used as planned, pri 
marily because of plane equipment failure. In one instance the 
transmitter on a plane was 70 kes, off frequency, and several 
planes had to come up on SAD-1 or SAD-2 for any communications. 
It is recommended HF radio equipment in p3.anes be thoroughly 
checked before leaving the carrier, 

(h) The SAD(VHF) - nets (140.02 and 140.53) using TDQ 
transmitters and RCK receivers were very satisfactory. However 
at least one spare TDQ should be installed in each AGC, and RCK 
receivers are recommended for use in voice filter, 

(i) General Comments 

(1) C.W. caused considerable interference on all 
HF nets but did not completely block out any transmis- 
sions, 

(2) Wave traps were used successfully to reduce 
feed-over on several circuits and it is recommended 
that they be made part of permanent 'installation. 

(3) RAO-4 receivers were satisfactory' except for? 



D-14 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THfr-'IBGh J IMA CAMPAIGN 



band switches and phasing controls. Structural weak- 
nesses were the cause of most trouble, * 

(4) Feed-over from inter-commander Air Supporl^ 
Control Unit nets was nil. ; *• .4 

14. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS '' 4* h 

(a) Weather conditions with moderately high ceiling 
and fair visibility is considered of major importance to effec- 
tive air operations during the bombardment phase. During this 
phase all pilots lack complete familiarity with the target area 
and some pilots lack experience in this type of work. Preci- 
sion bombing and firing is mandatory in order to obtain the 
desired results and it is therefore necessary that all pilots 
be able to locate the assigned targets definitely and accurate- 
ly and have sufficient ceiling to make precise firing runs. 
When low ceiling and reduced visibility are encountered at the 
objective which is defended by intense antiaircraft it is not 
practicable for pilots to study their targets in advance. They 
must then resort to a hasty procedure that is not conducive to 
precise bombing and destructive results, 

(b) Coordination and cooperation betvreen Naval Gunfire 
and Air Support Control was excellent and functioned smoothly 
and promptly. This degree of coordination was made possible 
by the fact that both Naval Gunfire and Air Support were con- 
trolled exclusively from the Joint Operations room affording 
continuous direct contact and mutual exchange of information 
with a minimum of delay. A target index prepared by Staff 
Intelligence was used jointly by both Air Support and Naval 
Gunfire and it proved to be very helpful. It is strongly re- 
commended that Air Support and Naval Gunfire continue to be 
controlled from the Joint Operations Room. 

(c) There were, as usual,' entirely too many "Bogeys" 
reported which later proved to"* De' iriendly. This problem is 
serious at present and will increase in importance in future 
operations. It is therefore recommended that consideration be 
given to the establishment of a Filter* Center afloat at the 
objective, A Filter Center adequately manned and equipped 
plus strictly enforced air discipline among friendly aircraft 
may well prove to be one solution to this identification pro- 
blem. Such a Filter Center should be separate and distinct 
from the present CIC. 

<~ . ■ - 

«>'- 

D-15 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE EtfO'4lMA CAMPAIGN 



(d) In order to assist in promptly evaluating the re- 
sults of air attacks during the bombardment phase it is recom- 
mended that the Air Coordinator carry a photographer and each- 
target be photographed immediately upon completion of the attack. 
These photographs can be dropped to the command ship when the 
Air Coordinator leaves the vicinity and prompt photographic in- 
terpretation may then be accomplished. The Air Coordinator 
should continue to make his own observations and report the re- 
sults in addition to this photographic coverage. This photo- 
graphic function should be carried out in addition to the Air 
Coordinator's normal duties and should not in any way interfere 
with the performance of those duties. 



E,C, PARKER j 
Captain, U.S.N, 
Commander Air Support Control Unit, 
Amphibious Group ONE, 



D-16 



ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATION IN THE 3WO JIMA CAMPAIGN 

APPENDIX I 



SORTIES DETAIL 



(1) Sorties 




¥F 


VT 




VHB 






D -3 147 


56 




36 




239 ' 


D -2 181 


113 




42 




336 


D -1 128 






24 




318 


526 


265 




102 




893 


Sorties Detail 












(A) Available 
Support 

Missions D -3 


D -2 




D -1 


TOTAL 


VF 84 




107 




128 


319 


VT 32 




62 




58 


152 


VBH 36 




42 




24 


102 


(B> For Photos 












VF 2 




6 




6 


14 


VT 1 




3 




3 


7 


SpCinCPac 








1 


1 



(C) For Hydrographic Work 
VT 3 

(D) For Smoke Mission 
VT 




,# 



5*' 



8 



ike-x 




ENCLOSURE (D) TO OTP 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN ' THE TWO'jlHA CAMPAIGN 

D -3 D -2 p -1 TOTAL >| 



(E) Target CAP 

61 63 64 193 

(F) ASP 

VT 20 42 26 

239 336 318 893 



/ 




D-I-2 




ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 
. . 

APPENDIX II 



MISSIONS DETAIL 



D -3 p -3 t| t -1 TOTAL 

Support (Navy) 6 IS 21 45 

Support (Amy) 1 1 

Photographic 13 3 7 

Hydrographic 3 2 3 8 

Smoke 1 1 

10 25 27 62 



/ 



r 



D-II-1 



ENCLOSURE (E) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS <$f * ' 

IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN . o ' ' 



COMMENTS ON UDT OPERATIONS' -' 



1, (a) The scheduled operations of the Underwater Demolition 
Teams prior to D Day were in brief: - 

(1) Reconnaissance of Eastern beaches on D -2 forenoon. 

(2) Reconnaissance of Yfestern beaches on D -2 afternoon. 

(3) Demolition operations either on night of D -2/D -1 
or on D -1, or both, as found necessary in recon- 
naissance, to remove obstacles, natural or man-made, 
which might be found in the approaches to the beaches. 
Removal of anti-boat mines. Marking channels. 

(4-) Assembly and dissemination of information on the 
foregoing. 

(b) The UDT operations, including operations of the close 
supporting DD's and LCl(G) ! s, wore under the command of CTG 52.4. 
(ComUDT'sPac) . Only a brief summary of the operations is given here. 
As CTG 52.4 will cover the operations fully in his action report. 



2, The reconnaissance operation on the Eastern beaches took 
place on D -2 -with ROGER hour (the time boats containing UDT per- 
sonnel and LCI(G) ! s in close support commenced approaching the beach 
from positions 2000 yards offshore) at 1100(K). Heavy fire was dir- 
ected by the enemy at these craft, probably from the high ground 
between the East Boat Basin and M0T0YAMA , possibly also from SURIBACHI 
and remaining blockhouses and pill boxes not destroyed on the slopes 
behind the beaches. All LCI(G)'s were hit, LCI(G) IPU so badly that 
she later was sunk (in 100 fathoms of water) by our gunfire. I£l(G)*s 
suffered many casualties. IEUTZE was damaged and her CO. seriously 
wounded. No damage is known to have been received by UDT boats. At 
the request of CTG 52.4- smoke was laid with W.P. projectiles along 
the ridge from SURIBACHI to about 4-00 yards north of East Boat Basin. 
This smoke ..plus increased rate of neutralization fire, appeared to 
decrease effectiveness of enemy fire. 

3, Despite the heavy fire the UDT personnel carried out suc- 
cessfully their mission of reconnaissance. One swimmer was^ai5i£rc- 
covcrcd, and is believed to have been hit by enemy fire. - J "Tne operation 
was completed about 1300, The reconnaissance disclosed that therefore 
no underwater obstacles in the beach approaches and that surf^arfcl beach 
conditions wore suitable for landing. 



E - 1 



ENCLOSURE ($) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATION IN THE IWO JIMA OPERATIONS 



Um Damage to all the available LCl(G) ! s necessitated their 
elimination from the support of reconnaissance of the Western 
beaches, ROGER hour was 1615 (K) , Destroyers in support closed 
to 2000 yards of the shoreline instead of remaining at 3000 yards. 
Fire was drawn, but was less intense than off the Eastern beaches, 
and neither damage nor casualties are known to have occurred. Again 
WP projectile smoke was laid by battleships. The operation was com-,' 
pleted about 1800(K). The reconnaissance disclosed that the Western 
beaches were free of underwater obstacles and that beach and surf t 
conditions were suitable for landing. 5 

5. In view of the information obtained on reconnaissance no 
demolition operations wore considered to bo necessary and none was 
undertaken. 

6. Recommendations regarding fire support of Underwater Demolition 
operations arc contained in Enclosure (C) . Comment and recommendations 
on the actual operation of the UDT ! s are withheld pending receipt of 
the report of CTG 52.4. 



E - 2 




ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT/oF' DERATIONS 
IN THE IWO J IMA CAMfgjOf Vf~# 

COMMENTS ON MINESWESPING *^-* 
16 February 1945. (D -3) 



1, Minesweeping operations were started on schedule 
TU 52.3.1, consisting of the HOPKINS (DMS 13), HAMILTON (DISS 18), 
CHANDLER (DIB 9), DORSET (DMS l), HOWARD (DISS 7), and HOGAN (IMS 6) 
commenced sweeping Sweep Area ONE at 0600(K) for moored and acoustic 
mines, completing the area at 1206 (K). 

2, Sweep Area THIRTEEN, north of 24° 30* N. , meanwhile 
was being swept for the same types of mines by the SERENE (AM 300), 
SHELTER (AM 301), and STRATEGY (AM 308) from TU 52.3.4, with PC 800 
as mine disposal vessel. This unit started the sweep at 0600(K) and 
completed at 1500(K), with negative results. However, at 0830(K) a 
mine was reported on the surface which was identified as a floating 
Japanese Type 93 Model 3 and was sunk by gunfire from the PC 800, at 
ten miles 122© (T) from Mt, SURIBACHI. 

3, Mark VI drill mine cases were planted as buoys to 
mark the inshore limits of the swept area in Sweep Are FIVE, which 
was swept for moored, acoustic, and magnetic mines by CHAMPION (AM 
314), ARDENT (AM 340), DEFENSE (AM 317), DEVASTATOR (AM 318\, TU 
52.3.5, together with STRENGTH (All 309) and SUCCESS (AM 310) from 
TU 52.3.4 to do the magnetic sweeping. During the sweep of the 
area, shore installations, particularly from target areas 166 B, E 
and 167 A, B, opened fire upon the unit which was returned by them 
and their support vessel BREESE (DM 18), The entire area was swept 
by l6lO(K), with the exception of the area 1000 yards east and west 
from HIGASHI IWA, which was not swept because of the shoals there. 
The DEFENSE (AM 317) fouled her sweep gear on an underwater object 
bearing 212° (T), distance 6100 yards from Mt, SURIBACHI. 

After the first pass was made in Sweep Area ONE, 
three ships of TU 52.3.1, then left the formation and commenced 
operations in Sweep Area FOUR for moored and acoustic mines, start- 
ing at 0712(K) and completing at 1230(K), These three ships were 
then joined by the rest of the vessels in TU 52,3.1 which had been 
completing Sweep Area ONE, snd the entire unit made one pass for 
moored and acoustic mines in Sweep Age a THREE between the 300 and 
500 fathom curves, completing at 11 




5, The REVEL (AM 284) ff qpi TU 52.3.4 Joined as a mag- 

netic sweeper with TU 52.3.3 comprisin| ^he SKmOSK (AM 303), SIG- 
NET (AM 302), STAUNCH (AM 307), SCURRY (AM^304), SPSG^ACLE (AM 305), 



F-1 " * •-' 



ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN £HE,3M^ JB& CAMPAIGN 
— V^- - 

SPECTER (AM 306), and TRACY (DM 19) in a moored, acoustic end" mag- 
netic sweep of Sweep Area TWO. This unit was the only one which 
completed its minesweeping schedule within the assigned time on '% ^ 
this day, completing area TWO at 1102(K) and then executing a sweep\ 
for the same types of mines in Sweep Area SIX, finishing the latter \ 
area at 1632 (K). No mines were swept in any area, and generally % 
the sweeping was without incident, \ 

17 February 1945. (D -2) 



6« Operations were again commenced on schedule with 

TU 52,3 .1, consisting of the same ships as the previous day, execut- 
ing a sweep for moored and acoustic mines in Sweep Area FOURTEEN, 
completing at 1022(K). The unit then returned for screening duty, 
all of the minesweeping task units being assigned to the screen upon 
completion of each day's sweeping assignment. 

7. It ha.d been planned for TU 52.3.6 (composed of TU 

52.3.7, YMS's 288, 323 , 362 , 374, 401, 426 , 428, and LINDSEY (DM 32) 
with SPECTACLE (AM 305) from TU 52.3.3) and TU 52.3.8 (YM3«s 193, 
235, 345, 361, 407, 475, and SC 1054 with SPECTER (AM 306) from 
TU 52,3.3) to make one pass for moored, acoustic and magnetic mines 
through Sweep Area NINE starting at 0800(K), but as the unit made 
their approach, they were fired upon by shore batteries and were 
ordered to retire by CTG 52.3. Heavy fire support units were brought 
up for cover, and the sweep was started at 0940(K). During the sweep, 
the unit was fired upon again from shore, which fire was returned by 
vessels of the unit and the covering heavy fire support ships. Dan 
buoys were laid to mark the inshore limit of the area swept, being 
laid at 1000 yards intervals by YMS 193 and Y1S 401. The YK3 362 
fouled her gear on an underwater object during the sweep. The area 
was completed at 1055 (K) with negative results. The unit then retired 
to the south until time to start the sweep of Sweep Area TEN. 

B Sweep Area EIGHT, except the inshore 25$ was swept 

by TU 52.3.5 (ARDENT (AM 340), DEFENSE (-AM 317), DEVASTATOR (AM 318) 
and CHAMPION (AM314)), and drew fire from shore batteries from the 
east corner of IWO JIKA while sweeping for moored and acoustic mines 
in that area. The fire was returned by ships of the unit, with 
results unreported. Upon completion of the sweep of this area, TU 
52,3.5 was scheduled to make one pass through Sweep Area THREE bet- 
ween the 200 and 300 fathom curves for moored and acoustic mines. 

9. In Sweep Area SEVEN, TU 52.3.4, consisting of SERENE 

(AM 300), SHELTER (AM 301% STRATEGY (AM 308), STRENGTH (AM 309), 



F-2 



ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO J IMA CAMPAIGN 



If I 

SUCCESS (All 310), REBEL (*M 284), and if M 
the island while executing a sweep for mjkg 
The unit returned the fire and was erderecr 
until fire support vessels arrived, 

10. TU 52.3.6, composed of the same vessels that swept in 
area NINE in the morning, was to commence operations in Sweep Area 
TEN at 1300(K), but the sweep did net start until 1430(K) when heavy- 
fire support ships and two destroyers were ready to give covering 
fire. One pass was made through the area for moored, acoustic aid 
magnetic mines, the sweepers drawing fire from the island which was 
returned by them and the heavy fire support ships. Some of the 
sweepers were seen to even be firing their .50 caliber machine guns. 
The area was completed at 1615(K) without any casualties. 

11. TU 52.3.3 (SKIRMISH (AM 303), SIGNET (AM 302), STAUNCH 
(All 307), SCURRY (AM 304)), less SPECTACLE and SPECTER which were 
operating with TU 52.3.6, operated with the screen during the entire 
day, having no sweeping assignment. As the other ■ mine sweeping task 
units completed their assigned sweeping achedules, they were ordered 
to the screen, 

12. CTG 52,3 reported that all scheduled areas were com- 
pleted prior to 1S00(K), with the sole exception of the inshore 2555 
of Sweep Area EIGHT. 




acoustic rSines.P 

ia'Vkiii/L, 




16 February 1945 , (D -1) 



13, Sweep Area THIRTEEN was completed by a sweep for 

moored and acoustic mines south of 24° 30 1 N, by TU 52,3.5, by the 
same vessels which had swept in Sweep Area EIGHT the previous day. 
The unit was to commence operations in the area at 0600(K), and the 
sweep was reported as being completed at 164S(K), a long operation, 

14 ♦ At 1445 (K), heavy fire support ships moved around on 

the north side of IWO JIMA to give covering fire for the completion 
of sweeping on that side of the island where the minesweeping ves- 
sels had encountered a considerable amount of fire on the, jppgijLpu& 
day. TU 52.3.3 (SKIRMISH (AM 303), SIGNET (*^O2^/S?A0|jffi 307), 
SCURRY (AK 304), SPECTACLE (Mtf$F)« SMlTER 306)) s&X Mep 
Area SEVEN for magnetic mines, fend again drew fire 1 1 JbtSSnd 
which was returned. Meanwhile J^^J k 5 g •oit^ireea of the same ships 
which had swept in Sweep Area 3mm on DOG minus WO, was sweeping 
Sweep Area EIGHT for moored, acoustic and magentic mines, making one 



F-3 



ENCLOSURE (P) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE ifei ^J3)fr> CAMPAIGN 


pass inshore of the 100 fathom curve and then between B|p JB£A and 
HIGASHI IWA, completing at 1545 (K), This unit also drew\fire from 
shore installations which was returned by the unit and the heavy 
fire support ships which were furnishing excellent covering fire. 

15 # Since TU 52,3,1 (HOPKINS (IMS 13), HAMILTON %aS3 IS), 

CHANDLER (DIB 9), DORSET (DIB 1), HOW ARD (EMS 7), HOGAN (WS K (>) 9 ' 
BREESE (DM 18)) and TU 52,3.6 (YMS»s 323, 362. 374, 401, 426 * 478 , 
288, 407, 193, 235, 345, 361, 475 and SC 1054; had no mineswe^ftng 
assignments, they were refueled and assigned to the screen, djner 
units were assigned to the screen as they completed the areas a^^gnt- 
ed to them, 

16 # CTG 52,3 visual dispatch to CTF 52 of 180644 advised 

that he considered the minesweeping to date sufficient until the 
island is taken. No mines were swept during the three days of sweep- 
ing, and no casualties were suffered by any vessel of TG 52.3 while 
engaged in minesweeping operations, 

17 # The GAMBLE (DM 15) was hit by a bomb from a low-fly- 

ing twin engine bomber at 2255 (K) while on screening duty and was 
taken in tow by the HAMILTON (EMS 18), 



' .v 



ENCLOSURE (G) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS 
IN THE IWO ,'IMA CAMPAIGN 



COMMENTS ON BATTLE DAMAGE 



1. 



PENS ACOIA (CA 21) 



Hit by enemy shore batteries at 0936 
with two shells of about 8 n caliber and four shell 
and 3, 5". 




ET^JtPbruary 

Id to be 6" 



Damage Compartments A302A, 40Q&, A309L flooded; CIC 
rendered inoperative; one plane destroyed, catapult damaged; one 5" 
gun inoperative; sick bay flooded; degaussing cable cut. 

Ship's force controlled fires and flooding, made all 
necessary temporary repairs. 



2. 



J£I(G)' g 474, 441, 473, 438, 449, 457, 4<ft, 471, 469, 
450, 346, 343, 



Hit by enemy shore batteries, mortar or small caliber 
fire on morning of 17 February while covering UDT beach reconnaissance. 

Damage ~ LCI(G) 474 capsized as a result of underwater 
damage and was ordered sunk during the afternoon of 17 February, Four 
LClCG^s received temporary repairs from TERRCB and one from ESTES, 
during night of 17 February, LCI (G) * s 441 and 473 had permanent ma* 
chinery casualties requiring towing from objective, LCl(G) 438, 
449, 457, 466, 471, required extensive repairs but were able to pro- 
ceed under own power, LCl(G)'s 450 and 469 required above-^water 
hull repairs only, LCl(G)'s 346 and 348 were fully repaired by 18 
February, 



3. 



BLESSMAN (APD 48) 
Bombed at 2130 18 February.. 

Damage - Hit starboard side amidships c>v££ v -forwa 




fireroom in troop spaces. One engine and fireroom w<p| • dama^ct as 
well as much topside equipment. Power and water prps^ir^-dlre lost 
temporarily, % 



GIBffiR (APD 11) assisted in ext^uisMng fires and 
BLESSMAN was taken in tow by ARDENT (AM 340)^,;^^^ 



V 



G-l 



ENCLOSURE (G) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 

A. GAMBLE (DM JLg) , f 

Bombed about 2200, 18 February 5 hit by. two ^50 pound 
bombs. ^ % 

• *$> 

Damage - Both firerooms flooded, both boilers J&ifc 
ploded, all power lost, 




HAMILTON (DMS 18) went alongside and brought M0a 
and flooding under control. GAMBLE was taken in tow by DORSEY^DMS l) 

5. LEUTZE (DD A81) 



Hit by shell of about 3 M caliber from enemy shore bat- 
teries at 1106 (K), 17 February. 

Damage - Forward stack, stack partition, uptake, and 
air casing of number one boiler holed. Additional minor topside 
damage. Ship remained opeiational. 



ENCLOSURE (H) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS I 1 
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



CONSENTS ON MEDICO FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL CASUALTIES 



1. Casualties were 


sustained 


as 


follows : 




W.I. A. M 


.I.ii. K.I.A. 


[TOTAL. / 


U.S.S. PENSaOOLA 


9S 


6 


17 / 


115 ' } 


LCI Group 449 


20 





!7 / 


$i 


457 


16 








16 


466 


18 


1 


4 


23 


469 


7 








7 


471 


6 





11 


17 


473 


30 








30 


433 


2 








2 


441 


27 





6 


33 


450 


6 








6 


U.S.S. TENNESSEE 


4 








4 


U.S.S. LEUTZE (DD 431) 


4 








4 


U.S.S. BLESSKAN (APD 4B) 


11 








11 


UDT Teams embarked in 










elessman 


20 





2 


22 


U.S.S. WASI.5JTH (DIS 15) 


2 








2 


U.S.S. BATES 


1 





J> 


1 


TOTAL 


272 


1 


57 


330 



J 

-) 



The U.S.S. GAMBLE (W. 15) was hit by a bomb but did not make a ca- 
sualty report to this Command. The casualty report from UDT's has 
not yet been received, 

2. Medical care was rendered and the casualties kept 
aboard the larger ships in which they occurred. The smaller vessels 
transferred their cases to any convenient ship which could' take .tftem. 
The U.S.S. TERROR (CM5) took fifty-ei^it cases from the , LCI Group. 
The remaining cases were treated aboard NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, arid 
ESTES (AGC 12). / 

./ 

3. Due to necessity for not impeding combat operations 
transfer to the larger ships was sometimes slow awd required, in 
many cases, repeated handling through small boats and AF&'s. 

4. Medical supplies and facilities f were adequate in all 
ships. Excellent first-aid was rendered abcard they small vessels. 



H-l 



ENCLOSURE (H) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE <$XD ^fBl^C^T, JGN 



5, RECOMMENDATION : That in future operations itM?©^, • 

stressed that during the pre-invasicn phase, each ship and unit ^lu^tj 
make a personnel casualty report to its Unit Commander, giving nuni-C 
ber of personnel wounded, missing and killed in action. This report 
to be sent daily by 1700, Unit Commanders in turn should report 
to the Task Force Commander, casualties aboard each ship and unit 
under his Command. This report to be sent not later than 1800 daily. 




H-2 



5^ 

ENCLOSURE (I) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS 
IN THE TWO JIM CAMPAIGN 



r.ammfR qn wither 
February l%5 (D -Jiff P fry) 



1. As Task Force 52 approached IWO JIMA, a moderate 1 
was centered 600 miles to the northeast , with a front extending s 
of the target into a new wave development, then located about 200 ^ 
miles to the west. We encountered the warm front of the wave late 

on the night of the 15th, and at dawn had a low broken to overcast 
of strato-cumulus at 1000 feet, and intermittent light rain. Be- 
cause of low ceiling and visibility, conditions for spotting as well 
as air strikes were very poor at the opening of the action on 16 Feb- 
ruary. 

2. The center of the wave development apparently passed 
just to the north of IWO JIMA at about 0900, when the wind shifted 
from southwest 12 knots to northwest 10 knots. Intermittent rain 
and low cloud did not break until 1400, when rain stopped, lower 
clouds gave way to an alto-stratus, alto-cumulus overcast at 9000 
feet, and visibility improved to 12 miles. Conditions for spotting, 
gunfire and low level air strikes were satisfactory, but the B-24 
strike scheduled for the afternoon was sent back. The sea was gentle, 
confused. 

3. By the morning of the 17th the cold front had moved 

300 miles southeast of IWO JIMA., and our weather was characterized 
by broken alto~cumulus clouds above 10,000 feet. Unlimited ceil- 
ing and visibility prevailed throughout the day. Weather was ex- 
cellent for all types of operations, with wind from the northwest, 
6 knots and a slight sea from northwest. 

4. The good weather was short-lived. Another wave was 

located, forming just east of FCEM0SA, By midnight of the 17th an 
alto-stratus overcast had formed and the following morning dawned 
with 6/10 of strato-cumulus and intermitted light rain. This wave 
was very small and moved rapidly, its aputer fusing south of IWO 
JIM by 2000 on the 18th. The lower cS^s were variable in aiaoun-t' 
and visibility averaged 6 to 10 miles. Conditions wlre^satis factory 
for close range gunfire, spotting, and low-level air strikes, but 
again the B-24 strikes were cancelled because of 8/10 of lb#^£rato- 
cumulus at 1800 feet. Ceiling was 9000 feet about 50$. of the' 
and 1800 feet the remainder. Surface winds were light,'l^ta ' 
from north-northeast to east. The sea was slight from nor the 




ENCLOSURE (l) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERA?!*! W SS&'B'WSf^ 

5. The small wave disturbance moved eastword rapidly 
and on D Day the ceiling and visibility were unlimited, with only 
scattered altocumulus and cumulus clouds present. Surface wind 
was U to 8 knots from northeast to southeast, and the sea was 
slight from the northeast. Weather conditions were excellent for 
all types of operations on D Day, 

6. REMARKS 

(a) The most valuable aids to forecasting on this 
operation were submarine weather reports. These reports, 
coming from the proper areas, were of invaluable assistance in 
determining the correct weather situation. 

(b) The search plane "in flights" and summaries were 
also of value, especially in areas to the north and east where 
the map would have otherwise been blank, 

WEATPfi MOTES 

# February (D -?) 

The day dawned with a low overcast at 1800 feet. 
Light intermittent rain reduced visibility to 3 - 6 miles. This 
condition continued until about 1000 when lower clouds broke 
giving glimpses of an alto-stratus overcast at 8000 feet. Inter- 
mittent rain and generally poor but variable visibility continued 
until 1^00. During the remainder of the day, the visibility re- 
mained above 12 miles, and ceiling at 9000 feet under a solid 
alto-stratus overcast. Surface wind was gentle, west to north- 
westerly. The sea was slight from the northwest. Low ceiling 
and visibility made conditions for gunfire, spotting, and air* 
strikes very unsatisfactory during the early morning, and unsat- 
isfactory until about 1^00, when they became average, 

17 February (ft -2) 

Broken alto-cumulus clouds at 10,00fl feet persisted 
throughout the day, together vdth a few lower cumulus. Conditions 
for operations were good, with ceiling and visibility unlimited, 
and a slight sea from the north. Surface wind was gentle, north 
to northwest. 





18 February (D ~1) 

An alto-stratus overcast at 9000 feet persisted 
throughout the day. However, increased strato-cumulus clouds 
gave a ceiling at 1500 feet during the morning until 0700, and 
again during midday from 1000 until 1400. Occasional light rain 
reduced the otherwise 12 mile visibility to 6 miles at times. 
Conditions for low-level air strikes, close range gunfire, and 
spotting were satisfactory, bit high level bombing was not 
possible during these times. Surface wind was light, northeast- 
erly, and sea was slight from the northeast. 



1-3 



ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPuRT ^©F OPERATIONS 
IN THE IWQ JIMA CAMPAIGN 



COMMENTS ON COMMUNICATIONS 

1. Upon the arrival of the ESTES at PEARL HARBOR, it was 
necessary to install considerable additional radio equipment to fit 
her out for use as flagship of Amphibious Support Force. Thereafter, 
and until departure for staging port, intensive efforts were made to 
test thoroughly all equipment and to calibrate on frequencies to be 
used in the forthcoming operation. In particular, the week's train- 
ing in company with ELDORADO and AUBURN was invaluable. The actual 
use of equipment on planned frequencies permitted the correction of 
minor difficulties in advance of the operation. It also developed 
data as to which transmitters and antennas could be used on partic- 
ular frequencies without unacceptable feed-ovor on other required 
circuits. 

2. Having in mind the necessary alterations and the fact 
that this is the first operation in which the ESTES has participated, 
it is considered that the installation rendered excellent service. 

3. BADAR CqJNTER^EASURES 

Enemy radar signals were intercepted (first intercept) as follows 

Pulse True Type 
Date Time Position F req. PRF Width Bearing Radar 



16 Feb. 


0151K 


23-32N 1U-14E 


156 


500 


7 






16 Feb. 


0620K 


24-33N 1U-09E 


101 


500 


19 


350 


AS 


16 Feb. 


2047K 


24-58N H1-05E 


300 


500 


10 


135 


AS 


18 Feb. 


03/+2K 


24-57N U1-09E 


200 


500 


15 


160 


AS 


18 Feb. 


2105K 


24-43N H1-10E 


100 


750 


60-65 100 


AS 



The above radar signals were heard at various times on the 16th, 17th, 
18th, and 19th of February. 

Jamming, own and enemy: 

(a) None noted by the enemy. 

(b) Following by own forces: 

Date Time Type of Jamming Apparent Tactics Effectiveness 

16 Feb, 0755K Noise To jam 159 mc. enemy Very good. 

radar. 

19 Feb. 074-8K Noise Own forces adjusting Fair 

jammers. ... . ■* . 

20 Feb. 0715K Noise Ovm forces adjusting Very good. 

jammers. 



J-1 



ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIKA CAMPAIGN 



Date Tine Type of Jamming A pparent Tactics Effectiveness 

21 Feb. 0355K Noise Jamming observed from Fair, could 

bearing of cur force, still read 
possibly resulting through, 
from erroneous report 
of enemy radar 

4. PUBLICATIONS 

(a) At the time of departure from PEARL HARBOR of Com 
PhibGrp ONE, Change TWO to CentComTWO and PAC-71 had net been 
made effective. Some of the ships in company did net have calls 
assigned in the old Annex B of CentComTWO, and as a temporary ex- 
pedient, spare voice calls were assigned for use during passage. 
While enrcute, on 21 January, two dispatches were received, one 
promulgating the effective date cf Change 2 and PAC-71 as 3 Feb- 
ruary, and the other stating that these publications were effective 
within Task Force 51 as cf 23 January. This Movement Task Group 
(52.11) was a part of Task Force 51, and therefore the now pub- 
lications, including voice calls and shackle code, were effective 
within the movement group. Upon arrival at ULITHI, it was then 
necessary tc use the old calls and old shackle with other ships 
present, and at the same time use the nev/ ones with the ships of 
Task Force 51. On the 24th, promulgation was made by ComFvvdArea 
that Change 2 and PAC-71 would become effective on 3 February; 

on the 25th, CincPoa OpPlan 11-44 and ComFIFTHFleet OpPlan 13-44 
were made effective on 26 January, the latter providing for use of 
new publication. Use of Change 2 and PAC-71 by ships present at 
ULITHI was confirmed on 26 January by visual. oeaeagQdjg. all ships 
present by ComFIFTHFleet. On the 30th, CincPoa message was re- 
ceived, directing delay of effective time of shackle key list 
until 3 February. To avoid confusion at ULITHI, it was necessary 
for ComFIFTHFleet tc send another all ships message that CentCom 
TWO Change 2 was effective locally. 

(b) The difficulties in providing for every situation 
are recognized; and tho above situation is outlined so that in 
the future further consideration can be given tc the conditions 
existing at large fleet anchorages in forward areas when putting 
into effect now publications having general usage. 

(c) Annex A to CentComTWO provides a method for referring 
to frequencies "in the text of despatches and elsewhere by one 

of the letters" followed by designating numbers and letters.; 

This method does not seem to be universally accepted. For; example, 



J-2 



ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIM CAMPAIGN 



certain channel numbers are prescribed by Cor.EsCarFor for VHF 
radio channels, differing from "D8 POA Aircraft VHF Channel 
Designation" contained in the insert on page A42 of annex A to 
CentComTV/O (Change 2) . Also, Task Force 51 Communication Digest 
for Control Vessels, Small Craft, Beachmasters and Shore Parties, 
on page 37 lists "Amphibious Task Force Frequencies listed in 
order of Channel Numbers", which are the channel numbers of Table 
B4- on page A21, Annex A, CentComTWO Change 2. However, this method 
docs not conform to the prescribed method described on first page 
of Annex A. It is recommended that a table cf Channel Numbers 
bo prepared and included in a Change to CentComTWO, so that all 
frequencies will be given one channel number and so that there 
will be uniformity of designating such radio channels among all 
the Task Units. 

5. RADTO 

(a) The Radio Frequency Plan for this operation was 
well conceived and functioned satisfactorily for this Task Force 
(TF 52) during the pre-D-day period. The Communication Plan cf 
Task Force 51 was considered sufficient, and therefore no separ- 
ate additional plan was issued by CTF 52. 

(b) On the whole, circuit discipline was very good. 
However, continued command control is essential and daily stress 
must be laid on the vital necessity cf each operator conforming 
to proper radio discipline and each commanding officer exercising 
active control of the circuits. 

(c) At one time during the few days at ULITHI, circuit 
discipline on the Fleet Common (34-. 8 mcs) became very bad. Un- 
authorized transmissions, particularly at night, of music, ob- 
scenity, etc., became so prevalent that it was necess-ry for 
ComFIFTHFleet to promulgate an all ships messages directing the 
suppression of unauthorized transmissions by direct officer 
supervision, and that the Commanding Officer or Watch Officer 
must retain personal custody of the microphone where no CWO was 
available. This directive reduced, but did not eliminate com- 
pletely, the objectionable transmissions. More active indoctri- 
nation of all radio operators (including coxswains and boat crews 
of small boats) is essential; they must be made to realize that 
the cluttering of this important warning circuit may result in 
failure by themselves to receive a vital warning when needed most. 



ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF 




(d) Particular commendation is due tc Task Units $2.5.1 
and 52.5.2 consisting of LCI(L) 627 and LCl(G)'s for the consis- 
tent excellence of their communications. Without exception, they 
answered up promptly when called, and traffic to and from then 
moved accurately and expeditiously. 

(e) More instruction is needed for voice operators. 
It is not enough for radio operators to know the Radiotelephone 
procedure, but all individuals ( officers and enlisted men other 
than radiomen), who use the microphone on radio circuits, must 
study and practice in order that they ray use correct procedure. 
Many do not seem tc realize that correct procedure is designed 
for accuracy and speeding up traffic handling. Among the more 
common errors may be listed the following: 

Use of both Roger and Wilco. 
Use of Over and Out. 

"Go Ahead" instead of "Send your message". 
"Repeat" instead of "Say again." 
"Error Error Error" instead of "Correction." 
Failing tc speak slowly and distinctly. 
Omitting time group needed later for reference. 

An excellent practice, which should become doctrine, is to write 
the message before it is given to the operator to transmit. Like- 
wise, all incoming messages should be written. TJie increasing 
use tactically of voice radio circuits requires adherence to- 
standard procedure, as many voice transmissions are now of more 
than momentary concern and require future reference and action. 

(f) Training of radio operators in a general way is 
essential, but not enough. To make a complicated radio plan work 
under the stress and strain of an operation, it is absolutely 
necessary that the operators obtain training in the actual use 

of the calls and frequencies specified for use in the operation. 
This creates a real problem, where training is scheduled for for- 
ward areas, and in locations where danger of intercept by the 
enemy is real. However, intercept by the enemy is relatively 
less important, because sufficient training must be made available 
to permit our circuits tc function and produce the communications 
which must be used in the operation. Therefore, it is recommended 
that radio silence restrictions on rehearsals and training circuits 
be modified, so as to permit training by all personnel rath the 
actual frequencies and calls contained in the cemmupteaMJBfc plan 
for the operation. Obviously the training *£tou$ft ue%]lJyJ| luper- 
vised, and it is suggested IM prevision be.ia^o^tc 



*a i* |f 3 #~ - ' |j| 

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS., HI THE IT70* J jfLt CAiI'AlGN 



radio traffic of similar nature on the sane frequencies at par- 
ticular locations (such as ULITHI) before and after departure of 
the Fleet units. 

(g) The need for a tactical voice circuit for each task 
group continues to be apparent. It becomes acute when several 
large dispositions are attempting to maneuver in the sane area, 
and the Fleet TBS circuit becomes overcrowded. Transport groups 
can easily use their respective Transport Group Common Frequency 
(on SCR 608) if the accompanying screen is able to receive and 
transmit on that frequency. It is recommended that high priority 
be given to equipping escort type vessels with SCR 608 equipment 
so that they may so operate with whatever transport group they 
may be assigned. 

(h) Japanese transmissions have been observed on a 
number of our frequencies. It is believed that this results 
simply from the fact that the Japanese use many of the same- 
frequencies as v/e. Only one instance (On Haiku Fox frequency) 
was noted where Japanese transmissions appeared to be intentional 
jamming. 

(i) Maintenance of radio silence at staging point in 
forward area was facilitated by the use of Radio Teletype to the 
shore (on VHF) . During the period at ULITHI, there were nc trans- 
missions on any normal ship-shore frequency. Necessary opera- 
tional traffic was passed to the shore radio station for point 

to point circuits, by means cf officer messenger or VHF radio 
teletype. All traffic of less than OP precedence v/as flown from 
ULITHI to Radio GUAM. 

(j) Reception of Fleet "foxes" v/as much better during 
this operation than in the PAIAU operation. One point deserves 
additional study, - the increasing need for decryption of traffic 
not addressed to all who need to know. There were several instances 
when we obtained dispatches, addressed in the heading to ethers, 
whereas in the text CTF 52 was included in the addressees. In 
order to keep abreast of the current operation, it has been 
necessary to decipher more than 80 percent of -,he Fleet Fox 
transmissions, a fourth of Yjhich were of no concern to us. There 
seems to be an increasing tendency to expect all commands to ob- 
tain necessary information by "snooping", i.e. decipherment of 
all traffic to other addressees which may appear to directly con- 
cern the decrypting ship. It is recommended that the principle 
be adhered to, that the originator is res> onsible for inclusion 
as action or information addressees all who need to know, and that 



ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF-£PERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



commands decipher only those dispatches in uhich they are addressed 
in the heading. To avoid multitudinous information addressees, 
it is recommended that further study be given to providing collec- 
tive calls to fit the particular operation in process of planning. 

6. VISUAL 

(a) Visual signalling was excellent. Visual silence 
was observed from sunset to sunrise, during which time limited 
number of operational dispatches was handled by Nan equipment. 

In cruising dispositions, the chain of visual responsibility con- 
formed to conventional usage and permitted effective use of Nan 
equipment at night, particularly for 2000 position reports. In 
a large fleet anchorage, such as ULITHI, the value of Nan equip- 
ment is not so great, because of distances involved and lack of 
knowledge of exact bearing of addressed ships. We have not 
found Nan equipment to be effective beyond ab.ut 6,000 yards 
range. It is considerably slower than daylight signalling, and 
should be reserved for important opera ticnal traffic, letting 
routine administrative traffic wait for daylight methods. 

(b) An all-around visual signalling light would be a 
great help for flagships in a fleet anchorage or at the objective. 

(c) The division of ULITHI anchorage into twenty areas 
of visual responsibility with assigned linking ship in each, was 
effective in improving visual signalling. Without this arrange- 
ment, visual signalling was almost impossible, distances between 
ships being at times ten or twelve miles with many ships betv/cen. 

(d) Use of semaphore at short distances has been stressed, 
but a very small percentage of messages were handled by that 
method. The princix^al moans of visual signalling was the twelve 
inch light, but on many occasions, both while cruising and while 

in objective area, it was necessary to use the twenty-four inch 
light to reach distant addressees. 

(e) While remaining in the objective area at night, 
the flagship displayed its X-12 Nan beacon (pulsating) for pur- 
poses of identification. Other ships were authorized to do 
likewise. On the first night, the TWIGGS (DD) was attacked by 
an enemy plane which she shot down. The TWIGGS suggested that 
the attacking plane may have been aided by a leaky Nan beacon, 
which may have been damaged during the day by shock of gunfire. 



ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN 



7. TgS 

(a) The TBS on primary frequency was reserved for 
tactical and emergency use, and discipline on this circuit was 
very good. While cruising, the TBS circuit was necessarily used 
for radar reporting by radar guardships not equipped with VHP 
oquipment for transmitting on 14-2.02 mcs. At a fleet anchorage, 
such as ULITHI, it is essential to use TBS at times for logistics. 
However, the load was lightened by directing ships having a dif- 
ferent type common VHF frequency to use that in preference to 

TBS (APD»s 37.2 mcs., LCI(G) 1 s 38.7 mcs., etc., but this band 
could not be used from 1000 to 1500 local time daily). These 
circuits were authorized for use only when visual would not 
suffice . 

(b) TBS number 2, while at ULITHI and when directed 
(via TBS No. 1) while cruising, was used for MCW transmissions 
on secondary frequency with ships having two equipments. The 
use of the fleet anchorage was limited to Flag Officers, battle- 
ships and cruisers. It functioned effectively, and permitted 
the handling of traffic beyond the immediate area over shore sta- 
tion point to point circuits (ships delivering traffic on MCW 
TBS socondary to flagship, which relayed by VHF Radio Teletype 

to the shore station). This use ?/as invaluable. It is recommended 
that similar use be standard practice at fleet anchorages when 
large numbers of ships are present at times when radio silence 
on lower frequencies is essential.